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Abstract: It is widely felt that the sorts of ideas current in modern Iaterality and split-brain research are largely without precedent in
the behavioral and brain sciences. This paper not only challenges that view, but makes a first attempt to define the relevance of older
concepts and data to present research programs.
In the 19th century, there was a body of literature that held that many mental pathologies could be explained by supposing that
each individual potentially had two conscious brains. Madness resulted when these begin to interfere with each other or otherwise
functioned independently. The left-sided localization of language by Broca in the 1860s complicated matters by showing that the two
brain halves functioned differently. Broca argued that functional asymmetry was a reflection of man's capacity to "perfect" himself;
soon, the left hemisphere was transformed into the superior, uniquely human side of the brain. Considerable effort then went into
seeing how far the functions of the right hemisphere complemented those of the left. The resulting dichotomies of mind and brain
interacted - and sometimes also conflicted - with "duality of mind" theories. In the 1880s, the Paris school of neurology helped bring
about a revival of interest in these theories with its startling metalloscopy and hemihypnosis experiments.
A section of this target article is devoted to the views of Hughlings Jackson. Jackson's physiological/philosophical writings on
hemisphere specialization and mental duality largely set him outside of the rest of the 19th-century tradition. The article concludes
that at least some of the data gathered in the 19th century might prove useful or interesting to certain investigators today. More
important, it asks how far an awareness of the "time-bound" nature of 19th-century concepts should change the way in which one
surveys the Iaterality scene today.
Keywords: aphasia; Broca; cerebral dominance; consciousness; history of neurology; hypnosis; Jackson; Iaterality; mental duality;
split brain
For the past 15 years or so, the behavioral and brain
sciences have been fascinated with the duality and asym-
metrical functioning of the human brain. Does severing
the corpus callosum result in two "conscious entities"
within a single individual (Sperry 1968)? Does the age-old
tendency for societies to dichotomize human experience
reflect the fact that, in the human species, "there are two
types of thinking generated in the same cerebrum"
(Bogen 1969)? Has Western society, with its emphasis on
logical thinking and language skills, overdeveloped its left
hemisphere at the expense of the intuitive, holistically
oriented right hemisphere, whose functions are claimed
to be far more developed in the cultures of the Orient
(Ornstein 1972)? Does the new research cast light on the
neurology underlying certain dynamic unconscious
processes described by Freud (Galin 1974)? What are its
implications for attempts by philosophers to reconcile a
personal, mentalist view of human consciousness with an
understanding of human beings as biological systems
(Nagel 1979; Puccetti 1981)? What does it mean for our
understanding of personality differences (Bakan 1969), oi
differences in the cognitive capacities of the sexes
(McGlone 1980; Witelson 1976)? Can we find in this
research a clue to the problem of the origins of con-
sciousness (Jaynes 1976)? Does it tell us anything about
the biology of mental illness (Marin & Tucker 1981), the
means by which the soul interacts with the body (Eccles
1976), or the original source of neurosis in the phylogeny
of the human race (Janov & Holden 1975)?
Underlying much of the present excitement is a wide-
spread feeling that we are pushing back frontiers that
earlier generations had never suspected existed, that the
sorts of ideas being propounded today are largely without
precedent in the behavioral and brain sciences. Benton
(1972:8) tells us, for example, that the 19th century
essentially ignored the right side of the brain, believing it
to have "no distinctive functions," but to be "merely a
weaker version of the left." Puccetti (1981) affirms that
the history of speculation about mental duality in relation
to man's double brain "is very brief indeed," with Wigan
(1844) being the first to propose that each man might in
fact have two conscious brains in his skull, and Bogen
(1969) being the second; this hiatus, Puccetti believes,
gives "some idea of the popularity" of the concept.
Here and there in the modern Iaterality literature one
does find some partial correctives, some indications that
the last word has not been said on 19th-century ideas
about the double brain, and that there is a gap in the
historical record (see, e.g., Zangwill 1974; Oppenheimer
1976; and esp. Harris 1980). To date, however, there has
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been no attempt to come to terms in a comprehensive
manner with the relevant literature, and no systematic
effort to define the precise relevance of that literature for
researchers working in the field of laterality today. This
essay offers an initial attempt to meet both objectives.
We begin with the basic conviction that the history of
science is more than "a kind of paperchase of ideas back
through the ages" - that authors and their linguistic
vocabulary must be set in their true historical setting, and
that the historian must constantly be aware of how the
meanings of words and ideas change their shape and color
over time, so as to adapt to new circumstances and new
needs (Stone 1981:86-87). Before one can grapple with
the question of the 19th century's relevance, then, one
needs to understand it on its own terms. The chief
interest of the work to be outlined here lies not in the fact
that it somehow harbored "premonitions" of this or that
aspect of 20th-century thought on brain duality, or that it
prophetically anticipated one or another modern finding
about hemisphere differences. The point is a rather more
subtle one concerning how a historical perspective on
modern laterality research might be important to scien-
tists interested in the place of their own work in the flow
of human ideas.
1. The early case for "duality of mind" (pre-
Broca period)
Since the earliest days of physiology, feeling had been
strong that the seat of the soul's operations would have to
be some unitary organ that could be regarded as corre-
sponding to the unity of the soul's experienced con-
sciousness. As the view gradually gained ground in the
17th and 18th century that the workings of the soul were
intimately correlated with the workings of the brain, the
almost perfect bilateral symmetry of the latter structure
severely limited the number of appropriate spots. Thus,
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was forced to choose the tiny
but centrally located pineal gland as the site of the soul's
actions; Francois Gigot de la Peyronie (1678-1747)
granted the honor to the corpus callosum; still others
opted for the septum lucidum or the central ventricle.
Little by little, however, it became clear that these
medial organs had little or no immediate connection with
consciousness. The phrenologists, led by the Austrian
anatomist, Franz Joseph Gall, were among the first early
in the 19th century to take the growing body of facts as
they found them and boldly map human consciousness
onto the convolutions of the two cerebral hemispheres.
Gall taught that each of the phrenological "faculties"
existed in duplicate - one in each hemisphere - so that
each side of the brain could in the end serve as a complete
organ of the mind, just as a single eye can serve as a
complete organ of sight. As the phrenologically oriented
French neurologist, Jean Baptiste Bouillaud, put it in his
1825 Traite: "We have a double intelligence: an intel-
ligence on the right and an intelligence on the left"
(Bouillaud 1825:264).
Although there was no absolute agreement on this
issue, most phrenologists were inclined to suppose that
any disorder that upset the perfect symmetry and
presumed simultaneous functioning of the two hemi-
spheres would have the effect of disordering the faculties
involved. Here the phrenologists were joined in their
opinion by certain others who, while rejecting Gall's
mosaic model of the mind, were nevertheless prepared to
accept the brain as the organ of the mind. Thus one finds
the idea beginning to be entertained that certain forms of
insanity may result from incongruous or independent
action of the two hemispheres.
As early as 1747, the radical French materialist, Julien
Offrey de la Mettrie (1709-1751), described the uni-
lateral madness of Pascal, for whom "madness and
wisdom each had its compartment or its lobe, the two
sides separated by a fissure" (la Mettrie 1747:120). In the
beginning of the 19th century, America's first psychia-
trist, Benjamin Rush (1745-1813), wondered whether
cases of somnambulism where patients seem "to depend
upon two minds" could be ascribed "to all the mind
being, according to Dr. Gall, like vision, a double organ,
occupying the two opposite hemispheres of the brain"
(Rush 1981:670). The Edinburgh phrenologist, Hewitt
Watson, in his 1836 "What Is the Use of the Double
Brain?" also felt that "two-fold personality," as well as
"many cases of insanity" might be explained by assuming
pathological dissociation between the two hemispheres.
In 1838, the pioneering French alienist, Jean Esquirol
(1782-1840), spoke of a form of madness in which a man
becomes "the homo duplex of St. Paul and Buffon,
impelled to evil by one motive, and restrained by the
other." He attributed this "lesion of the will" to "the
duplicity of the brain, whose two halves, not being
equally excited, do not act simultaneously" (Esquirol
1838:363). In 1840, Sir Henry Holland (1788-1873) - the
fashionable London doctor who became physician to
Queen Victoria - similarly suggested in his "On the brain
as a double organ" that "some of the aberrations of mind,
which come under the name of insanity" - especially
sinning against knowledge and desire - might be due to
"incongruous action" of the brain's two hemispheres.
(Holland 1840:184-86).
Of all the advocates for a relationship between madness
and disordered action between the two hemispheres,
however, none was more fervent or far-reaching in his
claims than the early-19th-century British doctor from
Brighton, Dr. Arthur Ladbroke Wigan. Wigan's master-
work, A New View of Insanity: Duality of Mind, was
published in 1844 near the end of the author's life. In it,
he set out to prove that "each cerebrum [hemisphere] is a
distinct and perfect whole," capable of independent
thought and independent volition. In the healthy brain,
one of the two hemispheres is almost always superior in
power, and exercises control over the volitions of its
fellow. In cases of disease, however, where "one cere-
brum becomes sufficiently aggravated to defy the control
of the other," insanity can set in as the two hemispheres
pursue independent courses, their separate wills strug-
gling against each other, their separate thoughts jumbling
together. The only way to prevent or control distressing
cases such as this is through "a well-managed education"
which serves to "establish and confirm the power of
concentrating the energies of both brains on the same
subject at the same time" (Wigan 1844:26-30).
Wigan was enormously proud of both the profound
originality and the profound importance of his "duality of
mind" thesis, likening it to Harvey's discovery of the
circulation of the blood, and contemplating consequences
618 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1985) 8:4
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00045416
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:15:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Harrington: History of lateralization
following its establishment more conducive to the hap-
piness of mankind even than those apt to follow from
vaccination and the electric telegraph. In essence, he was
convinced that he was laying the groundwork for a "moral
physiology" (p. 102) which, for the first time in human
history, would allow the existence of "moral evil in the
world" to be understood, and steps taken for its scientific
control and prevention. In his hands, brain physiology
became inextricably interwoven with the ethical values of
early Victorian society.
Wigan's book was reviewed by the British phre-
nologist/mesmerist, John Elliotson, in Zoist (1847).
Elliotson attacked the author savagely for his unwar-
ranted claims of absolute originality, his dismissal of
phrenological doctrine, and his self-aggrandisement. He
also pointed out that if, as Wigan argued, a person
requires two brains to do two things at once, "he ought to
require several brains when he does several things at
once, and a countryman walking the streets of London,
using his stick, talking, hearing, and staring as he
proceeds, could not dispense with fewer than five" (p.
233). An anonymous reviewer in the Journal of Psycho-
logical Medicine ([Review of] "New View of Insanity,"
1848) called Wigan's inquiry "novel" but as yet "sub
juclice" (p. 30). Forbes Winslow, whose own writings
would later make a strong impression on such men as
John Hughlings Jackson, was convinced that Wigan was a
genius who had discovered "great psychological truths."
"Generations may roll away ere a just appreciation will be
made of the suggestions contained in his celebrated
treatise on the 'Duality of the Mind" (Winslow
1849:497).
2. The discovery of asymmetry
2.1. Challenge to the "laws of symmetry"
The early advocates of duality of mind all took it for
granted, of course, that the two hemispheres of the brain
were functionally identical. The overturning of this view,
with the discovery that the "faculty of articulate lan-
guage" exists only on the left side of the brain, occupies a
peculiar place in the early history of neurology. Initially,
the fact that lesions causing speech disorders almost
always had their seat in the left hemisphere only was seen
as an unexpected - and thoroughly unwelcome - com-
plication to the effort being made by Paul Broca in the
early 1860s to localize speech in the frontal lobes. Never-
theless, by the end of the 1860s, the asymmetry problem
had forced a transformation in the way neurologists re-
garded higher mental functioning in the human brain and
in how they sought to measure man's worth in the scheme
of things.
As is well known, the association between speech
disorders and damage to the left cerebral hemisphere
actually seems to have been noticed first by an obscure
French country doctor, Marc Dax, in 1836. In more than
40 cases involving speech loss without paralysis of the
articulatory organs, Dax had noticed left-brain damage,
but he had been unable to find a single case that involved
damage to the right side of the brain alone (Dax 1836).
Dax's work was not published during his own lifetime,
but it was brought to the attention of the Academie de
Medecine in 1863 by his son, Gustav Dax. It was in that
same year that Broca - having already determined that
articulate language seemed to have its chief seat in the
foot of the third frontal convolution of the brain (Broca
1861a; 1861b) - also first began to struggle with the
problem of asymmetry (this coincidence of dates has led
some historians to speculate that Broca might have known
of Dax's work, although he himself always denied it; see
Souques 1928; Joynt & Benton 1964). On April 2, Broca
reported on eight new cases supporting a localization of
speech in the third frontal convolution, and he then went
on to note how remarkable it was that, in all these cases,
the lesion had been on the left side. "I dare draw no
conclusions," he said, "and I await new facts" (Broca
1863:202).
But the peculiarity of the coincidence continued to
trouble him, and he urged his colleagues to search for a
"counter-proof"; that is, some case of aphasia involving
the right frontal lobe rather than the left. By July 1863,
however, when no such case had been unearthed, he was
forced to concede that it might soon be "necessary to
admit that the faculty of articulate language is localized in
the left hemisphere" ("Atrophie" 1863:380-81).
Broca was painfully aware that an asymmetrical lo-
calization of language would represent a virtual "subver-
sion" of French physiological teaching of the time, still
strongly guided by the work of Marie Francois Xavier
Bichat (1771-1802). Bichat, a brilliant young physician
whose vitalistic orientation profoundly influenced
French physiology up to the time of Claude Bernard, had
also established what came to be called the "laws of
symmetry." These laws were derived from Bichat's
distinction between organs that serve "organic life" and
the passions (organs of digestion, respiration, circulation,
generation), and organs that serve the life of "external
relations" and understanding (the cerebral hemispheres,
sensory organs, arms and legs). The latter organs, Bichat
taught, are found in symmetrical pairs because the orga-
nism must be able to relate to the external world with
both sides of its body. The two parts of each of these pairs
necessarily function identically and in unison (Bichat
1805).
2.2. Toward a new paradigm of brain functioning
The challenge to Bichat's "laws of symmetry" crystallized
finally in 1865, in the wake of a report on Dax's work by L.
F. Lelut, one of the members of a commission assigned to
evaluate the old doctor's ideas in 1863. Judgment had
been swift and harsh: Not only was the asymmetry
hypothesis ridiculous, but the idea that mental faculties
could be localized anywhere in the brain was phre-
nological hogwash, and not worthy of serious scientific
attention. Bouillaud - who had been defending the idea
of cerebral localization, and especially Gall's frontal lo-
calization of language for some 35 years - was naturally
incensed. His reply to Lelut in the spring of 1865 touched
off a passionate debate on the "faculty of articulate lan-
guage" that would last for more than three months and
can be considered - as Riese (1947:326) has argued - the
climax of the early history of aphasia. Although discussion
was far from limited to the asymmetry problem (and
indeed, Broca's more recent work attempting to localize
speech in the third posterior convolution received far
more attention than Dax's paper), when the question of
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asymmetry was raised, tempers grew hot. There was a
widespread feeling that, not only did the idea contradict
all physiological teaching, but it was patently absurd, an
insult to the wisdom of Nature. As Paul Briquet indig-
nantly put it,
Would it be possible for the right eye to see only blue,
black, and red, while the left eye would be made for
seeing only green, yellow, and blue? Could the right
ear hear in music nothing but do, re, mi, fa, and the left
ear sol, la, ti? Would one make the right nostril for
smelling pleasant odors, and the left for the nasty ones?
- and for the tongue, similarly, have it taste sweet
flavors on the right side only, and acid ones on the left
side? ("Discussion" 1864-65:714. Cf. Bateman
1890a:408; Schiller 1979:192)
Then, on April 4, 1865, Bouillaud ("Discussion" 1864-
65:543) suggested to the Academie de Medecine that
perhaps an asymmetrical localization of language would
not be so absurd as everyone was saying, for it was not
without precedent in human physiology. Were there not
certain acts for which we normally - even exclusively -
employ our right hand in preference to our left? Would it
be absolutely impossible, then, that for certain mental
functions, such as speech, we similarly favor our left
hemisphere? Riese (1947:331) has said that Bouillaud's
words here mark the "birthday of the doctrine of left
cerebral dominance," in that the link between right-
handedness and left-brain speech was made for the first
time. In fact, there is nothing in Bouillaud's remarks to
suggest that he was advocating a causal link between
handedness and speech asymmetry; he seems, rather, to
have simply been drawing an analogy. Indeed, Bouillaud
tended to think any unilateral theory of language localiza-
tion highly improbable (Soury 1899:592). There is good
reason to believe that, at the debates, he was in some
sense exploiting Dax's work for his own purposes - using
it as an excuse to promote his strongly held views on
frontal lobe language localization.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a causal connec-
tion had been made by the time Broca stood up before the
Societe d'Anthropologie in 1865 and declared that "the
majority of men are naturally left-brained [for speech];
and that exceptionally some people, those we call left-
handers, are on the contrary right-brained" (Broca
1865:383). It is crucial to realize, however, that these
words were not intended to represent a radical subver-
sion of Bichat's "laws of symmetry." Broca was forced in
the end to account for the clinical data, but he proved
unwilling to undermine the foundations of French
physiology.
He argued, then, that Bichat had been essentially
right: There were no innate functional differences be-
tween our two hemispheres. The asymmetry of language
localization was simply due to the fact that - as the
anatomist, Pierre Gratiolet, had shown (Gratiolet and
Leuret 1839-57, 11:241-42) - the left frontal lobe of the
cerebrum grows a bit in advance of the right. Func-
tionally, the two lobes begin identically, but physically
(perhaps, as would be later argued, because of unequal
blood flow), the left is the more precocious side. In
childhood, then, when we must master the complex
intellectual and motor skills that characterize civilized life
- articulate speech being preeminent among them - we
tend to rely upon our slightly more robust frontal lobe,
and thus we educate it to the exclusion of the other (Broca
1865:393).
This proposal of Broca's that functional asymmetry is
due to the impact of education and civilization upon the
human mind is remarkable for the way it discovers a
virtue in necessity. From being a physiological absurdity,
functional asymmetry was suddenly declared "one of the
principal traits of the human brain" (Broca 1869:392), a
reflection of man's capacity to lift himself by his own
efforts beyond mere animal existence into a civilized,
human state (see Berillon 1884:10; Ball 1884:35; Bastian
1880:400; Delaunay 1874). Because the effects of educa-
tion upon the brain were believed inheritable (see le Bon
1879), it was also argued that the more motivated races -
those capable of what Broca (1860) called "perfectibility"
or continuing self-improvement - would tend to develop
brains that were more and more asymmetrical as time
went on. It is not surprising, therefore, that by 1869
Broca "had been able to assure" himself that asymmetry
was less pronounced in the brains of Negroes than in
those of whites (1869:393). Similarly, the French biolo-
gist, Gae'tan Delaunay, argued that women's brains were
less asymmetrical than those of men, resembling in that
respect the brains of savages and young, uneducated
children (Delaunay, 1874). This idea was still being
echoed as late as 1903 by the influential Italian crimi-
nologist, Cesare Lombroso, who proposed as well that
"born criminals" lack the asymmetrical nervous system
that marks a man of morality and civilization (see also
Marro & Lombroso 1883). In short, under Broca, asym-
metry not only became a distinguishing mark of humanity
in general, but a means of distinguishing the "better"
vintage segments of mankind from the substandard (cf.
Gould 1981).
It is important to realize that the anatomical evidence
for the claim that language asymmetry arises from devel-
opmental differences between the brain's two frontal
lobes was inconclusive at best. Broca (1875), attempting
to fortify Gratiolet's work, reported having found in a
series of studies that the left frontal lobe in man weighs an
average of 4 grams more than the right. An earlier,
extensive study made in England by Robert Boyd (1861)
had found the left hemisphere in general heavier than the
right by £ of an ounce. In contrast, John Thurman (1866)
found a tendency for the right hemisphere to outweigh
the left, and in Germany, Ecker (1868), concentrating on
the developmental aspect of the problem, was able to find
no significant asymmetry at all. Part of the disparity
between many of these findings can probably be blamed
on poorly controlled measurements - as one researcher
(Thurman 1866:4) admitted, "in dividing [the hemi-
spheres] . . . it is difficult to cut always in the exact
median."
2.3. From asymmetry to left-brain superiority
Broca never ceased to insist that these so-called nutri-
tional differences between the two hemispheres in no
way implied that the left hemisphere is congenitally
endowed with the capacity to learn language in some
special way denied to the right hemisphere. This is why
he could propose that, in certain cases of injury or disease
to the left side of the brain, the right side could step in and
shoulder at least some of the duties previously handled by
620 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1985) 8:4
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00045416
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:15:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Harrington: History of lateralization
its heartier twin. This came to be known as the doctrine of
cerebral substitution, and it went a long way toward
making Broca's third frontal convolution resistant to crit-
icism on clinical grounds. It was now possible for a patient
injured in that region to suffer little speech defect, or to
recover more or less completely from any defect original-
ly experienced - all without calling the fundamental
correctness of Broca's localization work into question. In
such a situation, the potential for dogmatism was very
real.
Nevertheless, as the century progressed, the original
interpretation of asymmetry taught by the Broca school
would undergo a subtle but significant mutation. In-
creasingly, the injunction that asymmetry pure and
simple was what counted - rather than the Ze/if-sidedness
of the asymmetry - was forgotten. This is understand-
able; it must have been easy to lose sight of the details of
Broca's argument, and to focus simply on the remarkable
fact that left-brain damage produces speech loss, while
right-brain damage does not. At the same time, the strong
Lamarckian element in 19th-century French evolution-
ary thought would rapidly have tended to blur any initial
distinction between left-brain superiority acquired by
individual cultivation and left-brain superiority as part of
man's unique native endowment.
New developments in the history of cerebral localiza-
tion doubtless also played an important role in encourag-
ing a tendency to see the left-sidedness of cerebral asym-
metry as an essential factor in the equation. In 1870,
German physicians Gustav Fritsch and Eduard Hitzig
applied galvanic currents to the cortex of laboratory dogs
and demonstrated the existence of "motor centers" in a
part of the brain traditionally held to be inexcitable. The
superiority of their electrical method of localizing over
the old use of experimental lesions attracted almost as
much attention as their actual findings. Other neu-
rologists, notably David Ferrier (1876) in England, hailed
the Fritsch and Hitzig method as a technological break-
through and adopted it to continue the search for both
motor and sensory centers in the brains of various labora-
tory animals. It soon became clear that all these centers
were bilaterally represented. Simultaneously, new
clinical studies were increasingly reinforcing the idea that
most or all of the higher "intellectual" functions associ-
ated with human beings had their seat in the left hemi-
sphere alone.
This well-documented phase in the history of aphasia -
which will occupy us only briefly here - opened with the
work of the German anatomist, Karl Wernicke, who, in
1874, published his classic paper arguing for a rela-
tionship between "sensory aphasia' (loss of receptive
speech capacity) and damage to the left temporal lobe.
"Word deafness" as such had been described by Charlton
Bastian in England as early as 1869, but it had not
previously been linked to a specific anatomical locus. In
the wake of Wernicke's work, the number of discrete
symbolic disorders associated with discrete lesions of the
left hemisphere proliferated. Eventually, some
neurologists took the further step of combining all the
new findings into a single theoretical framework, based
upon principles borrowed from the old "associationist"
psychology (these were the "diagram makers" later con-
temptuously described by Head [1926]). Hugo Liep-
mann's (1900) description of apraxia perhaps represents a
crowning piece of evidence for a view of the left hemi-
sphere as the superior, uniquely human side of the brain.
From a variety of evidence, Liepmann had been led to
conclude that the left hemisphere predominates in volun-
tary, purposeful acts (although not quite to the same
degree as existed in language); he later came to believe
that the activity of the right hemisphere was under the
guiding influence of the left. It is hard to avoid the
conclusion that some metaphysical will was here being
localized in the left side of the brain. One is not surprised
to learn, then, that Liepmann "saw in left cerebral domi-
nance the major part of man's superiority when compared
with the animal" (Riese 1947:334).
The belief in the special development of the left hemi-
sphere's frontal lobe also contributed to the tendency to
exalt that brain half, for the frontal lobes were widely
regarded at this time as the site of human reason and
intelligence. Gall had argued that all the intellectual
faculties unique to man were located in the anterior part
of the brain, and that a man was intelligent in proportion
as the frontal part of his brain was more developed than
the parietal and occipital parts (Soury 1899:514). Accord-
ing to Soury (p. 599), Gratiolet had called the frontal lobes
the "flower of the brain" and believed them to be es-
pecially developed in the white European races; only
thus could one account for the "sovereignty of mind" that
had enabled these races to build a world empire. Broca,
Magnan, Ferrier, Wundt, Bianchi, Schule, and
Mingazzini all in one fashion or another regarded the
frontal lobes as the chief source of understanding, will,
attention, and consciousness (Soury 1899:515, 519, 917).
It seems, then, that - for those who accepted Gratiolet's
claims - the left hemisphere may have gained part of its
good reputation by association.
3. Dichotomies of mind and brain
Although it is quite true that the left hemisphere was
increasingly seen as the superior side of the brain -
predominating in most or all higher mental and moral
activities - it is not true that the "other side of the brain"
(to use Bogen's term) was ignored. Indeed, a considerable
amount of effort went into trying to see how the functions
of the right hemisphere might be seen as complementing
those of the left. (See also Table 1.)
3.1. Anterior versus posterior functioning
Comparisons of the two sides of the brain took their point
of origin from the fact that Gratiolet not only had argued
that the left anterior lobe grew in advance of the right; he
had equally made the case that the right posterior
(occipital) lobe grew in advance of the left, so that in the
end a kind of balance was achieved between the two sides
of the brain. Broca, having seized upon the first part of
this passage from Gratiolet to account for language asym-
metry, did not neglect the second part either. In 1866, he
reported on the work of a German osteologist, Hans Carl
Barkow, who had found a tendency in a number of human
skulls for the frontal region to be slightly more
pronounced on the left side, and the posterior region
slightly more pronounced on the right side (Barkow
1864). Praising the exactness of Barkow's results, Broca
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Table 1. Dichotomies
19th century dichotomies (with selected references)
Left hemisphere Right hemisphere References
Anterior Posterior
Humanness Animality
(Broca 1866;
Roques 1869)
(Bourru & Burot
1886-87; Broca
1869; 1877;
Myers 1886)
Motor Activity Sensory activity (de Fleury 1872;
Exner 1881)
Intelligence Emotion/sensibility (Brown-Se'quard
1874a; Luys
1881b)
"Life of relations" The "organic life" (Brown-Sequard
1870; 1871;
1874a)
Reason Madness (Luys 1879;
1881a; Montyel
1884)
Male Female (Delaunay 1874;
Klippel 1898)
White superiority Nonwhite inferiority (Delaunay 1874;
1878-79)
Waking self "Subliminal" self (Manacei'ne 1894;
1897; Myers
1885)
Objective Subjective (Crichton-Browne
1895; Jackson
1880-81; Ver-
ity 1870)
20th-century dichotomies (after Springer & Deutsch, 1981)
Left hemisphere
Verbal
Temporal
Digital
Rational
Western thought
Abstract
Objective
Realistic
Intellectual
Right hemisphere
Nonverbal/visuospatial
Simultaneous
Analogic
Intuitive
Eastern thought
Concrete
Subjective
Impulsive
Sensuous
then mentioned that he had had the opportunity to
confirm them himself on two series of twenty brains, male
and female respectively. All this new evidence made him
increasingly confident that Gratiolet had been right, and
that there is "a sort of compensation between the weight
of the two frontal lobes and the two occipital lobes" (Broca
1866:196). Three years later, these alleged front-
al/posterior differences between the hemispheres were
given an explicitly functional cast, with the reported
finding that the left frontal lobe was more abundant in
gray matter than the right (gray matter being seen as the
"stuff" of intellect), while the right occipital lobe was
more abundant in gray matter than the left (Roques
1869:728).
Perhaps surprisingly, there was little or no considera-
tion of the idea that a more developed right occipital lobe
could mean particular right-sided involvement in certain
visual tasks. It is true that John Hughlings Jackson would
argue, beginning as early as 1864, for the existence of
special "visuo-perceptive" functions in the right hemi-
sphere, but (as will be seen) his claims were not based
specifically on a view of the occipital area as "visual
cortex." Berlin physiologist Hermann Munk in fact did
not localize his "visual center" in the occipital lobes until
1879 (correcting David Ferrier's earlier localization in the
supramarginal and angular gyrus). In a paper published in
1895, an American physician from Philadelphia, Th.
Dunn, also suggested that there might exist "a centre
(which may, for convenience, be named the geographical
centre) on the right side of the brain for the record of
optical images of locality, analogous to the region of Broca
for that of speech on the left side in right-handed persons"
(Dunn 1895:54). Dunn's views, however, were similarly
not based on a consideration of any possible anatomical
differences between the two occipital lobes but were
derived from clinical observation.
The fact that the possibility of special right-brain visual
capacities was mostly overlooked - again - does not mean
that the right side of the brain was ignored altogether. If
the anterior lobes were identified with human intel-
ligence and reason, the posterior lobes were equally seen
as the site of the passions and instincts. Even if Broca had
not already cast suspicion on the right hemisphere, then,
by implying that it is permitted to remain in an unedu-
cated, half-savage state, the reputation of that side of the
brain would doubtless have suffered from its association
with posterior-lobe functioning. Thus it was argued that
the right hemisphere plays a predominant role in
sensibility, emotion (passion, criminal impulsiveness),
and activities related to vegetative, instinctual life - in
this sense, neatly complementing the intellectual ac-
tivities of the left hemisphere.
3.2. Intelligence versus sensibility and passion
It would be wrong, though, to make it seem as if precon-
ceived notions about posterior- versus frontal-lobe func-
tioning were alone responsible for such a lateralized view
of brain functioning. It became known, beginning in the
1870s, that there were cortical sensory centers located
predominantly in the posterior regions of the brain, and
motor centers in the frontal regions. The Viennese phys-
iologist, Sigmund Exner (who would later serve as
Freud's university instructor in physiology), compared
motor and tactile representation in the human brain for
various parts of the body and came to the conclusion that
motor representation was both more intensive and exten-
sive on the left side, while sensory representation was
more intensive and extensive on the right side (Exner
1881:64-65). In France, Armand de Fleury (1872:840)
had similarly concluded that, all other things being equal,
left-brain damage tended to cause disorders of move-
ment, while right-brain damage was much more
frequently associated with disorders of the sensibility.
In 1881, Jules Bernard Luys - a neuroanatomist who
had done important work on the thalamus, and a physi-
cian at the Salpetriere and Charite in Paris - published a
paper arguing for an "emotion" center in the right hemi-
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already established in the left hemisphere. He had been
struck by the fact that there seemed to be definite and
consistent personality differences between his patients
suffering from right hemiplegia and those suffering from
left hemiplegia. Whereas the former, he said, were
"more or less apathetic, more or less silent, passive and
stricken with hebetude," the latter were peculiarly
emotional (they sobbed, but their tears seemed unmoti-
vated and rang hollow) and suffered from manic-like
symptoms and delusions of persecution. Luys (1881b) felt
that these affective abnormalities might be explained on
the hypothesis that some normal inhibiting center for
emotion in the right hemisphere had been destroyed by a
lesion supplementary to that responsible for the left
hemiplegia - a lesion which he had tentatively localized
in the temporal area of the brain.
The case for a special right-hemisphere role in sen-
sibility and emotion was also given an important boost by
repeated observations that hysterical disorders - above
all, the characteristic anaesthesias that Charcot had chris-
tened the "stigmata" - tended to manifest their symp-
toms unilaterally on the left side of the body (implying,
according to French theory at the time, a "functional"
lesion of the right hemisphere). Paul Briquet's (1859)
Traite clinique et therapeutique de Vhysterie - a book
which served as a point of departure for Chareot's view of
the disease - noted that hysterical hemianaesthesia had
been observed three times more frequently on the left
side than the right, and hysterical hemiparalysis was
found by later researchers to follow a similar pattern
(Richer 1881:530, 552). Brown-Sequard (1874a: 14) exam-
ined 121 cases of hysterical hemiplegia and found a ratio
of 4:1 in favor of the left. Richer went so far as to call
hysteria's predilection for the left side of the body "Char-
cot's rule, " although he warned that there were several
exceptions. That the rule was widely accepted into the
early 20th century can be seen from the number of
authors cited by the British psychoanalyst, Ernest Jones,
in a 1908 article that claimed to refute the old belief that
hysteria favors the left side of the body.
3.3. "Life of relations" versus the "organic life"
Brown-Se'quard (1874a: 10) argued that, whereas the left
hemisphere was primarily concerned with communica-
tion and intellectual activity, the right hemisphere served
chiefly in "the emotional manifestations, hysterical
manifestations included," and in "the needs of the nutri-
tion of the body in various parts." He proposed that the
two sides of the brain might thus be characterized accord-
ing to Bichat's old division of animal existence into "the
life of relations" on the one hand and the "organic life" on
the other. His belief in the right-brain's special "organic"
or "nutritional" activities was primarily based on com-
parisons of symptoms produced by organic lesions of the
left and right side of the brain. He claimed that various
"troubles of nutrition" - bedsores, oedema, pulmonary
congestion, involuntary evacuation of faeces and urine -
more frequently accompanied right-sided lesions than
left, and that physical symptoms from right-brain lesions
generally were more severe and apt to result in death
than left-sided ones (Brown-Sequard 1870, 1871; but see
the contradictory conclusions by de Fleury 1872). Rele-
Harrington: History of lateralization
vant to his argument, perhaps, was the curious claim
made by the German physiologist, Budge, that the "cere-
bral centre for the movements of the stomach" was on the
right side of the brain; irritation of this side causing the
stomach to move, while irritation of the corresponding
parts on the left side of the brain produced no effect
whatever (Brunton 1874:18).
It should be pointed out that, although he studied the
problem of hemisphere functional differences, Brown-
Sequard did not believe these differences to be innate,
but rather a consequence of improper childhood training.
"If we have two brains," he demanded before his Ameri-
can audiences in 1874, "why not educate both of them?"
(Brown-Sequard 1874a:l; see also 1874b). Brown-Se-
quard even went so far as to deny that one side of the
cortex controls sensation and movement on the opposite
side of the body; each hemisphere, he felt, is a complete
brain, not only for intellectual tasks as the other "duality
of mind" advocates believed, but for full (bilateral) motor
and sensory functioning as well. He pointed to cases in
which there had been loss of an entire brain half without
lasting interference to sensation and movement, and he
presented experimental evidence to show that disabilities
following unilateral lesions were merely due to "inhibito-
ry action" from other parts of the brain. Although he
made some converts, his radical antilocalization views
were not generally well received, and they brought him
into conflict with such leading neurologists as Charcot
and Ferrier. Nevertheless, like a prophet scorned but
true to his vision, he continued to argue his case well into
his old age (see, e.g., Brown-Sequard 1887, 1890).
3.4. Reason versus madness
The post-Broca years also saw a rise of the idea that the
right side of the brain was a natural breeding ground for
madness. If madness is a loss of all civilized standards of
reason and morality, a reversion to prehuman, brutish
behavior (as late-19th-century alienists were inclined to
believe); and if only the left half of our brain is properly
civilized, then it becomes possible to envision the "brute
brain within the man's" (the phrase is Maudsley's) as lying
on the right side of the skull. In 1879, Jules Bernard Luys
became the first to argue implicitly along those lines with
his declaration that, in the insane, the natural disparity in
weight between the hemispheres is increased to patho-
logical proportions - and "completely reversed." Instead
of the left lobe slightly outweighing the right as (he
believed) in the sane, "nutrition" is guided in the
opposite direction so as to favor the right hemisphere.
(Luys 1879:554).
Two years later, Luys (1881a) published the results of
an examination he had carried out on 55 brains of persons
judged insane at death; the right lobe was said to
outweigh the left in 71% of them. Montyel (1884), whose
later sample of 89 brains excluded cases of general paral-
ysis (which he felt were an exception to the rule), pushed
the figure up to 81%. Corroborating data on 400 brains
had been published across the Channel by Crichton-
Browne (1878), but was contradicted by the earlier data of
Boyd (1861), which were still considered relatively au-
thoritative. The question of a link between the right brain
and madness continued to be debated throughout the
century (see, e.g., Lyon 1895); indeed, in 1887, Montyel
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would go so far as to declare (rather grandly) that, ever
since Luys had published his 1881 statistics, it "had not
ceased to be the order of the day."
3.5. Mate versus female
The belief in the right hemisphere's evolutionary
inferiority that had led naturally to its associations with
madness was also the fundamental inspiration behind
certain arguments linking it to the female mind, and the
left hemisphere to the male mind. In 1874, Gae'tan
Delaunay, a French "comparative biologist," published
what was to become quite an influential medical disserta-
tion entitled Biologie compciree du cote droit et du cote
gauche. He argued - and his dissertation cites a number
of authors who apparently concurred - that the dif-
ferences between the two sides of the brain were analo-
gous to, and responsible for, the differences presumed to
exist between male and female brains (not to mention the
brains of nonwhites and small children). That Delaunay
was no mere aberration but spoke for a recurring dimen-
sion of 19th-century thought on the problem of hemi-
sphere differences is suggested by the fact that, as late as
1898, a French physician could still write: "The terms
'male hemisphere' and 'female hemisphere' should ren-
der rather well the differences in the nature of the two
brains, of which one, more intellectual, is more stable,
and of which the other, more exciteable, is also more
rapidly exhausted" (Klippel 1898:56-7). It is interesting
that, once one has given the two hemispheres sexual
identities, the idea of cerebral dominance becomes a
rather apt metaphor for the social and economic domina-
tion of men over women in 19th-century Europe.
3.6. Biological superiority versus biological inferiority
In the early 1880s, Delaunay was busy at the Salpetriere
carrying out a series of studies (all published in the
reputable Lancette Frangaise) designed to show that the
right hemisphere did indeed predominate in inferior
individuals, and the left in superior ones. He claimed to
have found, for example, that "evolutionarily advanced"
individuals (men, whites, the educated classes, and
generally all people of French origin) tended to direct
themselves toward the right in walking, owing to their
highly developed left frontal lobes. Individuals at an
"inferior" level of evolution, on the other hand (women,
nonwhites, children, the lower classes, aged persons, and
sometimes - in these politically sensitive years after the
Franco-Prussian War - Germans), tended to direct them-
selves toward the left. Similarly, superior individuals
tended to rotate toward the right ("In France, in all our
national dances, we turn to the right"), and to cross their
right legs over their left, thus sitting predominantly on
their left buttocks. Inferior individuals, in contrast, tend-
ed to rotate toward the left, and usually crossed their left
legs over their right (Delaunay 1879, 1883, 1884).
One of Delaunay's most interesting and best-known
studies along these lines involved an attempt to relate the
alleged different evolutionary levels of the two hemi-
spheres to alleged differences between dreams produced
on the left side of the brain and dreams produced on the
right side. Unilateral dreaming was solicited by having
the subject sleep on his left or right side, so as to alter
blood flow to one or the other side of the brain. Delaunay
claimed that the right hemisphere's dreams were gener-
ally illogical, richly sensorial (owing, presumably, to the
right brain's more developed posterior area), often
concerned with distant memories, and apt to be night-
marish. Left-brain dreams, on the other hand, were
considerably less absurd and more intelligent, were con-
cerned with recent events rather than reminiscences, and
often contained a considerable amount of conversation -
not surprisingly, because (of course) the faculty of articu-
late language was on the left (Delaunay 1882).
3.7. Waking life versus sleep and dreaming
Late in the century, Marie de Manaceine, a (woman!)
psychologist from St. Petersburg, performed some
experiments that she took to mean that the left
hemisphere was primarily concerned with waking exis-
tence, while the right was especially involved in sleep
and dreaming (what this meant for Delaunay's left- versus
right-brain dreams is not clear). In a series of experiments
performed on 52 subjects, Manaceine found (1897:140-
41; also 1894) that tickling a sleeper's face on the right side
of the median line always caused him to brush at himself
with his left hand, even when he was lying on his left side
and the action of that hand was impeded. Significantly,
left-handed people (of which she had a small sample)
always brushed at their faces with the right hand, even
when the left was lying free. "These facts," Manaceine
believed, "may be explained on the hypothesis that the
most active cerebral hemisphere is resting during the
hours of deep sleep." This same conviction that the left
side of the brain is the side of waking life, with the right
being more involved with the subconscious mental pro-
cesses of sleep, would ultimately lead Frederick Myers to
conclude that the "subliminal self was probably pri-
marily focused in the nondominant hemisphere (Myers
1885; see also Section 4).
3.8. Left versus right hysteria
Pierre Janet, educated in the doctrines of the Charcot
school (though keenly aware of its failings), was familiar
with the statistics indicating a prevalence of left over right
hysteria and saw no reason to question the truth of this
physiological "rule." At the same time, he did not ignore
the fact that at least £ of all cases of unilateral hysteria were
right-sided, and in his 1898 Nevroses et idees fixes, he
even stated his belief that hysterical mutism and aphasia
tended to occur in conjunction with right-sided anaesthe-
sias and paralyses, but rarely with left. It seemed to him
that this association (which, he noted, others had also
remarked upon) had relevance for any attempt to deter-
mine the relationship between hysterical ailments and
organic ones. In 1899, then, he undertook a systematic
study of the case records of 388 hysterical patients in an
effort to see whether there was any consistent rela-
tionship between the side of the body afflicted with
permanent anaesthesias and paralyses and the other sorts
of ailments suffered by the patients.
His statistics revealed a few interesting trends. As he
had predicted, there was a significant tendency for
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language-related disorders to occur in conjunction with
right-sided hysteria. Somnambulism, fugue, and attacks
of pathological sleep were found to be significantly more
frequent with left hysteria (lending credence to the right
hemisphere's image as inward-looking and hypersen-
sitive); difficulties with mobility occurred most fre-
quently in conjunction with right hysteria (in conformity
with the idea that the left hemisphere was more intensely
concerned with motor functioning than the right). The
statistics offered no support to the widespread view that
the left hemisphere was more or less exclusively involved
with intellectual functioning (a fact Janet himself pointed
out). Nor did "nutritional" disorders appear to be differ-
entially lateralized, notwithstanding the views of Brown-
S6quard. In the end, Janet himself was most personally
struck by the finding that respiratory disorders were 10
times more frequently associated with right hysteria than
with left. He ventured to suggest that there might exist a
certain rapport between the more voluntary levels of
respiration and articulate speech, making for a more
pronounced cortical representation of the former on the
left side of the brain (Janet 1899 [the name F. Raymond -
Janet's supervisor - appears as coauthor of this study, but
such use of joint signatures was only a formality; see
Ellenberger 1970:341]).
4. Revival of interest in "duality of mind"
(post-Broca period)
The historian's attempt to make sense of the late-19th-
century effort to compare and characterize the two hemi-
spheres of the brain is complicated by the fact that this
same period saw a dramatic revival of interest in the
argument that the two hemispheres might function inde-
pendently. The fact of asymmetry, and the perceived
structural and functional differences between the two
brains - particularly the left-sided localization of lan-
guage - were widely seized upon as evidence in favor of
the duality of mind and brain. As Brown-Sequard
(1874a:5) put it in 1874, "the very fact that the loss of
speech depends on a disease of the left side of the
brain . . . is extremely important in showing that the two
sides of the brain may act independently of each other."
The new wave of interest in duality of mind actually
began just before the discovery of asymmetry, with the
publication in 1860 of Gustav Theodor Fechner's (1801-
1887) Eleniente der Psychophysik. The Swiss naturalist,
Charles Bonnet (1720-1793), had demonstrated that,
when segmented worms were cut into two or more
sections along the line of segmentation, each piece
continued to maintain an independent existence, with
the full range of behavioral responses appropriate to its
species. This proved, Fechner felt, that unity of mind was
dependent upon the anatomical integrity of the nervous
system. If one could split a person down the center, and
maintain the psychophysical activity of both halves, one
would in the same way see the "doubling of a human
being." Each of our hemispheres, then, was capable of
supporting a mind on its own; nevertheless, it was easier
when the burden was shared between two hemispheres
equally. "The two brain hemispheres can be compared to
two horses pulling one wagon . . . If one [horse] is re-
leased, the wagon proceeds with more difficulty, or if it
still goes at the same rate because the one horse pulls
more strongly, it endures a shorter distance" Fechner
1860:536).
Later, the German pessimistic philosopher, Eduard
von Hartmann (1842-1906), would betray the influence
of Fechner with his argument (1869:118) that, "because
separate material parts give separate consciousness," the
human brain - with its two distinct halves - produced two
separate streams of conscious mental activity. Our sense
of unified identity was illusory, he argued, and simply
due to the fact that the commissures connecting our two
hemispheres mingled the two streams of consciousness
into one. If one could join the brains of two men by a
similar "bridge of conduction," they too "would no longer
know themselves as two Egos, but only as one Ego, as my
two cerebral hemispheres also only know themselves as
one Ego. "
When one moves from philosophy to psychiatry, spec-
ulation comes thick and fast and is too vast to permit
individual analysis. Taken as a group, the psychiatric
duality-of-mind literature is best understood as a part of a
much larger reaction by a self-consciously naturalistic,
materialistic medical community to what Ellenberger
(1970) has called "the discovery of the unconscious."
These were years that saw a fascination with a whole
range of phenomena that, in one fashion or another, were
seeming to point to the presence of "two minds" operat-
ing within a single individual. The rise of spiritualism -
with its "spirits" speaking through entranced mediums -
had led the way. Then, new hypnosis studies had begun
to demonstrate how it was possible to create new (and
often more intelligent or interesting) personalities in the
trance state of which the waking self retained no memory.
By 1880, divided or double personality had become one
of the most widely discussed disorders of the 19th cen-
tury; two of the most famous instances - Mary Reynolds
from the United States and Dr. Azam's Felida from
France - would be copied from book to book and circu-
lated for decades. Meanwhile, a view of man as a chron-
ically divided soul was finding wide currency in the
literature of the time (Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde being only the most famous example).
Medical men living in this environment began to see
two minds struggling against each other in all sorts of
mental pathologies which an earlier age might have seen
quite differently: cases, for example, in which patients
suffered violent and motiveless swings of mood; in which
voices carried on a dialogue with a patient, or echoed all
his thoughts back at him; in which the patient was
haunted by some hallucinated "other person"; in which
an extravagant delusion was maintained on one subject,
while the patient continued to exhibit perfectly sound
reason and judgment on all other subjects; in which the
patient was actually aware that he was suffering from a
delusion or a pathological impulse and struggled against
his affliction (partial insanity, or la folie lucide). The
double brain was an appealing way for medical men to
recast all these supposed examples of mental duplicity
into materialistic (and thus, by the logic of time, scientific)
terms. For some, the metaphor was so compelling, the
isomorphic mapping of "selves " onto brain halves so neat,
that the relative paucity of hard physiological evidence in
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individual cases often failed to deter them (for representa-
tive works, see Huppert 1869, 1872; Luys 1879 [repub.
1888]; Descourtis 1882; Ball 1884; Berillon 1884;
Maudsley 1889; Ireland 1891).
4.1. Two brains/two opposing personalities?
As has been mentioned, Broca's asymmetrical localiza-
tion of language was seen as important new evidence for
Wigan's old argument that the brain's two hemispheres
may function as independent organs of thought. At the
same time, Broca's work should have suggested that an
important revision of the old argument was in order. So
long as the two sides of the brain were believed to
function identically, physicians were free in accounting
for cases, say, of double personality indifferently to dele-
gate a "self to each hemisphere. Now, however, it seems
that if one still wished to claim that morbid independent
action of a man's two hemispheres could turn him into
some sort of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, then one would
have to argue further that Jekyll would tend to express
himself from the educated, civilized, left side of the brain,
and Hyde from the uneducated, passionate, right side.
Luys came close to taking this position in his proposal for
"reversed dominance" in the insane, but it is not clear
whether he ever firmly integrated his views on right-
brain madness with his views on brain duality and duality
of mind. Can one, then, find evidence for the existence of
a truly "post-Broca era" view of brain duality and double
personality?
In 1885, Frederick Myers, one of the founders of the
British Society for Psychical Research, published what
William James (1890, 1:400) called a "highly important"
article on automatic writing, in which he argued (1885:43)
that the secondary or "subliminal" self (which he believed
to exist in each of us) tends to "appropriate the energies"
of the right side of the brain for its activities, while the left
hemisphere tends to be "more immediately at the
disposal of the waking mind." Myers pointed out (pp. 78-
79, 57) that the writing produced automatically by sub-
jects in a trance state or using a planchette (the forerunner
of today's ouija board) was often filled with errors similar
to those produced by aphasic, right-hemiplegic patients
presumed to be relying on their right hemispheres to
write. In both cases, words were often distorted, abbrevi-
ated, and produced in mirror image or backward. The fact
- as the embarrassed Spiritualists were forced to admit -
that "Planchette . . . is sadly given to swear" was seen by
Myers (pp. 44-45) as additional evidence for special
right-lobe involvement in that activity; and he turned
here to Hughlings Jackson's demonstration that aphasic
patients often retain an ability to curse as a means of
"automatic" emotional release, an action which Jackson
believed to be mediated by the right hemisphere.
In the extremely complex case of the multiple person-
ality Louis V., about whom the French alienists Bourru
and Burot wrote (1888), it was found that the patient's
hysterical hemiparalysis and hemianaesthesia could be
"transferred" (a procedure which will be discussed
further on) from the left to the right side of the body and
vice versa. Each transfer was accompanied by dramatic
changes of personality, memory, and education. When
afflicted on his left side (which was presumed to inhibit
the normal action of his right hemisphere), the patient
was gentle, almost timid, and his language was correct
and polite. Turned into a right-sided hemiplegic (thus
inhibiting his left hemisphere), he became violent, ar-
rogant, obscene, and spoke with difficulty "like a child
who is learning to speak," although he was able to read.
Bourru and Burot (1888:127) concluded that "Louis V.
directed by the right hemisphere is a different individual
than the Louis V. who corresponds to the left hemi-
sphere. The right-sided paralysis only allows the violent
and brutal aspects of his character to appear; the left-
sided paralysis transforms him into a peaceful boy." They
were thus inclined to accept the conclusions that Freder-
ick Myers had drawn from their case; namely, that "the
personality of man is double like his brain; the personality
of the left hemisphere is the good one, whereas that of the
right hemisphere is the evil, the brutal and the savage"
(Bourru & Burot 1886-87:265; see also A. Myers 1885-
86; F. Myers, 1886).
Toward the end of the century, the Scottish physician,
Lewis Bruce (1895), would revive lagging interest in the
argument for a link between double personality and
morbid independent hemisphere action with his "Welsh
case." He had under his observation a patient who alter-
nated between periods in which he spoke English and
was right-handed, and periods in which he spoke a rather
incoherent form of Welsh and only used his left hand. In
the English stage, when "presumably using the left
cerebral hemisphere," he was the "subject of chronic
mania," restless and destructive, yet exhibiting "a fair
amount of intelligence." During the Welsh stage,
"presumably using the right cerebral hemisphere," he
became the "subject of dementia" or advanced "melan-
cholia," was shy and suspicious, sat doubled up in a chair
for hours, and spoke in an almost unintelligible manner.
"I have got Welsh patients to act as interpreters; they tell
me that they cannot understand much of what he says,
but what they do understand is spoken in the Welsh
language." Bruce concluded from these observations that
"in this case the cerebral hemispheres are capable of
individual mental action, and that the mentally active
cerebrum has a preponderating influence over the con-
trol of the motor functions, the patient living two separate
existences during the two stages through which he passes;
the mental impressions received during each of these
separate existences being recorded in one cerebral hemi-
sphere only." (See also Bruce 1897.)
4.2. Objections to later double-brain theories of double
personality
It must be admitted, however, that the above arguments
for a "two brains/two minds" theory of double personality
are somewhat exceptional in the way they take into
account the post-Broca data on differences between the
two hemispheres. A great many late-19th-century
authors paid surprisingly little attention to the complicat-
ing factor of functional asymmetry when implicating the
double brain in double personality. Curiously, the fact
that both of their "selves" could generally speak without
difficulty does not appear to have troubled many people.
For contemporaries, an important objection to the
double-brain theory of double personality arose out of an
increasing awareness that one is "not bound to the
number two in considering the mass of conscious,
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subconscious, and unconscious states that may succeed
one another in our body" (Rosse 1892:187). While it was
admitted that the double brain might be able to account
for some morbid phenomena, it could not stand as an all-
inclusive theory - in cases of triple personality, it was
asked, where is one supposed to locate the third self? (cf.
Ribot 1891:110-11)
The brain-duality hypothesis was also criticized for the
crudeness with which it was often applied. Ribot
(1891:109-13) disdainfully spoke of some authors who
believed that "cerebral dualism suffices to explain every
discrepancy in the mind, from simple hesitation between
two resolves, to the complete duplication of personality."
Though ultimately endorsing a limited theory of hemi-
sphere-independent action in pathology, he pointed out
that "contradictions in the ego . . . are not oppositions in
space (from one hemisphere to the other), but oppositions
in time. They are - to use a favorite expression of Lewes -
successive 'attitudes of the ego.'" In Germany, Wilhelm
Griesinger had not been "inclined to attribute a high
value" to the double-brain hypothesis (cited in Ribot
1891:109), and in England Charlton Bastian (1880:49) also
spoke of the "very doubtful nature" of much of the
evidence offered. Even Bourru and Burot (1888) recog-
nized the limitations of the brain-duality hypothesis in
explaining cases of alternation like that of Felida, and the
artificial provoking of new personalities in hypnosis.
Finally, the double-brain hypothesis of double person-
ality was undermined for some because of uncertainty
regarding the functions of the corpus callosum, the great
median tract of fibers joining the two sides of the brain.
Most advocates of "duality of mind" assumed that the
healthy person experiences a sense of unified identity in
spite of the functional independence of his two hemi-
spheres because the corpus callosum serves as a bridge of
conduction between the two psychic realms. Meynert
and Broadbent both believed (on rather shaky anatomical
grounds) that similar convolutions in the two hemi-
spheres were united by these fibers, in this way uniting
sensation and thought (Bastian 1880:483-85). Hamilton
(1884-85) had also argued for the probable psychic func-
tions of the corpus callosum in 1885, although he had
challenged the Meynert/Broadbent schema.
Nevertheless, there were a disturbing number of cases
on record in which the corpus callosum had been "found
to be entirely wanting, without any mental derangement
or deficiency of intellect. . . and without any manifesta-
tion of a double personality" (Ireland 1886:318; see also
Knox 1875; A. Bruce 1889). Descourtis (1890) tried to
explain the apparent absence of mental "doubling" in
cases involving loss of the corpus callosum by appealing to
the fact that the brain's two hemispheres - with their
almost identical life experiences and hereditary disposi-
tions - would naturally tend to feel and react as a single
personality, even though functionally independent; in
this respect, they resembled the Siamese twin brothers
(this was a common analogy in late-19th-century discus-
sions of the double brain). For William McDougall
(1911:117, 295-96) early in the 20th century, the fact that
absence of the corpus callosum failed to result in any
observable double consciousness seemed cause to
rejoice. To his mind, the materialistic belief that the unity
of personal consciousness is strictly dependent upon the
unity of the material connections of the brain was thereby
refuted - thus chalking up a clear victory for "animism,"
or the belief that mind (or soul) is an entity distinct from
the body.
Liepmann and Maas's work suggesting that normal
communication between the two hemispheres could be
interrupted by damage to the corpus callosum had been
published in 1908 but may not have been known to
McDougall. These German clinicians reported on a right-
handed patient with a callosal lesion who was unable to
follow verbal instructions to write using the left hand.
Nonetheless, their finding had relatively minimal impact
at the time, and it by no means put an end to the
controversy surrounding the corpus callosum and its
functions. Even if it had been widely accepted, it is not
clear that it posed any grave threat to the Cartesian soul
McDougall was so concerned to save. There is no evi-
dence that Liepmann's patient experienced himself as
"two selves," or suffered any break in his subjective sense
of unified identity - any more than do the split-brain
patients of today.
4.3. The "experimental" evidence
4.3.1. Phase one: metalloscopy. Although, as said before,
physiological evidence for "duality of mind" was often
wanting in individual cases, there did exist a body of
literature that purported to offer solid experimental evi-
dence (and quite dramatic evidence at that) demonstrat-
ing in a general way that the brain's two hemispheres can
function independently. This literature represents one
very important reason why duality-of-mind theories did
as well as they did in the late-19th-century (particularly in
France).
The story behind this development began in 1876 when
an elderly doctor, Victor Burq, wrote to Claude Bernard
in his capacity as president of the prestigious Societe de
Biologie of Paris. Burq explained that for the past 35 years
he had been successfully curing women suffering from
hysterical hemianaesthesia by applying metallic discs to
the afflicted side of their bodies. He asked Bernard
whether the Societe would be willing to investigate and
establish the validity of this phenomenon, which he
called metallotherapy (later the term "metalloscopy"
would be used to denote the production of phenomena
using metals, but without therapeutic intent).
Bernard, with commendable open-mindedness,
agreed; he appointed a commission to study Burq's
claims, which consisted of Charcot, Jules Bernard Luys,
and Amedee Dumontpallier. The commissions report a
year later (Dumontpallier, Charcot & Luys 1877) was
enthusiastic: Not only had the genuineness of the metallic
effects been confirmed (there was more doubt about the
long-term therapeutic benefits), but a new finding had
been made in the course of investigation. It seemed that
when sensation was restored to a region on one half of the
body using metals (and soon electric currents and mag-
nets), symmetrical regions on the healthy side lost normal
sensibility. This implied, according to French theory, a
dynamic transference of the responsible "functional"
lesion from one hemisphere of the brain to the other. It
was Dumontpallier who named this phenomenon (with a
banking analogy in mind) the "law of transfer."
Variations on the original discovery followed rapidly. It
was reported that one could bring about a series of
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"consecutive oscillations" in which sensibility would
transfer repeatedly from one to the other side of the body
(Richer 1881:531, 539-40). One of Binet and Fere's
(1885:20) patients subjected to these oscillation experi-
ments complained of a pain first in the right, then the left
side of her head, and she declared: "It's as if there were
doors banging between the two sides of my brain."
Matters were further complicated when doctors began to
declare themselves able to transfer not only hemi-
anaesthesia and (by this time) hemiparalysis, but volun-
tary behavior and intellectual activity as well. This was
called psychic transfer (Binet & Fere 1885; 1887:16-17).
Binet and Fere (1887:297-98) reported, for example, how
one subject was made to write down figures in an ordinary
way with her right hand while a magnet was concealed
near her left elbow. She was able to write only as far as the
number 12 with her right hand before she felt compelled
to stop and switch the pen to her left hand. The figures
she then set down were written in mirror image, and she
had become agraphic with her right hand.
The experimenters themselves tried to take a strictly
biophysical view of all these events, and they stressed
that there was nothing mysterious involved. Burq's
hypothesis, subsequently adopted in one form or another
by most of the others, was that the metals or magnets
acted somewhat like a solenoid, producing a slight elec-
trical current when placed in contact with the skin, which
then acted on the nervous system (see Adler 1880-81).
Brown-Sequard (1887) would later show that the "trans-
fer" of hysterical symptoms had an apparent analogue in
certain experiments he had performed involving "trans-
fer" of organically based disorders from one to the other
side of the body. In spite of the effort to keep explanation
at a no-nonsense, physiological level, however, there was
the inevitable minority opinion that attempted to account
for transfer by a more mystical theory of magnetic polarity
in the human body, reminiscent of that proposed by
Mesmer almost a century before (see, e.g., Chazarain &
Decle 1887-88). Jules Bernard Luys would ultimately
advocate an extreme version of this theory, extended to
include a belief in neo-Mesmeric "emanations" that could
pass between individuals. (Joseph Babinski [1886] also
apparently believed in an emanations theory for a time
and performed some startling experiments to demon-
strate it. He later recanted, however.)
Beginning about 1885, Charcot's rival at Nancy, Hippo-
lyte Bernheim, began a campaign to undermine the
metalloscopy research, arguing (1885) that Charcot and
his workers had unwittingly trained their subjects to
transfer symptoms and produce other phenomena and
had led them to expect that such and such an effect would
occur. At Nancy, where his patients knew nothing of
metalloscopy, he had been unable to produce transfer.
All the metalloscopy findings, he concluded, could be
accounted for in terms of "suggestion." Bernheim's
concept of suggestion has often been criticized as a rather
facile explanation, because it is an unanalyzed term and
does not explain how "expectation" or unconscious
"training" could have brought about the wide range of
physiological alterations and cures to which the Paris
workers were witness. Nevertheless, as Janet (1925:11,
797) put it, "the effect of [Bernheim's] . . . criticisms was
that of a thunderbolt," leading to dissent within Charcot's
ranks, and a widespread feeling among outside observers
that the whole experimental enterprise had somehow
been a cheat. Janet believed that "the metallotherapists
could and should have defended themselves. They ought
to have asked for a more precise definition of the term
suggestion; and when an agreement had been
reached, . . . they should have been ready to abandon
the phenomena which obviously belong to the field of
suggestion thus defined, while going on to enquire
whether there was a residual group of phenomena
which . . . were still worthy of examination. But before
they could have done this, they would have had to enter
the domain of psychological science, which seemed to
them difficult and repugnant. They preferred to throw up
the sponge."
4.3.2. Phase two: Hypnotizing the double-brain. Before
the decision was made to "throw up the sponge," how-
ever, Burq's metallotherapy had managed to play a crit-
ical role in arousing Charcot's interest in hypnosis, and it
had contributed importantly to the development of the
Salpetriere view of hypnosis as a physiological phe-
nomenon, an artificially induced state of hysteria consist-
ing of three distinct stages - catalepsy, lethargy, and
somnambulism (Charcot 1882). Most important, for the
purposes of this study, one also finds that the interest in
the possibility of functional hemispheric independence
aroused by the phenomenon of transfer was now carried
over into this new hypnosis research.
Charcot and Richer (1878) recorded how Gabriel
Descourtis, then an eleve du service at the Salpetriere,
was responsible for the original idea of trying to hypnotize
the brain's two hemispheres separately. This turned out
to be a rather simple procedure. A patient could be
plunged into the first stage of hypnosis - catalepsy - by
the normal physical means (a bright light, a sudden noise,
etc.). As it was held that shutting the eyes stimulated the
second phase of the trance - lethargy - one here varied
the procedure and only shut one eye, in this way presum-
ably affecting only the hemisphere on the contralateral
side (though of course the anatomical reasoning here was
faulty). The experimenters declared that the patient im-
mediately became lethargic, but only on the side of the
body that corresponded to the shut eye. The patient
remained in a state of catalapsy on the other side and was
thus hemicataleptic and hemilethargic at the same time
(p. 970).
In Germany, Rudolf Heidenhain (1880), Grutzner, and
O. Berger (1880) had also - and in apparent ignorance of
the French work - begun to experiment with a form of
hemihypnosis (Hall 1881), but no one else came close to
matching the virtuosity of the French in this endeavor.
Richer (1881:371) reported how hemilethargy and hemi-
catalepsy were induced in a patient and then transferred
from one side of the body to the other. One could also
induce hypnosis in a patient, it was said, breathe on one
half of his forehead while sheltering the other half with a
screen, and cause only half his brain to awaken; Luys
(1890:141) remarked on the "cold-blooded" manner with
which patients then noticed that they were "cut in two."
It was even claimed that one could command a hypno-
tized patient to read aloud or write, and then induce a
sudden onset of aphasia by altering the trance state of the
left hemisphere. Because similar right-lobe manipula-
tions were said not to disturb speech, this last was offered
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as new evidence - in vivo - of Broca's left-sided localiza-
tion of language (Ballet 1880) and attracted a considerable
amount of attention in France and abroad (for a critical
appraisal, see Bateman 1890a:335-42).
According to Dessoir (1887:544), however, it was
Dumontpallier who "was the first to show in a decisive
manner that the duality of the cerebral system was proved
by these hypnotic phenomena." Duinontpallier's experi-
ments (1882, [& Magnan] 1883, [& Be>illon] 1884), in
which he induced independent and different hallucina-
tions simultaneously in his patients' two hemispheres,
caused a considerable stir in the scientific community,
attracting the admiring notice of such illustrious French
scientists as Pasteur, Chevreul, Milne-Edwards, Brown-
S6quard, Henry Bouley, and Paul Bert (Berillon
1899:11). In one study, for example, a subject's face was
said to express horror on one side and contentment on the
other as one hemisphere hallucinated an attack by dogs,
and the other enjoyed a country fete (Dumontpallier &
Magnan 1883). Paul Bert, recently elected president of
the Society de Biologie after Bernard's death, declared
before a session of the Societe" in June 1884 that Dumont-
pallier's demonstration that hypnosis can divide a man in
two and create a double individual was the only true
innovation to have emerged from the new studies of
hypnosis, the only fact the old magnetizers had never
suspected (Berillon 1899:13, 1884:185-86).
Jules Bernard Luys (1890b: 126-27, 129-30) at the
Charite" hospital believed himself to have produced not
only a doubling of the intellectual faculties as Dumont-
pallier had, but a doubling and polarization of emotional
experience as well. Using magnets, he said, joyful feel-
ings could be made to migrate to one side of the brain and
feelings of despair to the other, while in the exact middle
there would appear a line of experimentally induced
indifference. He also managed to elicit contrary emotions
in his subjects by pressing certain substances sealed in
glass tubes to first the left, then the right side of their
neck. This work, it must be said, was considered suspect
and eccentric, even by contemporaries, and in the end it
helped rob him of a good part of a scientific reputation it
had taken him some 40 years to acquire.
All the double-brain experiments, however - even the
less extravagant ones of Charcot, Dumontpallier,
BeVillon, and others - ultimately fell into disrepute, one
of the victims of the wide-ranging Paris/Nancy dispute
over the nature of hypnosis and hysteria, from which the
latter was to emerge more or less triumphant. Doubt was
also thrown upon the studies for anatomical reasons.
Because the French hemihypnosis relied upon a method
of presumed cerebral manipulation via the retina, the
assumption had to be that all the fibers of one eye's optic
tract pass from the retina to the opposite hemisphere.
Physiology in the 1880s was still not clear on this point.
Although it was correctly believed by most that the fibers
cross partially at the chiasma and that was all (as Wallaston
had argued long before), Charcot had suggested (1875)
that there is an additional crossing of the fibers in the
corpora quadrigemina that makes in the end for full
decussation. This view was criticized by Ferrier, Michael
Foster, and others in England. Some German and
French physiologists, on the other hand (including
Brown-Sequard), took a third view and held that actually
complete decussation of the human optic nerve takes
place at the chiasma, in the same manner as had been
shown for a variety of other, lower species (Bateman
1890a:339-40,1890b:292-94; Olmsted 1946:147-49). By
the time the issue was settled in favor of Wallaston and
the English school, however, the double-brain hypnosis
vogue had already more or less died a natural death.
4.4. Miscellaneous applications of the brain-duality
theory
While the argument for hemisphere functional indepen-
dence was used most extensively in theories of mental
pathology, especially double personality and partial
insanity, one also finds it being invoked to account for a
variety of normal mental phenomena. In particular, it was
believed that some brain-duality hypothesis was required
to explain certain aspects of dreaming - those cases, for
example, where a dreamer is carrying on a long conversa-
tion with another person and two distinct trains of
thought are being evolved (Bastian 1880:492); or where a
dreamer finds himself baffled by twists of plot in what is
nevertheless a drama of his own creation (Greenwood
1892); or where a dreamer "puts and solves his own
riddle" (Maudsley 1895:220).
Maudsley (1889:187) felt that paramnesia - the "sin-
gular feeling which almost everybody has had . . . of
having been before in exactly the same circumstances and
having had exactly the same experience" - might be "due
to the instantaneously successive consciousness of the
separately acting hemispheres," a view which had also
been advocated by Jensen (1868) and Huppert (1869,
1872) in Germany and had been long before proposed by
Wigan. In the United States, a physician from Georgia,
R. C. Word (1888), appealed to the double brain to
account for "certain mysterious phenomena . . . which
have hitherto baffled every effort at explanation": mind-
reading and slate-writing. He felt that "under certain
peculiar circumstances one side of the brain may
converse with the other side." In England, the philoso-
pher Robert Verity argued (1870:44) that the duality of
consciousness into subject and object, thinker and thing
thought of, corresponded exactly with the duality of the
human brain, "each duplicate hemisphere being care-
fully separated from the other . . . and yet intercom-
municating with the other through central organs of
unity."
Finally, one finds the argument for hemisphere func-
tional independence being pressed into service as the
basis of a movement early in the 20th century to cultivate
universal ambidexterity. John Jackson, a grammar school
educator from Belfast, was one of the founders of the
British Ambidextral Culture Society in 1903, whose aims
he glowingly described in his book, Ambidexterity or
Two-Handedness and Two-Brainedness: An Argument
for Natural Development and Rational Education (1905).
Although admitting some innate basis for man's "dextral
pre-eminence," Jackson attacked the hard-line nativist
view of functional asymmetry and cited Wigan's claim
that each hemisphere may serve as a "distinct and
perfect" organ of thought. Given proper training, then, it
was possible to foresee a brave new world in which "each
hand shall be absolutely independent of the other in the
production of ANY KIND OF WORK whatever; . . . if
required, one hand shall be writing an original letter, and
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the other shall be playing the piano . . . with no diminu-
tion in the power of concentration" (p. 225).
In the United States, Jackson and his followers were
violently attacked by Gould (1907), who called them
"cranks" and "sillies" and accused them of endangering
the health of schoolchildren everywhere. In England, Sir
Crichton-Browne (whom Jackson dubbed "the English
Goliath of lopsidedness") put the ambidexters in the same
class as those who "are addicted to vegetarianism,
hatlessness, or anti-vaccination and other forms of aber-
rant belief," and he hinted darkly that they were all
destined for "the already over-crowded lunatic asylums"
(cited in Jackson 1909:8). The shrillness of these attacks is
quite striking, and it says something about the extent to
which the post-Broca interpretation of asymmetry as a
sign of superiority and health had gotten under
neurology's skin.
5. The Hughlings Jackson perspective
John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911) is one of the best-
known names in this study (along with perhaps Broca,
Wernicke, and Charcot) and is the only one whose repu-
tation today may be even greater than it was in his own
time. He is also the maverick of this study; his views defy
attempts at assimilation that would not risk misleading or
confusing the reader. This also allows a considerable
amount of space to be devoted to Jackson's thought on
hemisphere differences and brain duality. He had much
to say on these issues and - in spite of the frequent
references to his work in the modern laterality literature
- much of what he had to say has been misunderstood or
only partially appreciated. There is a particular need
today to go beyond both panegyrics and secondhand
reports and begin to take a fresh look at what Jackson's
views on the double brain actually were.
5.1. Dissent from the French 'iaculty" school
In the 1860s, Jackson was one of the very few important
aphasiologists to begin to have serious doubts about the
reality of Broca's speech faculty. Historians (e.g., Green-
blatt 1970, 1977; Engelhardt 1975; Young 1970) have
pointed out that the "faculty" approach to cerebral
localization was essentially foreign to Jackson, who had
been reared in the British philosophical tradition of
associationism. As a student at York, he had been strongly
impressed by the teachings of Thomas Laycock (1812-
1876), who had pioneered the idea that one could account
for all nervous functioning, including that of the brain, in
terms of a reflex principle operating according to associa-
tionist laws. Jackson had also imbibed the writings of such
associationist psychologists as Alexander Bain, George
Henry Lewes, and especially Herbert Spencer. We may
conclude that he ultimately found it impossible to accept
the essentially dynamic view of mental processes implicit
in associationist theory, and at the same time to go along
with an approach that broke up aspects of mind and
spatially localized them as static entities.
Jackson's dissent from the French faculty approach to
language, however, can be even more decisively linked to
his growing puzzlement over the " 'strangeness of this
association' of 'the loss of a purely mental faculty' [i.e.,
speech] with a decidedly physical deficit such as hemi-
plegia" (Greenblatt 1977:424). It soon became clear to
him that he was dealing with an issue that struck straight
at the heart of the mind-body problem. How could one
localize a mental entity within a physical space? The
answer was, quite simply, that one could not. Some 70
years earlier, the philosopher Immanuel Kant had de-
nounced the doctrine of the seat of the soul, pointing out
(in Riese and Hoffs summary, 1950:59, 61) that the soul
"perceives itself only by the internal sense; thus it cannot
assign to itself any place in the body." Motion and
sensation alone, Kant went on to say, admitted "of a
spatial relationship with the cerebral organs."
This was essentially Jackson's conclusion as well. The
only logically possible field of inquiry for physiology was
that of sensorimotor relations. There could be no "phys-
iology of mind," Jackson declared, any more than there
could be a "psychology of the nervous system." Thus, the
explanation for the "strange association" of the loss of a
"mental faculty" like speech with a "physical" motor
defect like hemiplegia lay in realizing that - so far as the
physiologist was- concerned - hemiplegia and aphasia
were both motor disorders, to be understood within a
common framework. Jackson thus took the crucial step of
rejecting the traditional v.ew of the cortex as the terra
incognita of the mind. As Laycock had done before him,
but more speculatively, he proposed instead to extend
the principle of sensorimotor reflex action right up into
the highest cortical centers. This resulted in his develop-
ing a distinctive perspective on the problem of the double
brain, which will be considered in the sections that
follow.
5.2. Unilateral disorders and "sparing"
In an 1878-79 paper on affections of speech, one finds
Jackson paying tribute to the work of a younger English
neurologist, William Broadbent, and acknowledging to
him a "particular indebtedness." "Broadbent's hypoth-
esis - a verified hypothesis - is, I think, essential to the
methodological investigation of affections of speech" (p.
155).
Few today are familiar with the "essential" hypothesis
to which Jackson is referring here, but its effect on
Jackson's thought was profound. In 1866, Broadbent had
proposed an explanation for the rather strange fact that in
hemiplegia - regardless of the extent of unilateral brain
damage - there are always some muscles that are more
severely paralyzed than others. Limbs (especially the
arms and hands) generally suffer the most, whereas the
muscles of the trunk and upper face escape with little or
no weakness. Jackson himself in 1863 had made the
interesting observation that the muscles that tend to be
most severely afflicted in hemiplegia are also those "most
under the control of the will" (cited in Greenblatt
1977:417), though he had been unable to offer a theory as
to why that might be.
Broadbent, however, had noticed something else. He
pointed out in his 1866 article that the parts of the body
that suffer most in hemiplegia are those that are moved
"independently of the corresponding parts of the
opposite side " - that is, they tend to be muscles that are
unilaterally innervated by the contralateral side of the
brain. The parts of the body that are spared in hemi-
plegia, on the other hand, are those that are generally
only capable of being moved "in concert with the corre-
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sponding muscles of the opposite side" - that is, they are
parts of the body that are innervated only bilaterally, or
by both sides of the brain together. The reason, according
to Broadbent (1866), that these latter muscles escape
damage in hemiplegia is that, though they are indeed
normally innervated by the two sides of the brain in
tandem, they are "capable of being excited by either
singly" (italics orig.). Thus, when an individual suffers
unilateral brain damage, the muscles of bilateral use on
the paralyzed side of the body can continue to function
because the undamaged ipsilateral brain half can con-
tinue to call them into service.
Before Jackson could make use of Broadbent's hypoth-
esis, it was necessary that he come to the important
conclusion that it is not in fact muscles that are paralyzed
in cases of brain damage, but movements that are lost
(Jackson 1873). Once that step was taken, Jackson could
propose that, within the hierarchy of the nervous system,
it is the "highest," most "voluntary" movements that are
the first to be lost in cases of trauma; functionally "lower,"
more "automatic" and less specialized movements tend
to be preserved longer. (In Jackson's later conception, the
terms "voluntary" and "automatic" had nothing to do
with some metaphysical "will," but simply referred to the
relative levels in the nervous system of physiological
complexity, flexibility, and independence.)
This done, the importance of Broadbent's observations
for explaining the intriguing relationship between
muscles paralyzed in hemiplegia and muscles "under the
control of the will" became clear. Broadbent's observa-
tions on hemiplegia showed that the hierarchy of the
nervous system is complicated on the level of the brain:
Movements here tend to be represented unilaterally in
proportion as they are voluntary; they tend to be repre-
sented bilaterally in proportion as they are involuntary or
automatic (cf. Gowers 1885:51-53). This is why, in a
unilateral disorder such as hemiplegia, only the most
voluntary movements are lost. Furthermore, because
Jackson believed that the entire nervous system must be
conceived in sensorimotor terms - that one could not
distinguish between "physical" and "mental" functions in
the brain - he saw no reason why the insights gleaned
from hemiplegia should not be valid for another unilateral
motor disorder, aphasia.
5.3. Propositions! and emotional language
Clinical observation, Jackson felt, strongly suggested that
like the hemiplegic, the aphasic loses his most voluntary
(speech) movements but is spared the loss of his more
automatic movements. That is to say, he is generally
severely deficient in the highly voluntary and specialized
capacity to form "propositions" or string together units of
speech to express ideas, but he may often manage to burst
forth with samples of involuntary "emotional speech" -
swearwords, exclamations, and certain types of gestures.
Following Broadbent, this implies that automatic or emo-
tional speech is essentially a bilateral activity and thus, in
the left-brain-damaged aphasic, may be set into motion
by the undamaged right side of the brain. In contrast, the
highly "special" and "educated" movements of proposi-
tional speech are represented only unilaterally in the
brain, like the special voluntary movements of the arm
and hand; thus, these movements are lost when half the
brain is damaged (see Jackson 1868b:358, 1868d:275,
1871:642, 1873:84, 1874a:99; Gowers 1885:126).
Aphasia, of course, differs from hemiplegia in one
crucial respect: the latter can result indifferently from
damage to either side of the brain, whereas the former
almost always results from left-sided damage only. Jack-
son (1866:661, also 1868a:209) accepted the French
anatomical explanation for this curious fact and spoke of
Gratiolet's "statement to the effect that the frontal con-
volutions on the left side are in advance of those on the
right in their development. Hence, if this is so, the left
side is sooner ready for learning. It is the elder brother."
Like Broca, then, Jackson did not believe that language
asymmetry was a consequence of innate functional dif-
ferences between the two hemispheres. Both sides of the
brain, he said, lay down representations for words, but it
is "the left [that] begins to act" first, and therefore it is the
left that becomes proficient in the voluntary language
movements that constitute speech.
The automatic (bilateral or either-sided) functions of
language, however, were not restricted by Jackson to
emotional outbursts but also included the very important
process by which we passively "receive the propositions"
of another; by which we understand language. This was,
Jackson argued, perhaps the most involuntary language
function of all. The process by which words take on
meaning is a strictly deterministic one operating accord-
ing to associative laws. Every healthy English-speaking
person, Jackson (1868c) said, is "compelled" to under-
stand the meaning of, say, the word "horse" each and
every time it is spoken; he is helpless to prevent some
image of the animal from springing to mind. Thus, both
sides of the brain, having the capacity for the automatic
functions "in which words serve," can "understand"
language, though only the left can speak.
Nevertheless (and this point is crucial), although both
sides of the brain can automatically "understand" speech,
Jackson (1876c: 174) held that only the left can go one step
further and become conscious of this understanding; only
the left can ever become "conscious in words." This
aspect of Jackson's thought is explained more fully in the
section on the duality of mental operations. For the
moment, it will suffice to say that the justification for this
claim is bound up with Jackson's belief that only the left
side of the brain is capable of voluntary speech or "propo-
sitioning. " One will recall that Jackson's use of the term
"voluntary" had nothing to do with true free will, but
simply described the physiological functioning of the
highest (but still lawfully determined) levels of the
nervous system. From a psychological perspective, then,
the only difference between a voluntary and an involun-
tary act was that the former was always initially "precon-
ceived" or "represented in consciousness" (Jackson, quot-
ing Spencer 1868b:359, italics orig.). By definition, in
other words, actions could be deemed voluntary if they
were accompanied by consciousness. Conversely, "the
more operations are automatic, the less we are conscious
of them" (1874b:141). This is why Jackson could argue
that the speechless man whose intact right brain could
still (automatically) understand speech - and could there-
fore instantly hand him a brick on command - had no
"memory" of the word "brick," was not "conscious of the
word itself. He has no consciousness of it, but of the thing
it is symbol of- a very different thing" (1874b: 140-41).
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5.4. The functions of the right hemisphere
If the right side of the brain lacks the capacity to be
"conscious in words" (since it lacks voluntary speech),
this is not to say that it is unconscious altogether. The
speechless man has lost his capacity for verbal
consciousness, but, Jackson argued, he remains fully
conscious of things. For Jackson, this suggested that,
alongside the sensorimotor processes underlying speech
and verbal thought, there is a second series of "sensori-
motor processes concerned in the recognition of objects
(not in seeing objects), and in putting images of things in
'propositional order,' so to speak" (1872:514). Partly be-
cause this "other" series of operations seemed unaffected
by left-brain damage, Jackson proposed that it must be
mediated in its most voluntary aspect by the right side of
the brain.
Jackson's direct clinical evidence for his localization of
"object recognition" and imagistic thought in the right
hemisphere was chiefly drawn from only two cases. In
1872, he described a man suffering from a relatively rare
form of left hemiplegia in which the leg was more affected
than the arm. The striking thing about the case was that
this man seemed to have lost his ability "to recognise
places and persons. At one time he did not know his wife,
he gave his watch away, and having wandered from
home, was unable to find his way back" (p. 513). When
Jackson came to describe a second, similar case in 1876,
he called this inability to recognize objects, persons, and
places "imperception," and he argued that it was a defect
"as special as aphasia." It occurred, he believed, as a
consequence of insult to the right-posterior lobe, that
lobe being the "leading" side for object-recognition, and
the left "more automatic." "This is analogous," he wrote,
"to the difference I make as regards use of words, the
right is the automatic side for words, and left the side for
that use of words which is speech" (1876a:148).
Two points must now be made. The first is that Jackson
himself (1872:514) admitted that the clinical evidence for
his conception of "imperception" was "slender." It was
anatomy, rather, that he saw as providing the truly
"strong" support for his views. What was the anatomical
evidence then? It may surprise some to learn that here
Jackson pointed to the claims that had been made in
France for asymmetrical but complementary (left-ante-
rior/right-posterior) development in the human brain.
The uncertain merits of these claims were discussed
earlier.
Why, though, would a more developed occipital area
on the right side of the brain (assuming it really exists)
have been seen by Jackson as strong evidence for his
belief in the special visual-perceptive functions of the
right hemisphere? As noted before, the answer has noth-
ing to do with Munk's "visual center" in the occipital
lobe, and takes us to our second point: Jackson's theories
on the complementary activities of the two hemispheres
seem to have been significantly shaped by certain a priori
convictions, which partly biased the way he interpreted
later data. In the hierarchy of the nervous system, Jack-
son felt that speech represented the pinnacle - the
highest and most voluntary - of all possible movements.
Visual perception, in a similar way, was seen by him as
the highest or most voluntary of all possible sensations. As
early as 1864, then - before he had any conclusive clinical
evidence - he suggested that if it turned out that
Expression had its chief seat in the left side of the brain,
there was "no absurdity" in supposing - on theoretical
and, one is tempted to say, even aesthetic grounds - that
its "corresponding opposite," Perception, might turn out
to have its chief seat in the right side. Jackson's discovery
several years later of the French anatomical argument for
asymmetrical development between the two brain halves
appeared as a valuable confirmation of the correctness of
his original proposal. One is justified in asking, then, to
what extent Jackson's views on right-brain functioning
might be seen as a somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation
of certain (highly inconclusive) anatomical data.
Taking a broad view of what has been summarized so
far, one finds that Jackson's conception of left- and right-
brain differential functioning implies that, in the course of
increasing sensorimotor specialization ("evolution") in
the human nervous system, the motor and sensory
aspects of voluntary mentation have divided themselves
up, so to speak, between the two hemispheres. At the
highest cerebral levels, one no longer finds a strictly
vertical hierarchy of functions, but the beginnings of
evolution along the horizontal axis. The left-anterior
(motor) lobe has become specialized for speech and ver-
bal thought (the most voluntary of movements), and the
right-posterior (sensory) lobe has become specialized for
visual perception and imagistic thought (the most volun-
tary of sensations).
5.5. The duality of mental operations
The right anterior and left posterior lobes of the brain,
then, were held by Jackson to be at a functionally lower
level of "evolution' than their "elder brothers." This is
not to say, however, that these two corners of the brain
were seen as playing no role at all in the sensorimotor
activities underlying speech and perception. Jackson
(1878-79:167) felt that the "energizing" of these lower,
automatic nervous arrangements, "although unattended
by any sort of consciousness, is essential for, and leads to"
the energizing of those higher, more voluntary nervous
arrangements in the left-anterior and right-posterior
parts of the brain, which are attended by consciousness.
In short, mentation is a dual process. During the first
involuntary stage, words and images are revived in vari-
ous ways according to associative laws and are arranged in
"propositional order." The end of this automatic,
preparatory phase represents the beginning of thought in
its voluntary aspect, as words and objects now made into
significant entities or perceived in a meaningful way "well
up" - as if from nowhere - into consciousness (see
Jackson 1868b, 1868c, 1874a, 1876c:73-76, 1878-79,
1880). "It is, I think," Jackson observed (1878-79:168),
"because speech and perception are preceded by an
unconscious or subconscious reproduction of words and
images, that we seem to have faculties' of speech and of
perception, as it were, above and independent from the
rest of ourselves . . . We seem to ourselves to Perceive,
as also to Will and to Remember, without prior stages,
because these prior stages are unconscious or subcon-
scious."
It has been seen that, for Jackson, the speechless man
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continues to understand language "automatically" using
his right hemisphere. It can now be understood that this
is because he has retained the first, automatic, and
unconscious half of his "verbalising" series, which is
bilaterally represented in his brain, and has lost the
second (unilaterally represented) voluntary/conscious
half that is speech (while the duality of his imagistic series
remains intact). In principle, the "imperception" patient
should be in the converse situation, though it is not clear
that the clinical evidence supported Jackson here.
Sometimes Jackson referred to the first, automatic half
of thought as "subject consciousness," and the second,
voluntary half as "object consciousness": "The substrata
of consciousness is double, as we might infer from the
physical duality and separateness of the highest nerve
centers [i.e., the cortex]. The more correct expression is
that there are two extremes. At one extreme, the
substrata serve in Subject-consciousness, at the other
extreme in Object-consciousness . . . Subject-con-
sciousness is not commonly spoken of as consciousness; it
is sub-consciousness bordering in unconsciousness . . .
Object consciousness . . . [is] consciousness commonly
so-called" (1876c:174-76).
Although the terms "subject" and "object" con-
sciousness may seem to introduce an unnecessary
complication into Jackson's "mental duality" theory,
Jackson in fact hoped that they would serve as both a
clarification and elaboration of the simple automat-
ic/voluntary dichotomy. The term "subject con-
sciousness" was meant to describe the psychological (sub-
conscious or unconscious) processes that accompany the
energizings of that level of the brain we call our "self."
Physiologically, the self is to be understood as the "sum-
mation" of all the lower sensorimotor processes in the
nervous system, the "re-representation" of all the parts of
the body as a whole; it has its anatomical locus in the
highest nervous centers possible that do not yet involve
consciousness.
When these centers are activated as a result of some
impression from the environment (or a lower-level inter-
nal stimulus), we as "selves" are naturally altered; physio-
logically we are not the same. Nevertheless, we do not
know that yet. Jackson held that we can become conscious
of changes in our "selves" (in our highest nerve centers)
only indirectly, only in symbolic form. In order to know
(be conscious of) some thought or perception that has
been aroused in us, we must "object-ify" it using words or
images arranged in propositional form; and then we must
"project" that now-symbolized thought outside our "self
so it can be contemplated by that same "self."
Consciousness was thus envisioned by Jackson as a sort
of inner perceiving organ; words and images were the
"stuff" that cloaked otherwise unknowable or invisible
thoughts and let them be "perceived" (Sigmund Freud
would later develop very similar views). Mercier
(1901:503), one of Jackson's followers, wrote: "While
sensations are objects of contemplation by the subject,
yet as they are being received, in the moment of their
reception, they are rather modifications of the subject
than objects of contemplation by it . . . It is only by a
fiction [i.e., by the symbolizing process] that we can bring
them out into the field of object-consciousness for exam-
ination." As Jackson (1887:96) put it: "We may say that
Harrington: History of lateralization
what is commonly called consciousness (object con-
sciousness) is a 'revealing of self.
Jackson applied his theory of mental duality or
subject/object consciousness to a great many (apparently)
widely differing pathologies. Aphasic "recurrent utter-
ances" and "paraphasias" among normal people were
explained in terms of faulty processing from the subjec-
tive (right-brain) to the objective (left-brain) stage of
verbalizing. Delirium was seen as a "dissolution" to what
was normally the first, subjective stage of thought, in
which words and images were revived involuntarily in the
brain following the associative "law of resemblances."
The epileptic "dreamy state" - in which the patient
may experience a sense of deja vu, a vivid dreamlike
revival of memories of former surroundings, or a terrify-
ing sense of loss of personal identity - was defined by
Jackson as a heightening of subject consciousness accom-
panied by a diminishing of object consciousness. The
tendency for patients to describe their experiences as a
feeling of "double consciousness" was, Jackson
(1876b:702) felt, quite proper, because the "dreamy
state" in fact represented a "revelation of the normal
duality of all healthy mental action"; the person being
dimly aware of both the objective and the subjective
stages of his thought processes. Here Jackson was not too
far in his thinking from such men as Wigan and Maudsley,
who argued that the feeling of deja vu might be due to the
"instantaneously successive consciousness" of two inde-
pendently functioning brain halves. Later observations
by Jackson and at least two younger colleagues suggested
that the right hemisphere tends to play a particular role in
the production of "dreamy states," which was somewhat
at variance with Jackson's original schema of double-brain
functioning. Thus, in his Cavendish lecture on "dreamy
mental states," Crichton-Browne (1895:21) was led to call
the right hemisphere "the more subjective of the two
hemispheres of the brain" (Jackson 1880-81; Pick 1903).
6. Conclusion
Were this essay appearing in a history of science journal,
it would require no special justification. For the historian,
the interest of the material surveyed here would be self-
evident. It is not simply in virtue of being a much-
neglected aspect of neuropsychiatric thought that 19th-
century perspectives on the asymmetry and duality of the
brain are of interest historically. The literature, rather,
has much to tell historians about certain tensions and
paradoxes underlying the overall 19th-century attempt to
come to terms with mind and madness in a post-Darwin
world of "atoms and ether" (as William Kingdon Clifford
once put it) with "no room for ghosts." In so doing, it
exposes some of the broad philosophical difficulties inher-
ent in any attempt to lay the shifting boundaries of human
personality out upon the static lobes and convolutions of
the brain, and it sheds light on the way scientific theory
may be molded by sociocultural influences.
This is all very well for the historians, but what has the
subject to offer scientists working in the field of laterality
today? Some modern-day laterality researchers might be
inclined to feel that the opinions of 19th-century writers
on brain duality and hemisphere differences, while
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perhaps interesting, have little or no immediate rele-
vance to present research programs - particularly since it
is so clear that much of that older literature is weakened
by sociocultural influences, philosophical a priori as-
sumptions, and methodological defects.
There are two replies to be made to this sort of
argument. First: It is hardly likely that all the older work
would be judged empirically vacuous by modern stan-
dards, and it is possible that some reports of findings
might prove useful or interesting to certain investigators
today. Would not Galin, Diamond, and Braff(1977) and
Stern (1977), for example, studying the possibility that
conversion reactions (hysteria) are more frequent on the
left side of the body, want to know that data were
gathered on this question throughout the second half of
the 19th century? Is it possible that some of the quite
large body of literature claiming that the right hemi-
sphere tends to outweigh the left in the insane might be of
interest to psychiatric researchers looking at schizo-
phrenia as a left-brain "dysfunction" (e.g., Gruzelier &
Hammond 1976)? Might not Bakan (1969), arguing for a
relationship between hypnotizability and right hemi-
sphericity, possibly be interested in Janet's 1899 report
suggesting a tendency for left-sided hysteria to be more
frequently complicated by periods of fugue and somnam-
bulism than right-sided hysteria?
Should scientists such as Dimond (1979), interested in
the psychiatric implications of the split-brain research,
care about the case of Louis V., Bruce's "Welsh" case,
Myers' argument linking automatic writing to action of
the right hemisphere? What is the meaning of
Manaceine's work on hemisphere "substitution" during
sleep - might it be at all relevant, say, to the work of
Goldstein, Stoltefus, and Garduck (1972) on changes in
interhemispheric amplitude relationships in the EEG
during sleep? Might there be something in the opinion of
Brown-Sequard that certain visceral disorders are more
frequently associated with right-hemisphere lesions than
with left? What of the clinical data reported by Sigmund
Exner and Armand de Fleury suggesting that sensory
disorders are more frequent with right-brain lesions, and
motor disorders with left-brain lesions? Or the observa-
tions by Hughlings Jackson, Pick, and Crichton-Browne
pointing to a link between epilepsy originating in the
right hemisphere and "dreamy" mental states? These are
just a few examples that come readily to mind, but they
will do to make the general point.
At the same time, it is believed that the chief contribu-
tion the 19th century is in a position to offer modern-day
scientists lies at another level - a historical level rather
than an empirical one. This is the second - and more
important - reply to those scientists who fail to see the
relevance of studies such as this one to their own work. At
the historical level of understanding, the "mistakes" of
the 19th century become no less significant than the
scattered observations that happen to fit well into
modern-day perspectives.
We would draw, then, the following moral from our
history: One of the most striking things about the 19th-
century literature on the double brain is how time-bound
it is; how plainly in its broad theoretical contours it can be
shown to reflect the larger sociocultural ethos within
which the writers were immersed. In many instances,
certain methodologies or interpretations of data that
seem patently defective or dubious to us today, become
comprehensible and even inevitable when reinserted in
their original historical context. For the scientists and
medical men themselves, however, all these limiting
forces on their work were essentially invisible; there was
no question in their minds about the precise and objec-
tive nature of the research they were carrying out.
Yet by no stretch of the imagination can the men about
whom we are speaking be considered fools, or cranks, or
even second-rate scientists. On the contrary, they often
represented some of the leading lights of the medical and
scientific establishment, and their work was published in
the most authoritative professional journals of the time.
Knowing all this should change the way in which one
surveys the modern laterality scene. It will not do to say
that what is true for science in the 19th century has no
implications for our understanding of science in the 20th;
that modern laterality research is different from that of a
century ago, because it is so much more methodologically
sophisticated and is grounded in a far sturdier foundation
of experimental and clinical data. Neither of these latter
claims is particularly disputed. But even sophisticated
methodologies are conceived within a guiding theoretical
framework, and no data are gathered in a cultural
vacuum. How much does an appreciation of the develop-
ment of science through history force us to consider our
own science as time-bound in ways we cannot even
suspect? To what extent has the double brain, both in the
19th century and in our own time, served as a projecting
screen for collective social preoccupations? More gener-
ally, what social and philosophical forces are acting when
scientists are satisfied that, by dichotomizing human
cognition and identifying the dichotomies with the two
sides of the brain, they have come closer to understand-
ing cognition itself? And how is one to explain their
preoccupation with dichotomies in the first place?
Certainly, a tendency to perceive experience in stark
polarities and left/right janus-faced reversions seems to
be a deeply imbedded cognitive habit of our species
(Needham 1973), and Corballis (1980) has recently point-
ed out that much current laterality thinking is couched in
dichotomous constructions that find parallels in mytho-
logical systems around the world. Does the fact that
scientists were no less prone to these sorts of construc-
tions in the 19th century (Table 1) suggest that science's
capacity to come to terms with the bilateral brain may not
only be limited by historical contingencies, but may also
be distorted to an unknown degree by the deeper
rhythms of the scientists' own minds and brains?
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Harrington reminds us that a modern preoccupation with
human laterality has long historical antecedents. Many of us
believed that this current interest began mainly in the middle of
the present century. We now learn of an enormous groundswell
throughout the last century. Was this earlier interest main-
tained throughout the first half of this century, or was there a
hiatus? If the latter, then the 19th-century preoccupation with
glotogenesis, which twice culminated in a virtual ban on discus-
sions of the origins of language by the Societe de Linguistique de
Paris (see, e.g., Dingwall, 1979), and its recent resurgence (De
Grolier 1983) provide an intriguing and probably related
parallel.
Why this fascination? Ask educated laymen what are the basic
questions of existence and a hierarchy of three will probably
emerge:
1. The origin, evolution, and future of physical matter, ener-
gy, and the universe, including, perhaps, a possible place for a
deity in the scheme of things.
2. The origin and evolution of life.
3. The nature of human conscious awareness, individuality,
volition.
The third question comes close to explaining a fascination with
hemisphere differences and mental duality.
A second, more mundane reason is that the issue promises
(but often fails to deliver) the grossest examples known of
localization of function, to provide yet another handle on the
mind/body problem, the interface between structure and func-
tion, which takes us back of course to the third question. Thus
our two most essentially human attributes, language and non-
verbal cognition, are asymmetrically represented. We are in-
terested in how we differ from other species, and speech loss or
apraxia after left-hemisphere trauma are socially catastrophic,
even though many might be unaware of diminished minor-
hemisphere function. Would there have been similar interest if
hemisphere duality had instead consisted of, say, sensory versus
motor function (indeed, see de Fleury, 1872), or long- versus
short-term memory, episodic versus semantic memory, classi-
cal versus operant conditioning, hunger plus sex versus thirst
plus aggression (or any other such arrangement), vision versus
audition, tactile, and kinesthetic sensibility? Of course we
dichotomize, even in the presence of triads or tetrads, not
because that is just another manifestation of our own duplex
nature, but because, as indeed information theory indicates, in
this way we can at least try to play twenty questions with nature
and win (though cf. Newell, 1973). The botanists' dichotomous
key is not bothered by a multiplicity of variables. Of course
other cerebral dichotomies are possible - cortical/subcortical,
anterior/posterior. Only the latter comes close to being "in-
teresting," matching the sensory/motor dichotomy as a very
crude and incomplete approximation. With the current view
that perception involves at least an implicit response, interest in
the sensory/motor distinction has revived, probably because it
appears to be becoming less sure, more subtle - and that is
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another reason for our interest in cerebral asymmetry, the
essential slipperiness of any distinctions.
Another reason is that it embodies a microcosm of psychology:
All the sensory modalities and motor processes are involved,
together with sex differences, developmental aspects, psycho-
linguistics, genetics and inheritance, clinical aspects, and the
effects of brain damage at birth and in adulthood. The bound-
aries of psychology, physiology, psychopharmacology, neu-
rology, and anatomy are happily crossed, often without regard
to the problems of reductionism, and other disciplines like art,
music, and education are enthusiastically invited. Above all,
there is at least the possibility of examining two independently
functioning personae within a single body - something better
even than a clone, as most experiences will have largely been
shared by both individuals throughout life, and far better than
identical twins.
Looking at the historical antecedents to a line of scientific
thought, we experience two competing tendencies: (1) to say
how clever our predecessors were to get it so nearly right, with
so small a data base, for example, the "atomists" of classical
antiquity like Lucretius; (2) to smugly assert from our superior
vantage point how wrong they were. Both approaches are of
course on their own equally incomplete and unhelpful. Indeed,
how can one judge oneself from the viewpoint of posterity? We
may wonder at the parallels between 19th- and 20th-century
thought on the duality of the mind, but of course the two
traditions are far less independent than were even the contem-
poraneous though mutually isolated Darwin and Wallace on the
theory of evolution, with a long informal tradition and prior
Zeitgeist for biological change and adaptation. We would really
have to look at two totally independent cultures, for example,
American Indian and European in the 15th century, to see the
extent to which the dual constraints of external reality and the
modelling propensities of the human mind lead to true parallels
of theory.
Nevertheless, a paper chase through the ages does reveal
some intriguing parallels between 19th- and 20th-century ap-
proaches to mental duality. Harrington has already mentioned
some recurring hypotheses in her conclusion, such as the
relationship between lateral asymmetries and conversion reac-
tions, hysteria, schizophrenia, hypnotism, and sleep. I could
add the following recurrent ideas: that there is a maturational
precocity of the left hemisphere (Corballis & Morgan 1978); that
language functions of the left hemisphere are not so much innate
to it but rather a consequence of its earlier maturation (Waber
1979); that females (McGlone 1980), illiterate peoples (Vocate
1984), and criminals (Andrew 1978) have reduced or reversed
asymmetries; that language has preempted visual-perceptual
processing space on the left so that the superior abilities on the
right occur as if by default or as a corresponding opposite (cf.
Corballis 1983); that expressive propositional speech is a pre-
rogative of the left hemisphere, whereas the right can only cope
with receptive comprehensional aspects (cf. Coltheart, Patter-
son & Marshall 1980); that the right hemisphere predominates
for imagery and imagistic thought (for review, see Farah, 1984);
that it functions as a largely unconscious automation (Eccles
1973); that it subserves emotion (Ley & Bryden 1981) and
dreaming (Kerr & Foulkes 1981); that its writing is distorted,
abbreviated, and often mirror reversed (Gazzaniga & LeDoux
1978); that it deserves a better deal from educationalists (Bogen
1975; 1977); that the hemispheres differ in abundance of grey
matter (see, e.g., Goldberg & Costa 1981, for reviews); that the
corpus callosum may be the best instrument yet available for
plugging into a sentient brain (a remark which in its current form
has been attributed to Bogen); and that there is an overlap
between the concepts of distal/proximal musculature, volun-
tary/involuntary functions, and impaired/preserved motor ca-
pacities after a unilateral stroke. How many times has the wheel
been reinvented?
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Hemisphere asymmetry: Old views in new
light
Jozef CerriciCek
Department of Neurology, Comenius University Medical School, 811 03
Bratislava, Czechoslovakia
Harrington's target article is evidence that science is part of the
ongoing cultural milieu. New ideas and even new discoveries
are rooted in the current state of scientific "truth." If they
bypass the current state too radically, their acceptance has to
wait for evolution and adapt to new methodologies and to
changing philosophical opinions.
Thus Boyd's finding of a heavier left hemisphere cited by
Harrington has been supplemented or replaced by histological
studies (Galaburda, Sanides & Geschwind 1978) and by
computed tomography (Chang & Damasio 1980). But contro-
versies remain: according to Harrington, in 1868 Ecker found no
reliable signs of hemispheric asymmetry, and neither did Hen-
derson, Naeser, Weiner, Pieniadz, and Chui in 1984 using
computed tomography.
Likewise Delaunay in 1874, as quoted by Harrington, specu-
lated about the biological differences between the male and
female brain. In 1982 Geschwind and Behan pointed to devel-
opmental and immunological differences in the male and female
brain, and Inglis and Lawson (1981) found sex differences in the
effect of brain damage.
One hundred years ago Delaunay classified people according
to their tendency to walk to the right or left side. Glick, Crane,
Jerussi, Fleischer, and Green in 1975 wrote about biochemical
differences in the brains of rats according to their right- or left-
side turning behavior.
These few examples complementing those mentioned by
Harrington may show that (1) it is useful to go far into the past
when reviewing a problem one is working on, (2) it is useful to
compare recent research findings with ancient ones and not to
view them only in the light of their contemporary level of
science. One thus comes to the opinion that in many fields the
spiral of growth of human knowledge is a rather low one.
Right and left as symbols
M. C. Corballis
Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
People throughout recorded history and in all cultures have
interpreted their environment and experience in terms of
oppositions, or dichotomies, such as day and night, light and
dark, good and evil, health and sickness, male and female,
reason and intuition. Right and left constitute another such
opposition, but one that seems to have a special, overriding
status. Right-left symbolism permeates the customs, myths,
and mores of virtually all cultures, ancient and modern, in
surprisingly similar ways (Needham 1973). In his classic essay on
the subject, Hertz (1909) pointed out that the symbolic potency
of the right-left dichotomy owes much to human handedness -
the "pre-eminence of the right hand." Since the dramatic
discovery of cerebral asymmetry in the 1860s, however, di-
chotomies prevailing in human thought have been grafted onto
the cerebral hemispheres; dichotomania has gone to our heads.
The question arises as to whether the right-left distinction is
somehow reponsible for our tendency to dichotomize. Hertz
thought not, and he argued in fact that the responsibility was
round the other way. He maintained that dualistic thinking was
"inherent in primitive thought," and that handedness emerged
in order to resolve the conflicts between oppositions:
For centuries the systematic paralyzation of the left arm has, like
other mutilations, expressed the will animating man to make the
sacred predominate over the profane, to sacrifice the desires and
interests of the individual to the demands felt by the collective
unconscious, and to spiritualize the body itself by marking upon it the
opposition of values and the violent contrasts of the world of morality.
(Hertz 1909, translated by Needham 1973, p. 21)
Hertz was an enthusiastic advocate of ambidexterity, as a means
to overcome the one-sidedness imposed by the primitive
dichotomization of thought and to "develop the energies dor-
mant in our left side and in our right cerebral hemisphere"
(Needham 1973, p. 22).
Although a few would agree with this account of the origin of
handedness and cerebral lateralization, Hertz anticipated later
developments in calling for an end to the oppression of the left
hand and right cerebral hemisphere. This was a common theme
in the 1960s and 1970s; one modern educator, for example,
notes "the tragic lack of effort to develop our children's right
brain strengths. That potential - a source o f . . . creative,
artistic, and intellectual capacity - is at present largely
unawakened in our schools" (Garrett 1976, p. 244). This roman-
ticization of so-called right-hemisphere values seems to me to
represent one difference between the 19th- and 20th-century
dichotomies listed in Harrington's Table 1. The 19th-century
dichotomies reflect the inferior status bestowed on women,
nonwhites, animals, and the insane, while right-hemisphere
values in the 20th-century list owe at least something to black
power, women's liberation, the protest against the Vietnam War
and the military-industrial complex, and the rise in popularity
of Eastern religious cults. As in more primitive times, the left-
right dichotomy continues to carry the burden of contemporary
social, political, and philosophical issues.
What explains the symbolic potency of left and right? Else-
where (Corballis 1980) I have suggested two related factors. One
is the paradox of human handedness: The hands are structurally
almost identical, yet they are functionally very different, as a
right hander can easily verify by trying to write or throw with the
left hand. Again I cannot resist Hertz: "What resemblance more
perfect than that between our hands! And yet what a striking
inequality there is!" (Needham 1973, p. 3). Functional asymme-
try in a structurally symmetrical pair seems to imply a noncor-
poreal ingredient, bestowed perhaps by some divine creator,
hence the common belief that the right side is sacred and the left
profane. The same paradox seems to apply to the cerebral
hemispheres, whose functional asymmetry belies their anatom-
ical symmetry, and in Eccles's (1965; 1981) notion that human
self-consciousness is exclusively left-hemispheric, we may
perhaps discern the modern equivalent of the primitive idea
that the right side of the body is touched by the divine.
The second source of left-right potency is that right-handed-
ness and left-cerebral specialization for language are exclusively
human phenomena, and so differentiate us from other species -
and especially from other primates. Again this invites the
Cartesian interpretation that some noncorporeal property has
been bestowed uniquely on the human brain, and more
especially on the left hemisphere. As Harrington makes clear,
this idea is featured prominently in 19th-century thinking, as in
the views of Hugo Liepmann; it may have provided the consol-
ing thought, in the post-Darwinian trauma, that we may be
different from the apes after all.
To some extent these two aspects of left and right are yielding
to more exacting investigation. It is becoming clear that there
are anatomical (e.g., Galaburda, LeMay, Kemper & Geschwind
1978) and hormonal (Geschwind & Behan 1982) differences
between the hemispheres that may at least partly account for
functional asymmetries, and there is increasing evidence for
functional asymmetries in nonhuman species that in some
respects resemble those in humans (Denenberg 1981).
It should not be denied that there is at least some scientific
basis for the dichotomies tabulated by Harrington. The very
commonality between 19th- and 20th-century dichotomies
suggests some basis in truth, although it is scarcely reassuring
that the 19th-century ideas, once prevalent, should have sunk so
completely into obscurity. It is to Harrington's credit that most
of us are aware of them at all. The commonality, moreover,
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might reflect the enduring nature of human social, political, and
philosophical concerns rather than any underlying neurological
truth. Primitive associations with the left and right hands or
sides of the body show considerable uniformity across diverse
cultures, separated in time and geography, yet they clearly have
little basis in fact.
Another dangerous dichotomy lurks, however: that between
science and myth. The two surely lie at the extremes of a
continuum; no healthy science is without a dose of myth, just as
all myths convey a measure of truth. I have no doubt that
conceptions of human laterality will continue to evolve both as a
result of careful scientific evaluation and in response to broader
human concerns.
Laterality as a means and laterality as an
end
Paul Eling
Max-Planck-lnstitut fur Psycholinguistik, 6522 BC Nijmegen, The
Netherlands
Harrington describes, in considerable detail, how eagerly 19th-
century scientists accepted theories about particular psychiatric
disorders that were based on the notion of the independence of
the two cerebral hemispheres. In her review, she attempts to
make two points. The first one is that many hypotheses
discussed in current papers on laterality were also discussed and
accepted - at least by some authors in France - in the prior
century, even though the empirical basis was inadequate. I
suppose that this is not a great shock to most researchers
working in the area of laterality. On the contrary, the Wigan-
Broca-Wernicke-Jackson type of review can be found in many
papers and textbooks. In this sense, Harrington challenges a
belief that is probably not held by most researchers.
However, as Harrington indicates, there is a second, more
subtle argument to be made. Although I had some difficulties
detecting this argument, I expect she has in mind the moral that
can be drawn from history, as discussed in her conclusion. In
principle, I am inclined to support this second point. My
experience reading the 19th-century literature on brain-behav-
ior relationships suggests that it is illuminating to keep in mind
how theories and ideas described in these papers are related to
ideas developed in other areas of science (e.g. physics,
Russelman 1984) and to the larger sociocultural ethos. And the
question that follows is, of course, what about us?
Although I am clearly in favor of Harrington's approach, I
would like to make two critical remarks. The intention of these
remarks is positive: to allow a clearer elucidation of the
argument.
It first seems important to correct a potential misunderstand-
ing that results from throwing all laterality work into one heap.
This is sometimes done by those who are skeptical about certain
claims made with respect to the functioning of the two hemi-
spheres. It is my impression that Harrington's paper also pre-
sents a caricature of what laterality studies are about in general.
Since dichotomies are commonplace in this area, it will do no
harm to introduce one more. This has to do with two ways of
doing laterality studies. The first line of research can be charac-
terized as "laterality as an end." Researchers doing this type of
work consider the two hemispheres to work independently. The
purpose of their work is to demonstrate that the left and right
hemispheres are specialized for particular functions. Their ulti-
mate goal is to describe the underlying principle that is shared
by all the functions represented in a single hemisphere. The
basic assumption these researchers make, although usually it is
implicit, is that each hemisphere can function on its own.
The second line of research is not as widely used as the first
one. In this approach, phenomena of asymmetrical functioning
of the brain are used to study - at the neurological or psychologi-
cal level - the working of the brain as an integrated system. A
good example would be Broca himself. Although it is widely
stated that Broca is the founder of laterality, in the first sense
described above, he was much more careful in his statements.
As Harrington describes, he was forced to accept the notion of
left-sided representation of speech. She correctly quotes Broca
when claiming that the majority of people are "left-brained " and
that by exception only some of those we call left handers are
"right-brained" (Broca 1865, p. 383). Although Broca talks
about the two hemispheres and hand preference here, he does
not claim that there is a clear relationship. Harrington fails to
take into account Broca's disclaimer of this relationship, which
appears two pages later (Broca 1865, p. 385; Eling 1984).
Apart from having difficulty accepting asymmetrical repre-
sentation, Broca also carefully restricts his claim to only a small
portion of the faculty of language. He believes that this faculty
consists of three different layers with several parallel compo-
nents in each. This system enables one to communicate in
different modalities. He also does not believe that the left
hemisphere is the exclusive place for the general faculty of
language or for the special faculty of articulated language (which
is, according to Broca, also used for speech perception). Only
the speech production aspect of this last faculty is asym-
metrically localized by Broca. Thus, he was far from stating that
there is something like "cerebral dominance, " even for
language.
What Broca has done in his analysis is to demonstrate that
"language" is represented by many subsystems, of which the
faculty of coordinating speech movements is only one that can
be isolated by a localized lesion. Broca does not claim that the
left hemisphere is verbal and the right nonverbal. He is arguing
that there is such a thing as a speech coordination function,
which is apparently not doubly represented.
From history we can learn that this approach using laterality
effects as a means to study the functioning of the brain has been
used by others. However, it was clearly not as popular as the
laterality studies that contain (implausible and therefore
interesting?) claims such as predicting that each hemisphere is
enough to function as a human being or to have a full personality
in itself. Nevertheless, I consider this approach to provide a
more serious possibility of learning something about how the
brain works. Moreover, I wonder whether this approach is
affected to the same degree by the more subtle argument
Harrington wants to make in her conclusions.
This brings me to the two critical remarks mentioned in the
beginning. In her review of the studies Harrington restricts
herself mainly to the 19th-century papers on dual brain, dual
mind. On the basis of this evidence alone it is difficult to see how
these papers reflect the larger sociocultural ethos. What I miss
in her argumentation, then, is the link with notions and beliefs
that were held concurrently in other (scientific, religious, politi-
cal) circles.
Indeed, it is remarkable to see how quickly some theories
were accepted at a time when the empirical basis was clearly
deficient, but when the general Zeitgeist was apparently right.
This should change the way in which one surveys the modern
laterality scene (why not other areas of brain research?). The
interesting question of how this should change our view of our
contemporary work is not addressed by Harrington. I think that
the answer to this question will contribute significantly to our
evaluation of the different interpretations of laterality studies
that can be found in the current literature.
Brain theory and the uses of history
Samuel H. Greenblatt
Division of Neurological Surgery, Medical College of Ohio, Toledo, Ohio
43699
At the beginning of her target article, Harrington proposes that
a historical perspective on her subject may be of importance to
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contemporary workers in laterality research. After a thorough
and thoughtful review of the subject she concludes that her
results should have two uses for the working scientist. First,
there is the seemingly self-evident point that some 19th-century
data are still valid and useful. Second and more interesting is the
importance of recognizing historical relativism. In Harrington's
words, it is now easy to see that the views and disputations of the
19th century were severely "time-bound." Though she does not
actually say it, she implies, with good reason, that we are as
much time-bound as the people of any other era. In other words,
we are both beneficiaries and victims of the intellectual milieus
in which we work.
This last point can be usefully illustrated by expanding upon a
historical event that Harrington mentions only briefly. In what
we now call the neurosciences, the intellectual milieu of the
1880s was really very different from that of the 1860s. The
ostensible difference was the existence and acceptance of a
viable theory of cortical localization, but localization had come
into its own because a more fundamental change had occurred
simultaneously. During these few decades, the earlier view of
the cerebral convolutions as the "common sensorium" - the
"terra incognita of the mind" - was replaced by the modern idea
that the convolutions are subject to the same physiological laws
and analyses as the rest of the neuraxis (Greenblatt 1977:428;
1984:250). This realization followed from the successful exten-
sion of the sensorimotor paradigm of associationist psychology to
the cerebral cortices. Hughlings Jackson was the leading
theoretician in the advocacy of evolutionary associationism in
this context, but the same theoretical foundation underlies the
work of the French and German localizationists of the 1870s and
1880s (Buckingham 1984).
Though it generally goes unrecognized, 19th-century associa-
tionism is still very much with us (Buckingham 1984; Young
1970). To put it more critically, I would claim that our theories of
how the brain works have not advanced beyond the fundamental
assumptions of evolutionary associationism. From this point of
view, then, there is a third and potentially powerful use of
historical analyses such as the one Harrington has presented. If
carried to sufficient depth, such studies should lead to conscious
recognition of the assumptions that bind us to our own times. In
other words, we may be able to break out of our own limiting
assumptions by finding out what they are. Where is our terra
incognita of the mind?
I think our own territories of the unknown will be found at the
points in associationism where the theory becomes ambiguous,
that is, relatively powerless to predict or explain new findings.
One of the best examples of this ambiguity is how associationism
deals with laterality. There is nothing in the theory that predicts
dominance and precious little that explains it, but neither is it
contradicted. Hughlings Jackson eventually dealt with the
undeniable data about dominance by viewing the phenomenon
as part of a developmental hierarchy. This approach is somewhat
satisfying as a broad perspective, and it can lead to a certain
amount of further investigation, but so far it has not led to a clear
understanding of laterality in biological or physiological terms.
What fundamental advantage did dominance convey and how is
a lateralized function integrated into the total brain mechanism
for cognitive function? Even more broadly, how are we to
conceive of a total brain mechanism for a cognitive function in
associationist theory? To put it in Jacksonian terms (1874b: 132),
the reflex-based, sensorimotor paradigm of associationism does
not explain "propositionising."
None of these comments is meant to be historically
pejorative. Our 19th-century forebears adopted associa-
tionism because it worked for them in their circumstances. It
predicted the presence of motor processes in the cerebral
cortices, and the existence of those processes was confirmed.
We do not need to discard our legacy. Rather, by understand-
ing it more fully we should be able to build upon it more
successfully.
Nineteenth-century views on madness and hypnosis:
A 1985 perspective
J. Gruzelier
Department of Psychiatry, University of London, Charing Cross and
Westminster Medical School, London W6 8RP, England
Harrington has provided a welcome antidote to the ahistorical
leanings of contemporary neuroscience in her target article. In
concluding she questions whether knowledge of the 19th-cen-
tury view of madness as a right-hemisphere function would have
influenced contemporary investigations of schizophrenia as a
left-sided disorder. This is best regarded as a tongue-in-cheek
remark for it does little justice to the richness of thought of
either century. To consider the 19th century, the evidence
reported in support of right-hemisphere involvement in psycho-
sis was flimsy, such as Maudsley's reference to psychosis as "the
brute brain within the man's' and involved bland conceptual
juxtapositions such as the alignment of reason with the left
hemisphere and instinct with the right. This ignores the influen-
tial and seminal insights of Emil Kraepelin (1855-1926) and
Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939), who documented psychotic phe-
nomenology in great detail. Both believed that impaired
linguistic functions were cardinal features of schizophrenia. The
requisite localisation of such functions to the left hemisphere
was provided by Kahlbaum (1874) "the vicinity of the sylvian
fissure and of the second and third frontal gyri, i.e., the areas
which on the basis of findings in aphasia are regarded as the site
of mental speech formation, is very noteworthy in regard to the
clinical symptoms related to speech (mutism and verbigeration),
which are very prominent in catatonia" (Zilboorg 1967, p. 448).
Notwithstanding the weight of contemporary evidence in
favour of left-hemisphere involvement in schizophrenia (e.g.,
Gruzelier 1981; Newlin, Carpenter & Golden 1982), recent
evidence suggests that different types of syndrome constella-
tions in schizophrenia may reflect opposite states of hemispheric
balance. The withdrawn, retarded syndrome often found in
chronic, nonremitting schizophrenia, which is accompanied by
a reduction in linguistic functions, reflects a loss of left-hemi-
sphere activation. There is a corresponding increase in right-
hemisphere activation, which contributes to depressive affect.
In contrast, the reactive and linguistically florid syndrome,
often found in acute schizophrenia, reflects the opposite state of
hemispheric imbalance (Gruzelier 1983; 1984).
An impairment of interhemispheric pathways may be one of
the sources of hemispheric imbalance in schizophrenia. Here
views on hemispheric disconnection as long ago as the mid-18th
century were particularly insightful, as was their subsequent
expression in the mid-19th century in the writings of Wigan
(1844). Their inspiration to contemporary research on callosal
disconnection in schizophrenia has been acknowledged (Green,
Glass & O'Callaghan 1979).
The attempt to attribute to madness a reversal in asymmetries
of the weight of the hemispheres (Luys 1879) has a counterpart
in recent attempts to compare schizophrenic and control brains
with computed tomography for asymmetries in the width of the
frontal and occipital lobes. While a consensus has yet to be
reached, a proportion of schizophrenic brains do show cranial
reversals, and this appears to be a higher percentage than in the
normal population (Luchins 1983).
Schizophrenia aside, the affective psychoses may well have a
right-sided origin (Flor-Henry 1979) in keeping with 19th-
century views on psychosis. Nevertheless, the manifestation of
mania and depression is thought to reflect left- and right-
hemisphere functions respectively (Flor-Henry 1979). There is
also consistency between the 19th- and 20th-century views on
lateralisation in the control of emotion (see Gur, 1983, for a
review on the latter).
Hemispheric interactions are also a current focus of interest in
the neuropsychology of hypnosis. Contemporary research
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began by observing parallels between the hypnotic experience
and right-hemisphere functions, functions compatible with the
theories of Janet and Hughlings Jackson: somnambulism, the
dream-like quality of hypnosis, primary process thinking, auto-
matic memory, childlike emotions, visual imaging, and the
suspension of a critical attitude. Those who were hypnotically
susceptible were assumed to possess a predisposition to right-
hemisphere processing (Bakan 1969). Recent research suggests
that the inhibition of left-hemispheric processing is a prerequi-
site for a successful hypnotic induction, and this occurs subse-
quent to the focusing of attention and the engagement of the left
hemisphere (Gruzelier, Brow, Perry, Rhonder & Thomas
1984). A preexisting right-hemisphere bias when not coupled
with a flexibility to shift to left-hemisphere processing may in
fact be counterproductive to the induction of hypnosis. In fact, a
flexibility in the allocation of cognitive resources appears to
contribute to hypnotic susceptibility (MacLeod-Morgan & Lack
1982). Here an analogy may be drawn with the virtuosity of the
French School of the 19th century in producing consecutive
oscillations in sensitivity from left to right and in hypnotising the
hemispheres alternately.
Perhaps most intriguing of all were the 19th-century views of
the dynamic interplay between hemispheric functions,
processes which continue up to the present day to receive
scattered attention. The bulk of research in lateralisation then
and now has been concerned with fairly circumscribed functions
and structural impairment, and with some notable exceptions
(e.g., Denenberg 1983; Kinsbourne 1975) it has been left to
psychopathologists to unravel the lateralisation of dynamic brain
functions.
The ambidextral culture society and the
"duality of mind"
Lauren Julius Harris
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience Program, Michigan State
University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824
The invitation to comment on Harrington's splendid essay
posed a problem of choice, as the author has set a table laden for
me with too many tantalizing dishes. Finally, though, I was
drawn to an item placed well away from the main courses,
among "miscellaneous applications of the brain-duality theory."
This is the story of the ambidextral culture movement - salad to
Harrington, meat and potatoes to me (see Harris, 1985).
Harrington has wisely noted that the men about whom we are
speaking cannot be considered fools, or cranks, or even second-
rate scientists. This was no less true for the principal figures in
the ambidextral culture movement. As even one of its severest
critics, Sir James Crichton-Browne, had to admit, the move-
ment had the support of "a large number of highly educated,
intelligent and reasonable people, and of some men of light and
leading" (Crichton-Browne 1907, p. 624). But what attracted
them to the movement? There were several reasons, all of which
are relatable to more general issues in the development of ideas
about brain duality.
In speaking of the origins of this educational movement,
Harrington has noted only that John Jackson, its founder, had
promoted Wigan's (1844) view that each hemisphere may serve
as a distinct and perfect organ of thought. The implication for
Jackson was that with proper training, the hands could become,
as Jackson put it with his characteristic restraint, "absolutely
independent . . . in . . . ANY KIND OF WORK whatever"
(1905, p. 225). In urging ambidextral training, however, Jackson
had promised richer rewards than merely independence of the
hands (and, by implication, of the cerebral hemispheres).
Ambidextral training also would equally train the two hemi-
spheres and thereby enhance - even double - mental power.
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Here, still another figure enters the story- Brown-Se'quard. As
Harrington mentioned, but not in connection with the ambidex-
tral culture movement, Brown-S6quard also had called for equal
training of the two hemispheres.
Wigan, of course, had written in the era before Broca; Brown-
Sequard, afterward. So, for Brown-Sequard, the new evidence
linking speech (as well as intelligence and will, as Brown-
Sequard supposed) predominantly to the left hemisphere
carried a startling implication: "If we make use of only one brain
for most of our actions, we leave inactive one-half of the total
mass of brain matter, and, therefore, we leave quite useless one-
half of the most important of our organs as regards manifesta-
tions of intelligence, will, and perception or sensation." There-
fore, "we ought to give education to the two sides of the brain,
or, rather, to the two brains" (Brown-Sequard 1874a, p. 2).
Because Brown-Sequard assumed that brain and mental devel-
opment were connected to the "leading movements of the
body" (1874a, p. 20), the means by which he proposed to
accomplish this two-brain education were predominantly
motor. Thus every child should be made to "exercise the two
sides of the body equally - to make use of them alter-
nately . . . In this way it would be very easy indeed to obtain a
great deal, if not all the undeveloped power possible to the
individual" (1874a, p. 20).
Jackson's promise that equal-hand training would enhance
mental capacity might have been a potent enough inducement
for the teacher-members of the Ambidextral Culture Society.
The medical men may have been more impressed with another
possibility. By Jackson's time, aphasia had become a prominent
medical problem. Jackson even thought it was increasing in
incidence: "This disease of Aphasia, together with its related
'Agraphia,' is becoming more prevalent every day, a circum-
stance calculated to raise serious apprehensions as to the future,
if nothing can be done to arrest its advances" (1905, p. 124).
Jackson's answer was that equal training of the hands would not
only enhance mental power, it also would build language
centers in the right as well as in the left hemisphere. As such,
ambidextral training would help to prevent or to ameliorate the
aphasias and hemiplegias resulting from unilateral brain injury.
The ambidextral culturists thus promised remarkable psycho-
logical and medical benefits. Could they substantiate any of
their claims? To show that two different tasks could be carried
out at the same time, Jackson drew largely from anecdote and,
frankly, parlor tricks, for example, a photograph in his book of
two different letters written concurrently by a 17-year-old girl -
after 8 months of practice (1905, p. 193). Another girl, Jackson's
own daughter, appears to have been particularly accomplished
in such feats, judging from an account in 1903 by the president of
the Ambidextral Culture Society, the distinguished orthopedic
surgeon, E. NobleSmith, F.R.C.S., Edinburgh. (Smithhimself
had become an advocate of ambidextral training in the convic-
tion that it would reduce scoliosis.)
To support his bold assertion that ambidextral training could
aid victims of aphasia, Jackson cited medical opinion. For
example, Sir James Sawyer, consulting physician to the Queen's
Hospital, Birmingham, and a vice-president of the Ambidextral
Culture Society, proposed that ambidexterity, by tending to the
more equal use of the two sides of the brain, "might prevent, or
help in the cure of, some cases of hemicrania. Perhaps it might
prevent some cases of hemiplegia" (1900, p. 1303).
Jackson was also able to invoke the great name of Sir David
Ferrier, for although Ferrier had acknowledged the evidence
that the speech center was in the majority of instances in the left
hemisphere, he also said that there was no reason, "beyond
education and heredity, why this should necessarily be so"
(1886, pp. 450-51).
It is quite conceivable that the articulating centres of the right
hemisphere should be educated in a similar manner. A person who
has lost the use of his right hand may by education and practice
acquire with his left all the cunning of his right. In such a case the
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manual motor centres of the right hemisphere become the centres of
motor acquisitions similar to those of the left. As regards the articulat-
ing centres, the rule seems to be that they are educated, and become
the organic seat of volitional acquisitions on the same side as the
manual centres. Hence, as most people are right-handed, the educa-
tion of the centres of volitional movements takes place in the left
hemisphere, (p. 451)
Ferrier also suggested that, although the left articulatory center
was the one commonly and specially educated in speech, it was
conceivable that "a person who has become aphasic by reason of
total and permanent destruction of the left speech centre may
re-acquire the faculty of speech by education of the right
articulatory centres" (p. 451).
As the quoted passages above show, Ferrier had not, in fact,
specifically said that this education could be brought about by
hand training, although one can see why Jackson might have felt
justified in drawing such an inference. A later writer, however,
was explicit on this point. Varia Kapiani (1913), a staunch
advocate of ambidextral training, mentioned cases by a Dr.
Manfred Fraenkel in which speech that was lost after a left-sided
stroke with right-sided paralysis reportedly had been regained
by systematic writing with the left hand. Even after a second
left-sided stroke, speech remained, proving clearly, according
to Fraenkel, that left-hand writing had caused the power of
speech to transfer to the right brain. Evidently unknown to the
ambidextral culturists was C. T. Buzzard, physician to the
(British) National Hospital for the Paralyzed and Epileptic, who
had developed a system of therapy based on this assumption
(1882, p. 441).
In further support of his views, Jackson and other advocates of
ambidextral training cited reports that left-hemisphere injury
was less likely to result in permanent speech loss in children
than in adults. As we know, Broca (1865) himself had noted this
relationship and had suggested, in explanation, that "someone
whose third frontal convolution, ordinarily the seat of articulate
language, would be atrophied from birth, would learn to speak
and would speak with the right hemisphere" (pp. 386-87;
emphasis in original, my trans.). (This, then, was the circum-
stance for which Broca invoked what became known as the
doctrine of cerebral substitution, mentioned by Harrington.)
Similar views were expressed by Brown-Sequard (1874a) and by
the neurologists Howell T. Pershing (1897, p. 787) and Sir
William Gowers (1896-1902; quoted in Jackson, 1905, p. 123).l
Broca (1865), whose opinions on this matter were not, in fact,
mentioned by Jackson, was cautious in his interpretation of the
age difference. He noted, for example, that the adult aphasic
rarely received the intense language training ordinarily
provided children (p. 390). The neurologist Bernard Sachs,
however, concluded that in young children, hemispheric differ-
entiation for speech "is not nearly so complete as in the adult"
(1897, p. 323); and Gowers inferred that there must be "a
capacity for the acquisition of voluntary speech processes on the
right side of the young which there is not in the adult" (quoted in
Jackson, 1905, p. 123). Consequently, "The exclusive relation of
voluntary speech to the left brain is due to the disuse for speech
of the right brain: it seems to occur in the transition from
childhood to youth, and it is related to the use of the right hand"
(Gowers, quoted in Jackson, 1905, p. 123). The reports thus
gave "clear proof," as Brown-Sequard put it, "that the right side
of the brain can be educated to become a leader in mental
faculties as well as the left side of the brain" (1874a, p. 18).
Given the state of knowledge at the time, the ambidextral
culturists' interpretation of the available clinical and other
evidence cannot be said to have been purely fanciful. Consider,
for example, the proposition that training the left hand might
succeed in building new language centers in the right hemi-
sphere, thereby facilitating recovery from aphasia. Jackson, as
we have seen, could invoke the opinions of eminent physicians
and scientists, even if, as in Ferrier's case, such a view was at
most only implicit. The fact that neuropsychologists today reject
any such proposition does not mean that its early advocates were
foolish to believe in it. Consider also the ambidextral culturists'
application of the principle that in the young brain the right
hemisphere has a capacity for the acquisition of language that is
lacking in the adult brain. Not only was this in Jackson's time a
perfectly reasonable interpretation of the clinical evidence such
as it was, but neuropsychologists in our own time have drawn a
similar conclusion on the basis of new studies (e.g., Chase 1974;
Krashen 1973; Lenneberg 1967). Indeed, as St. James-Roberts
has observed, the principle has become a "part of neuropsy-
chological dogma" (1981, p. 32). Only lately, on closer inspec-
tion of the evidence, has the dogma begun to be questioned (St.
James-Roberts 1979; 1981).
In short, although some of the ambidextral culturists
undoubtedly were - in George Gould's (1907) dismissive terms
- "cranks" and "sillies," they were, for the most part, serious
people struggling with serious ideas. Indeed, it seems to me that
their counterparts today - the educators and others who call for
"two-brain education" in the schools - do not, in many respects,
measure up to their predecessors (see review in Harris, 1985).
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The case for applied history of medicine,
and the place of Wigan
H. Isler and M. Regard
Neurology Department, University Hospital, 8091 Zurich, Switzerland
History is only viable if it is not boring. Harrington's historical
review is stimulating and lively enough to avoid this common
plight, and her sensitivity for important developments is
remarkable. She makes a strong case for applied history of
medicine; we can only support this, trying to add some cor-
roborating evidence.
There is not much room for mental duality in our thinking,
which is still moulded upon the doctrines of Descartes who held
that the soul, or spirit, or subject, must be "one and indivisible."
In this context we have to stress the importance of A. L. Wigan,
who attempted to overcome this barrier. He incurred the
displeasure of his contemporaries (Isler & Regard 1984) and
does not appear in general histories of medicine and of later-
alization (Young 1970; Hecaen & Dubois 1969; Hecaen 1978;
Schiller 1979). He has been mentioned several times since 1963
(Hunter & MacAlpine), but the bulk of his achievements have
hardly been appreciated so far, including his precise ideas of
higher cerebral activity as well as his dynamic balance model of
hemispheric function. Wigan succeeded in establishing new
patterns of discovery, which enabled him (see Isler, 1968) to
accommodate a surprising amount of information on the brain's
"behavior. " He created the concept of hemispheric dominance
and gave a perfect prediction of both the importance of left-
hemisphere dominance and the qualifications of its future
protagonist (who later turned out to be Broca) (Wigan 1844, p.
313). He recognized prosopagnosia as unilateral (p. 170). De-
scribing the split-brain condition (p. 52), he found that it did not
prejudice everyday life. He thought that the healthy left hemi-
sphere, "having thus the possession of reason" (p. 98), could
balance a diseased mode of mind in the right hemisphere. "It
appears almost certain that sensation and perception are not
performed by the same organs which exercise the purely reason-
ing faculties" (pp. 320; 99). "There was only one organ of speech,
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and it was compelled to obey the most tyrannic of the two
discordant influences" in a case of paragraphy (pp. 144-241) (see
also "as a phrenologist would say . . . organs of the mind," (p.
269). The dominance of the healthy hemisphere over the dis-
eased one is destroyed by anger, passion, or drink (p. 52f).
Dominance is exchangeable and varies individually in healthy
people (pp. 157, 337). "I suspect that in the case of left-handed
persons there is a transposition of the relative power of the two
brains" (p. 337).
As we see in Harrington's target article, Brown-Sequard
made himself unpopular by insisting on a set of ideas that are
indistinguishable from Wigan's own: each hemisphere is a
complete brain; one can be lost without loss of sensation and
movement; disabilities from unilateral lesions can be due to
inhibitory action from other parts of the brain; functional hemi-
spheric differences may be due to training. He actually quoted
Wigan in 1877 (Bogen 1973). He was a great friend of Broca's,
and it is rather likely that he acquainted Broca with Wigan's
work, through which he was to be given his route to lasting
fame.
Harrington's dramatic history of the aberrations of the
double-brain concept - metalloscopy and transfer of hysterical
hemisyndromes to the other side - is a classical example of
applied history of medicine. Only after reading about the burst-
ing of this intellectual South Sea bubble of the 1870s can one
fully understand the violent fear of all things subjective and
emotional that plagues brain researchers up to this day. This
catastrophe was clearly the result of degeneration of ideas
closely resembling those of Wigan. How much has the suppres-
sion and neglect of his work had to do with this development?
Wigan's patterns of discovery appear as a closer approxima-
tion to nature than many popular doctrines and models of our
time. Their heuristic potential should be applied.
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Scientific amnesia
David E. Leary
Department of Psychology, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New
Hampshire 03824
Since Nietzsche, according to one recent commentator, the
question of truth has been transformed: "It is no longer, 'What is
the surest path to Truth?', but, 'What is the hazardous career
that Truth has followed?'" (Foucault 1980, p. 66). After reading
Anne Harrington's analytic review of nineteenth-century
neuropsychological theory and research, I cannot help wonder-
ing whether science, at least in one of its aspects, has become
one of the hazards in the career of Truth.
My ruminations upon this point revolve around a single
question: Why have we forgotten so much of the scientific
episode - and so much of the scientific material - that Har-
rington reviews? This was no minor drama in the history of
neuropsychology; its central characters were not bit players; its
temporal and spatial setting was not far removed from our own;
and most of its literature is readily accessible in our university
libraries. Yet Harrington's assertion that few contemporary
scientists have referred to, much less utilized, significant por-
tions of this literature is but slightly exaggerated.
Why do scientists forget previous lines of research, even
major lines of research? It is, I suggest, at least partially due to
one of the norms of science itself. The norm goes back to the
17th century, but its full, and I would say detrimental, actualiza-
tion is a product of our own times.
It was Sir Francis Bacon, of course, who issued the most
notorious call to arms - the call to study nature instead of books.
Rene' Descartes' similar rejection of the study of "letters" and
his espousal of the principle of systematic doubt corroborated
Bacon's stricture against reliance upon prescientific and quasi-
scientific texts. So too did John Locke's less strident recommen-
dations about the empirical pursuit of knowledge. All three
thinkers, along with their contemporaries, considered the
distrust of tradition - especially of the scholastic tradition passed
down in written form - to be one of the common, enabling
virtues of "the new mechanical philosophers" who constructed
early modern science. As we know, that distrust has paid
remarkable dividends.
Unfortunately, however, distrust breeds distrust, and what
began as an appropriate concern about reliance upon previous
nonscientific texts has become a thoroughgoing skepticism
about all "outdated" texts, scientific ones included. Whatever
can be said in defense of this bibliophobia, it has led to what
might be called the functional illiteracy of many contemporary
scientists. By functional illiteracy I mean, of course, not the
inability to read, but the selective limitation of reading, with
marked preference accorded to the most recent material on any
given subject. In either form, this functional illiteracy accounts
for another functional disorder suffered by many contemporary
scientists, a disorder we might call scientific amnesia.
Should I call this form of short-term memory a disorder?
Obviously, I feel that it is a disorder for scientists not to
remember the work of the past, but as I have suggested, such
amnesia is legitimized by the norms of their discipline.
Especially over the past century, as the amateur pursuit of
"natural philosophy" has been transmogrified into the profes-
sional business of contemporary "science, ' distrust and hence
disregard of dated research have been raised to a fine art. As a
result, scientists are constantly losing sight of those parts of their
discipline's history upon which they are no longer actively
building. Their blindness to such apparently dead-end, tangen-
tial, and stalled historical developments has helped sustain the
illusion of linear progress in science, but ironically it has at the
same time reduced the likelihood of true progress, that is, the
likelihood that these developments will be recalled and built
upon when opportune moments occur. Instead it condemns
scientists to occasional, unwitting reinvention of past successes
and failures.
The illusion of steadily cumulative, linear progress in science
is also sustained by the cult of the scientific method. I readily
admit that we have received many good things in exchange for
our methodolatry, and I recommend continued obeisance at the
methodists' altar, though of a less drastic, less true-believing
sort than we have witnessed through much of this century (see
Toulmin & Leary 1985). But we should recognize the price we
have paid for our faith in the Cartesian dogma of the prerogative
of method: we have forfeited confidence in, and thus use of
knowledge gained by methods other than those we currently
prefer to use. So even those scientists who might otherwise
grant some value to dated knowledge are likely to assume that
such knowledge is incommensurate with our current knowledge
because of its tainted methodological pedigree. The implicit
conclusion for many is: If earlier investigations, as in 19th-
century neuropsychology, did not utilize currently popular
research methods, they cannot have much to offer.
On the contrary, I believe with Harrington that we have
much to learn, not only from the particular historical episode
that she has reviewed, but from many others as well. What we
have to learn, from which episodes, cannot be predicted in
advance. It will depend on what it is we want to know, and what
it is we think we know. But at minimum, greater literacy - less
amnesia - should help to sensitize us to the historicity of our
own topical interests, conceptual frameworks, methodological
approaches, and theoretical convictions. This should have salu-
tary, liberating effects. (I do not believe that the history of
science should be X-rated. See Brush 1974.) It should help us to
become aware of our own blind spots, even if it cannot produce
perfect vision.
Picking up on what Harrington has already suggested, I
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would argue that the separation of science and scholarship, upon
which modern science has been based, seems to have reached a
point of precipitately diminishing returns. We need to reinstate
scholarship, especially historical scholarship, into our scientific
disciplines - into undergraduate and graduate training, into our
scientific endeavors, and into our presentations and publica-
tions. If we can do so, at least one obstacle in the path to Truth -
the hazard of scientific amnesia - will be removed. Other
obstacles will surely remain, but perhaps they will then be seen
more clearly for what they are. As it is now, it is often difficult to
know which obstacles deserve our fresh, naive attention and
which have already been dealt with by our predecessors.
Hemisphere differences before 1800
Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst
Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands
Harrington's target article is a fine survey of 19th-century ideas
on the cerebral hemispheres, but the history of her subject is
longer than she thinks.
In the first place, there is at least one ancient Greek theory of
hemispheric specialization. This is how a 12th-century Latin
codex describes the views of Diocles of Carystus, a famous
Athenian physician from the 4th century B.C.:
He says that phrenitis (madness, frenzy) arises from an inflammation
of the heart and an obstruction of the blood or innate heat, from which
the brain derives sentience and intellect. The latter is that with which
we understand, the former that with which we sense. Accordingly,
there are two brains in the head, one which gives us our intellect, and
another one which provides sentience. That is to say, the one which is
lying on the right side is the one that senses; with the left one,
however, we understand. (See Lokhorst 1982a:35)
Diocles's theory is astonishingly modern: the terms he uses,
intellectus on the left side and sensus on the right, are even
identical to the last entries in Harrington's table. Where the
theory comes from is not clear. Before Diocles, Alcmaeon and
Empedocles had already distinguished between sentience and
intellect; moreover, it may already have been surmised in his
time that the hemispheres are different in that each one only
controls the opposite half of the body. There is, however, no
evidence of an earlier combination of these two ideas. How the
theory fared after Diocles's times is clearer: It fell into complete
oblivion, the reason for this probably being the emphasis on the
unitary system of the cerebral ventricles in later accounts of
brain function. Nevertheless, if the early 19th-century brain
scientists had shown a greater regard for history, they easily
could have known about Diocles's theory: There are no less than
three 16th-century editions of the codex (Horatianus 1532; cf.
Lokhorst 1982b).
In the second place, there is more to be found in the 18th-
century literature than Harrington suggests. I am thinking not
only of the discussions about the function of the corpus callosum
and the crude split-brain experiments from this period (see
Neuburger 1897), but especially of Meinard Simon Du Pui,
whose De homine dextro et sinistro (1780) clearly anticipates
some of Henry Holland's and Wigan's ideas. Thus, he wrote that
man is from a medical point of view a "homo duplex, a right man
and a left one" (p. 108); "man's nervous system is just as bipartite
as the rest of his body, with the result that one half of it may
become affected while the other half continues to carry out its
proper functions" (pp. 184-85). Broca knew of these views but
considered them too extreme: "The thought is far from me to
divide man into two distinct beings, like Du Pui has done"
(Broca 1865:393).
Harrington's 19th-century material gives a good picture of the
period. However, one should not underestimate the anatomical
knowledge available by the end of the century concerning
hemispheric differences. For example, the recently discovered
fact that the right hemisphere contains relatively more white
matter (i.e., fibers) than the left one (Gur, Packer, Hunger-
buhler, Reivich, Obrist, Amarnek & Sackeim 1980) was already
known to Van Biervliet (1899, p. 296). Furthermore, mention
should be made of a highly curious book, Le duplicisme humain
(1906), in which Camille Sabatier, a retired French politician,
puts all previous research into one grand, unified perspective.
Finally, what about the use of history for present-day
research? I agree that the older literature may yet have a
stimulating role to play. However, I fail to see any broader
significance of historical investigation for contemporary re-
search. For, suppose a scientist has learned from history how to
recognize a time-bound and socioculturally colored theory
when he sees one (as Harrington exhorts him to do). Does this
help him in his capacity as scientist? No; for no matter how
clearly a theory may reflect its cultural or psychological origins,
it can still turn out to be either true or false.
The many-mind problem: Neuroscience or
neurotheology?
John C. Marshall
Neuropsychology Unit, University Department of Clinical Neurology, The
Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford OX2 6HE, England
No one in any of his or her right minds could now seriously deny
that the hemispheres of human (and many animal) brains exhibit
"complementary specialization." The aphasias (Lecours, Lher-
mitte & Bryans 1983) and high-level apraxias (Freeman 1984)
are the best documented examples of deficit consequent upon
left-hemisphere lesion, and where comparable deficits are not
typically seen after right-hemisphere lesion; contrariwise, per-
formance on a number of visuoperceptual and spatial tasks is
maximally impaired after right-hemisphere damage (Ratcliff
1979). There are other disorders - the amnesias (Squire 1982)
and the prosopagnosias (Damasio, Damasio & Van Hoesen
1982) are the clearest representatives - where it would seem
that the full-blown clinical syndrome only emerges consequent
upon bilateral damage. (This does not preclude the possibility
that the two hemispheres make a differential contribution,
either qualitative or quantitative, to autobiographical memory
or to the recognition of familiar faces.)
It is possible to argue that the normal brain is functionally
symmetric, and that the appearance of asymmetric capacities is
an artifact of overemphasis on the performance of lesioned
brains. However, the fact that many of the asymmetries found
after brain damage can also be shown in radiological and elec-
trophysiological investigations of the normal brain (and in
behavioral studies of lateralized stimulus presentation) makes
such an interpretation seem, for the moment at least, somewhat
perverse. Our best bet is that the human brain is indeed left-
right asymmetric in many aspects of its normal functioning; and
the discovery of these asymmetries can be seen as an (almost)
unqualified success story for the progress of cognitive neuropsy-
chology as a normal science in the century or so that has followed
Paul Broca's very considerable amazement on finding that his
aphasic patients had left-brain damage.
What morals, then, should we draw from Harrington's acute,
amusing, and instructive analysis of some of the highways and
byways that 19th-century neuroscientists explored en route to
our current, perhaps fragile, consensus? The first moral is
obvious, but important: Do not believe the third-hand accounts
of the past with which textbook writers attempt to convince us
that we are so much more clever and wise than our predeces-
sors! It really will not do simply to acknowledge that Hughlings
Jackson wrote a paper on the daulity of the brain. Harrington has
performed an invaluable labour of love, digging around in the
primary literature and presenting 19th-century views on the
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duplex brain within a comprehensible intellectual framework.
The past is not another country and, besides, the wench is not
dead.
From this follows the second moral: Those who know no
history are destined to repeat it. What is particularly interest-
ing, however, is which bits are repeated. As a good historian,
Harrington argues that discoveries are made in a particular
ideological context and interpreted in the light (or darkness) of
prevailing sociological conditions. I am both more and less
convinced of this than is Harrington.
First, less. It is, I think, a considerable tribute to the self-
correcting nature of scientific argumentation that so many seem-
ingly good ideas were so rapidly shown to be nonsense; Burq's
metalloscopy, Charcot's hemihypnosis, and, of course, Gall's
craniology are compelling examples. Anyone can make a
mistake (David Ferrier once localized primary visual functions
in the angular gyrus), but errors of this nature are quickly sorted
out and do not tend to recur.
On the other hand, speculations about how many minds,
selves, or souls a single brain can support do recur. These
arguments have, at best, a wildly tangential relationship to the
data that purportedly sustain them; it is thus hardly surprising to
find that sociological constraints determine, in large part, the
metaphorical interpretation of results. Localizing a fairly well-
defined psychological function, color perception, for example
(Zeki 1980), is one thing; localizing the yin and the yang is
something else.
Contemplate the following three statements:
Different parts of the brain have different functions; these parts can
be differentially active in the normal brain and they can become
radically disconnected from each other after brain lesion.
"Each mental organ", says one of our cleverest phrenologists,
"speaks its own language and understands the language which it
speaks itself." (Lange 1925, p. 121)
The new idea that emerges from these data, is that, quite literally,
there are several selves to man, and what I want to argue is that they
are not necessarily conversant with each other internally. (Gazzaniga
1978, p. 233)
In either the 19th or the 20th century, moving from the first to
the third of these remarks is an enterprise fraught with more
than scientific considerations.
Two hemispheres do not make a dichotomy
A. David Milner
MRC Cognitive Neuroscience Research Group, Psychological Laboratory,
University of St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JU, Scotland
Harrington's essay is fascinating as a summary of 19th-century
writings on the topic of cerebral hemisphere asymmetry and
interaction, but, more important, it highlights instructively how
prevailing attitudes influenced and moulded the ideas that were
put forward. If we can see this from our 20th-century vantage
point, I have no doubt that our own excesses in this area will be
equally evident to a 21st-century historian of science. Of course,
scientific theories are never conceived in a cultural vacuum, and
indeed in an important sense theories can only be successfully
explanatory if they provide suitably familiar metaphors or analo-
gies and are consistent with an existing conceptual framework.
Likewise, neuropsychology is not unique in science in its love of
the simple dichotomy. Not only is it didactically convenient to
contrast nature versus nurture or waves versus particles, but
there is evidently a profound human need to attempt to impose
an order on nature. It is difficult, however, to resist the feeling
that the topic of hemisphere specialisation is unusually prone to
excesses of both these kinds at the present time, just as it was a
hundred years ago.
The main impetus to such theorising in recent times was
provided by the behavioural studies of "split-brain" animals,
and subsequently humans, initiated by Sperry and his cowork-
ers in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet very little knowledge about
human cerebral asymmetry emerged from this work that was
not already known from studies of unilaterally brain-damaged
individuals. One can only infer from this that the excitement
created by the "split-brain " work derived instead largely from
the separate (though related) evidence that the disconnected
cerebral hemispheres, though not alike, could function inde-
pendently. This conclusion has led almost imperceptibly and
perhaps inevitably to the totally unjustified inferences that
nondisconnected cerebral hemispheres might be able to func-
tion independently, and that different individuals might rely on
one hemisphere rather than the other in their cognitive "style '
(see Beaumont, Young & McManus 1984). (In parallel, discus-
sions as to whether the "split-brain " patients could be said to be
in possession of two "minds" led in some quarters back to
speculations that intact individuals might have, and be capable
of separately activating, two "minds"). One result was that the
late 1960s' antiscientific ethos and fashion for meditation and
mysticism became incorporated into a 1970s' pseudoscientific
identification of realism and logicality with the left hemisphere,
and imaginative and intuitive thought with the right. Such
myths continue to pervade our culture in the 1980s. (The
glorification of irrational thought has been built into some of
these modern distinctions; such thought was relegated to the
right hemisphere in the 19th century too, by some theorists, but
evidently it was at least disapproved of.)
These wilder flights of fancy (many of which are still taken
seriously outside mainstream academic psychology) have been
accompanied by a host of "respectable" hypothesised distinc-
tions between the hemispheres, so that information-processing
metaphors like "digital vs. analogue" and "serial vs. parallel"
can be listed along with "yin vs. yang" and the others.
Harrington revealingly compares such a modern list with its
19th-century equivalent. Our society has thankfully changed in
some ways, such that, for example, racial stereotypes are no
longer incorporated into our neuropsychological theories (al-
though sexual stereotypes there still may be in some cases,
albeit in a more subtle form). But despite the differences, it is
striking that the search for a simple characterisation of the
brain's functional asymmetry has been powerfully rehabilitated
after a long hiatus during the first half of this century. As in the
last century it is once again tacitly assumed that the characterisa-
tion should be along "psychological" lines, that is, that the
hemispheres differ in ways similar to the ways in which people
differ or in which an individual differs from one occasion to
another.
There is actually no unequivocal evidential support for any of
the proposed functional distinctions between the hemispheres
though many do have a genuine basis in fact. The most secure is
that most closely tied to the classical neurological data, namely,
verbal versus nonverbal/visuospatial (the first on Springer and
Deutsch's modern list as presented by Harrington). Yet as a
recent analysis of lesion data (Bryden, Hecaen & De Agostini
1983) shows, even this pattern is far from universal. Contrary to
widespread belief, the evidence indicates that only 72% of right-
handed males, 46% of right-handed females, 26% of familially
sinistral left-handers, and 35% of nonfamilial left-handers show
the classical pattern of left-hemisphere specialisation for lan-
guage and right-hemisphere specialisation for spatial ability.
This leaves almost half of the general population unaccounted
for. Although a few people appear to show the opposite pattern,
verbal/spatial complementarity in either lateral direction oc-
curred in an estimated total of only 73% of right-handed males,
55% of right-handed females, 29% of familially sinistral left-
handers, and 42% of nonfamilially sinistral left-handers. It
clearly follows that a large number of people must share control
of these capacities within one hemisphere. Most important,
Bryden et al. s analysis also revealed that hemisphere specialisa-
tion for language was statistically independent of hemisphere
specialisation for visuospatial ability; that is, these two tenden-
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cies in the population cannot be causally interdependent. (Actu-
ally one cannot exclude the possibility that the two might be
partially and separately cocaused by common underlying
determinants.)
These sobering calculations suggest that the search for an
explanatory dichotomy for the cerebral hemispheres is totally
misguided. There may be several real "gradients" of specialisa-
tion between the hemispheres (e.g., for linguistic comprehen-
sion, for spatial analysis, for gestalt perception, for emotional
arousal, for complex motor control), each of which will favour
one or the other hemisphere (c.f. LeDoux 1983), but each of
which is determined independently of the others. Of course
some such gradients will tilt in a given direction for nearly all
people (e.g., the gradient for expressive speech), others will do
so for most people (e.g., spatial ability), while yet others may tilt
with a roughly equal incidence in either direction. These last
might be invisible in neurological group studies, but could be
detectable in other kinds of research. Such a series of gradients
could result, through their interactions, in a wide variety of
different cognitive types. Ultimately they should be open to
characterisation in processing rather than psychological terms.
Once one begins to entertain the possibility of such indepen-
dent gradients, it becomes increasingly apparent how narrowly
restrictive are the persistent attempts to construct dichotomies
between the hemispheres. It also becomes unsurprising that a
variety of studies have found only weak relationships between
tests of laterality and tests of inferred hemispheric preference
(Beaumont et al. 1984). In the light of these considerations, it
might be appropriate not only to abandon the search for the
hemispheric dichotomy, but indeed to abandon the widespread
tendency even to talk of hemispheric dichotomies at all. Our
knowledge is only of a certain number of capacities for which in a
given individual there may be a quantitative difference between
the hemispheres. It adds nothing to the scientific status of such
findings to pair some of them together as apparent opposites.
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Lateralization and sex
Ursula Mittwoch
Department of Genetics and Biometry, University College London, London
NW1 2HE, England
Harrington attributes to Delaunay the idea that the two sides of
the brain are analogous to, and responsible for, the presumed
thought processes of males and females. The author also
suggests that once the two hemispheres have been given sexual
identities, the idea of male cerebral dominance becomes an apt
metaphor for the social and economic relationship between the
sexes in the 19th century. Lest it be thought that male chauvin-
ism is an invention of the 19th century, attention should be
drawn to the fact that an association of the supposedly superior,
dominant side of the body with maleness and of the inferior,
weaker side with femaleness predates the discovery of the
lateralization of the cerebral hemispheres by two and a half
millennia. Two new aspects of the association between body
side and sex that developed in the 19th century would seem to
be the extension of the concept of lateralization to the brain and
the inversion of the relationship between right and left.
Before Broca's (1865) finding of the major role played by the
left cerebral hemisphere in the production of speech, the right
was not only regarded as the superior side, but was also associatd
with maleness; whereas femaleness went with the left, inferior
side. The Pythagorean Table of Opposites lists two adjacent
pairs - right and left, male and female (Lesky 1951; Lloyd 1973).
According to Aristotle, the larger claw of lobsters and crabs is
situated on the right. Although this statement proved to be
erroneous (Thompson 1919), Aristotle concluded that the right
side is naturally superior to the left. That this notion has been
well and truly integrated into our own sense of values is evident
by the meanings of words like "right," "righteous," "dextrous,"
and "adroit," on the one hand, and of "sinister," "gauche," or
"left-handed," on the other (Mittwoch 1977).
Just as the right side is superior to the left, so the male is
superior to the female. Aristotle believed that the male is
characterized by an abundance of the superior element, fire,
and the qualities "hot" and "dry," while the female has an
abundance of water and is therefore rather cold and wet (Gordon
1979; Aristotle 1979).
Given the relationships between right and left and between
male and female, only one further assumption was required to
arrive at a consistent theory of sex determination. If we add the
additional postulate that the right side is hotter than the left, the
conclusion follows that males are associated with the right side
and females with the left (Lesky 1950; Lloyd 1973; Mittwoch
1985). This theory was open to some variation. Parmenides (5th
century B.C.) seems to have thought that the sex of a child is
determined by its position in the womb, males being on the
right and females on the left, whereas his contemporary Anax-
agoras thought that the father was responsible for the sex of his
offspring, semen from the right side becoming male and from
the left side female. Aristotle (4th century B.C.) criticized both
theories, since he had evidence from dissections that fetuses of
different sex could be found on the same side of the uterus and
also that males with only one testis could father children of
either sex. However, such factual details did not seriously
disturb the right-left theory of sex determination, which in fact
persisted until the discovery of sex chromosomes, that is, the
beginning of the 20th century (Meisenheimer 1930; Mittwoch
1985).
The theory put forward by Broca in the second half of the 19th
century that the superiority of the right hand had its origin in the
left cerebral hemisphere threatened to invert the right-left
theory. This new development paved the way for the seemingly
innovative idea put forward by Delaunay and other authors
cited by Harrington that the superior thought processes of the
male had their origin in the left, superior hemisphere, and vice
versa that female thinking is associated with the right, inferior
hemisphere. It would seem, however, that this break with the
past was of interest mainly to specialists and did not make much
impact on the general public. After all, right is still right.
During the course of the last century, the battle against
sexism has met with considerable success so that the social and
economic domination of men over women has been markedly
reduced. By contrast, lateralism still reigns supreme. Even
though the stigma of left-handedness may be diminished, we are
a long way from putting into practice the recommendation by
Plato that children should be taught to use both hands equally,
just as they learn to use both feet. "Through the folly of nurses
and mothers we have all become lame, so to speak, in our hands"
(Plato, in Laws, quoted by Lloyd, 1973, p. 185).
Irrespective of the exact relationship between lateralization of
the brain and handedness, there can be little doubt that, if we
wished, we could be ambidextrous.
What textbooks between 1887 and 1911 said
about hemisphere differences
David J. Murray
Department of Psychology, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada
K7L 3N6
My first thought on putting down Harrington's fascinating target
article was "Why is most of this new to me?" I have admittedly
made no attempt to specialize in the history of physiological
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psychology, but even in the reasonably extensive reading I did
for a paper on experimentation in memory in the late 19th
century (Murray 1976), I never ran across much of this work. It
occurred to me that one reason I was ignorant of much of the
research on laterality was that, as I acquired knowledge in
psychology over the years, it was by a fairly consistent route:
consult a textbook, then go to the primary literature. Works that
did not get into the textbooks were simply unexplored except
insofar as the primary literature (journal articles, etc.) led to
them. Accordingly, I did an informal survey of five of the most
widely read texts on physiological psychology from the period
1887 to 1911.
I originally began by listing Harrington's 19th-century
dichotomies as shown in Table 1, in the hope of finding out what
each text said about each dichotomy, but the exercise was
fruitless: I could find no mention of such ascriptions as intel-
ligence/emotion, male/female, or reason/madness to the
left/right hemispheres respectively. In fact the texts all had in
common a relatively complete eschewal of wild speculations
about hemispheric functioning and focused fairly narrowly on
the fact that speech seemed to be more localized in the left
rather than the right hemisphere. The details are worth spelling
out, however, for they reveal the slow process by which original
data became accepted into the corpus of knowledge thought
respectable enough for the consumption of textbook readers.
Wundt (1887) gave a diagram of the left hemisphere in which
he distinguished between a motor speech area in the frontal lobe
just anterior to the Sylvian fissure and a sensory speech area in
the upper temporal lobe. One of his sources for believing that
speech was located in the left hemisphere was evidence that
suggested that aphasia was more often associated with right than
with left hemiplegia. I could find no other suggestions about the
distinctive roles of the two hemispheres, but Wundt was quite
speculative about the frontal lobes, assigning to them a center
for "apperception."
Ladd's text (1887) was the English-language equivalent of
Wundt's and widely read in its day. Part 2, Chapter 2, is on the
localization of cerebral function. We read there how the new
research inspired by Fritsch and Hitzig had led, in the previous
15 years, to an extensive search for localization of function in the
cerebrum. Much space is devoted to the evidence for motor
areas in the cerebral cortex, but Ladd chiefly relied on the
monograph of Exner (1881), also referred to by Harrington. This
monograph was very detailed on motor dysfunction following
damage to the hemispheres and incorporated evidence that
motor dysfunction could be associated with sensory dysfunc-
tion. Ladd writes, however, that
Exner feels warranted in affirming that "the tactile cortical fields for
the different divisions of the body coincide in general with their motor
cortical fields." It is to be noted, moreover, that the percentage of the
cases of disturbance of tactile sensations occurring on the right
hemisphere is more than twice as large as that of the left. Sensibility
seeins, then, to be the predominating/unction of the right hemisphere
as motion is of the left. (p. 284, italics Ladd's)
Later Ladd reviews the evidence that speech is localized in
the left hemisphere but does not integrate his discussion with
the passage just quoted.
James (1890) gives a picture of the left hemisphere similar to
that of Wundt but with Wundt's "motor " and "sensory" areas
now renamed after Broca and Wernicke, respectively. James
disagreed with Wundt's speculations on the apperception cen-
ter, and, although his recently reconstructed lectures on Excep-
tional Mental States (Taylor 1982) show his wide acquaintance
with the fringe literature of psychology, he does not indulge in
speculation about the two hemispheres other than to discuss
their role in language mediation.
Ebbinghaus's text (1905) was less forbidding than Wundt's
and was read widely by German psychologists at the turn of the
century. He said less about the brain than any of the others, and
his main concern in the first volume, chapter 2 (p. 11) was to
establish in his readers a sense of caution about ascribing any
function to any particular brain part - the difficulties of the topic
are elucidated in a discussion of the functioning of the occipital
lobes. There is little on the separate roles of the hemispheres.
Ladd and Woodworth's text (1911) updated that of Ladd
(1887). There is much more extended discussion of aphasia, with
a diagram of the left hemisphere showing Broca's and Wer-
nicke's areas as well as an area in the middle frontal gyms
labelled "Writing?" The discussion of the motor areas is less
cluttered than in the 1887 text, and the detailed discussion of
Exner's findings is no longer there, nor is the passage quoted
above. After an extended discussion of other areas of the hemi-
spheres, Ladd and Woodworth stress the predominance of the
left hemisphere in right-handed persons and then write:
It would almost seem, from the evidence obtained, that the left
hemisphere so completely takes charge of acts of skill, and of the
intellectual processes concerned in them, as to leave nothing for the
great bulk of the right hemisphere to do. Such a conclusion is, of
course, in itself extremely improbable, especially in view of the equal
size and inner development of the two hemispheres, but it must be
admitted that the role of the right hemisphere, aside from the
simplest sensory and motor functions, is not at all clearly made out. (p.
264)
Thus the ultracautious note sounded by 1911 in the textbooks.
Even Hughlings Jackson was hardly mentioned in the books
listed - only James acknowledged the possible truth of his
"levels" theory of nervous functioning, and none of the texts
referred to Jackson's theories of laterality. Whether the texts
omitted speculative material because it was uncertain and likely
to mislead the reader, or simply because it was difficult and
made for a less black-and-white picture than the teacher
desired, or both, is not clear. Even now the most subtle reward
one can gain from an experiment in psychology is to have it
mentioned in a widely read text. Textbooks are a sort of
battlefield in which scientific contributions compete for space. If
the contributions lack solidity or are overcomplex they are left
out, and a generation of learners does not know about them until
historians such as Harrington exhume them.
Continuity of thought on duality of brain and
mind?
Jane M. Oppenheimer
Department of Biology, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010
Harrington has presented a more comprehensive enumeration
and analysis than has hitherto been available of selected 19th-
century ideas on functional asymmetry of the brain and its
relation to the mind. She has concentrated mainly on work
published in English and in French. Should this be reflected in
the title? References to work in German are sparser, and one
wonders why. Did interest in this area lack in Germany, where
progress in physiology, including that of the brain, was burgeon-
ing in the latter 19th century? An explanation is needed, or at
least desirable.
It is far more difficult to comment on an article that concen-
trates on history than on one dealing with experimental find-
ings. In both, facts are assembled and interpretations of them
are attempted. But it is harder to judge interpretations of ideas
than it is to evaluate conclusions from empirical or quantitative
data, even when contemporary work is at issue. The problem
becomes more acute for historical data, since both terminology
and the connotations of particular words change with time.
I have no challenge to the facts that Harrington presents. My
chief concern is that I wish that her discussion of actual influence
of one thinker's ideas on those of others had been further
extended. Let us consider Hughlings Jackson, for example. She
correctly devotes much space to his ideas and says of him that his
"reputation today may be even greater than it was in his own
time." Retrospectively contemplated, one of the most fascinat-
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ing aspects of the work of Hughlings Jackson was that it was
inadequately appreciated, not only in his own time, but for some
time after; if I remember correctly, it began to draw deserved
attention only in the 1930s. Yet it did have its influences earlier.
It is usually considered undesirable for authors who publish in
specialized learned periodicals to refer to articles in
encyclopedias, but the best recent evaluation of the work of
Hughlings Jackson is found in the article about him in the
Dictionary of Scientific Biography (Clarke 1973). Clarke points
out far more clearly than does Harrington what Hughlings
Jackson's ideas meant to others who worked nearer to him in
time.
Harrington, nevertheless, is at her strongest when she
describes and analyzes the thought of those she chooses to
discuss. Her weakness is in the presentation - or rather nonpre-
sentation - of her analyses as part of ongoing history. The first
sentence of her abstract begins by saying that "This paper
challenges the belief that lateralization has no history." Many of
us know that the study o/brain lateralization has a history; a few
of us are even named in the third paragraph of the article, and
we are only a small sample. The sentence in the abstract
continues by saying that the paper "attempts to define the
relevance of older ideas to present research." But that is exactly
what it does not do, except in the most abstract terms in the very
beginning of the paper and in the final conclusion. In fact,
influences on late-20th-century research are mostly never men-
tioned. Late-20th-century research itself is barely mentioned,
Bogen and Sperry permitted only a single reference each, both
from the 1960s. Where is Akelaitis (1942, 1944)? Gazzanig
(1972)? Geschwind (1965)? Jerre Levy (1971)?
The conclusion says that if the essay were in a history of
science journal, it would not require justification. Indeed, it
requires it even less in a journal concentrating on empirical
evidence. The writing of generalities on the meaning of history
is superfluous in such a paper as this. The uses of history would
better speak for themselves if history were permitted to state
explicitly which 19th-century ideas were specifically effective in
stimulating what 20th-century thought, and which were not.
Such a contrast might at least arouse speculation about reasons
for continuities and discontinuities in history and science, and
even about the origin of ideas.
Experiencing two selves: The history of a
mistake
Roland Puccetti
Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia,
Canada B3H 3J5
Embedded within the history of the concept of mental duality,
about which Harrington has given us the fullest account so far,
there lies a further notion that rests, I believe, on a simple
mistake (see section 4.2). The mistake was shared, in fact, by
members of the opposing camps on the question of dual
mentality.
For McDougall (1911) the absence of signs of double
consciousness where the corpus callosum was missing proved
the unity of the mind was not dependent upon the integrity of
the central nervous system. Descourtis (1890) thought that
unifying factors provided by the two cerebral hemispheres'
having shared a common body simply disguised dual con-
sciousness in the disconnected state. Liepmann (1900), howev-
er, showed that under careful observation the loss of commu-
nication between the half brains could manifest itself, for
example, when his right-handed patient with a callosal lesion
was unable to write with the left hand upon verbal instructions
to do so. Yet even this patient, Harrington notes gave no
evidence that he "experienced himself as 'two selves,' or suf-
fered any break in his subjective sense of unified identity - any
more than split-brain patients of today."
In philosophy it is a pretty safe bet that that if something is
inconceivable it will do no conceptual work in any direction. But
such is surely the case with requiring of mental duality that it be
experienced by someone without a corpus callosum (better,
without any forebrain commissures, as in complete cerebral
commissurotomy). To see why this is so, let us start with the
assumptions of "folk psychology," namely, that each normal
human being is an organism endowed with one brain that is the
biological substrate of a single conscious mind. Given these
assumptions, could I feel a sensation of yours, or you one of
mine? Surely any sensation I feel is mine, independently of what
you feel at or near the same time; and what you feel is your
sensation quite apart from what I may be feeling just then.
Consider: Even if our brains were electronically interconnected
such that when someone (even I!) steps on your right foot, not
only do you feel this, but the relevant neural events in your left
somatosensory strip trigger mimicking events in the homolo-
gous area of my brain milliseconds later; still I do not feel your
sensation, for there were two sensations of a foot being stepped
on in quick succession to each other: yours and mine. Indeed,
even if that primary receptive area of neocortex in your brain
were anesthetized, so that there was only one sensation, mine, it
would still be mine, though it was your right foot being stepped
on that initiated the train of afferent impulses terminating in the
illusory sensation I would have of my right foot being stepped on
(in this indirect way I would be giving myself the sensation of my
foot being stepped on by stepping on yours!). So it looks clear
not only that sensations cannot be ownerless (Strawson 1959)
but also that they are nontransferable between distinct
conscious subjects, minds, or selves.
But then it is equally clear that both proponents and oppo-
nents of mental duality were mistaken in looking for evidence of
it in experience: for no one could experience such a condition.
Take the model proposed by Wigan (1844) and revived by Bogen
(1969). If I have two cerebral hemispheres and each is the
organic basis for a mind, then I, one and the same person, have
two distinct minds. But as we saw in the folk psychology
example, minds cannot introspect each other. It makes no
difference if you internalize the two minds to my body. If there
is another mind in my head besides the one now thinking what
to say next in this commentary, I cannot have introspective
access to its conscious contents with this same mind (based, no
doubt, in the left cerebral hemisphere). If I could, they would
not be two minds, but one. And if there are two such minds,
then the one that is not writing this commentary cannot be iny
mind, but must be someone else's mind. What mental duality
really implies is dual personhood in the same body (Puccetti
1973; 1977; 1981).
But to say that mental duality cannot be experienced is not to
say that it cannot be evidenced in other ways. Take Liepmann's
right-handed patient with a callosal lesion who was unable to
follow verbal instructions to write using the left hand. What
explains this inability? First, ipsilateral pathways are insufficient
to allow the speaking left hemisphere to guide the left hand in
writing. Second, while we normal right handers can (though
clumsily) write using the left hand, we utilize the commissural
relay system (left hemisphere-right hemisphere-left hand) to
do so, and these pathways had been disrupted by the callosal
lesion. Third, the only neurological resource remaining for
Liepmann's patient in confronting this task was the mute,
aphasic, and agraphic right hemisphere, which of course had
never learned to write with either hand!
Now suppose someone asks of Liepmann's patient this simple
question: Can he write? On the model provided by folk psychol-
ogy, a single mind has been divided (or the cerebral hemi-
spheres have been rendered functionally independent of each
other) by virtue of the callosal lesion. So the answer has to be:
Yes and no; he can write a letter with the right hand, but not
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even a sentence with the left hand (though it is not paralyzed at
all). This is, obviously, a disturbing response, but we are stuck
with it so long as we persist in construing consciousness as
spanning both hemispheres of a normal human brain.
Consider now the Wigan-Bogen model confronting the same
question. On that view, the patient can write with "mind-left"
but not with "mind-right." Since both minds are his minds, the
answer has to be Yes, leaving unexplained why he can't do so
using the left hand (for Wigan this is especially provoking, since
he thought both hemispheres capable of ratiocination, presum-
ably including putting words on paper). At the very least, a
neurologist would find such a model unhelpful in explaining
unilateral agraphia subsequent to callosal lesion.
Why not, then, reject both these models and say that lesion to
the corpus callosum in this patient cut off cross input between
the two cerebral hemispheres, each of which served as the
biogical substrate of a distinct person? Thus the mute person on
the right side of the head could not direct the left hand in
writing, while the speaking and writing person based on the left
hemisphere was unable, in the absence of cross-recross path-
ways between the two hemispheres, to direct the left hand in
writing.
To speak this way is admittedly awkward and even mislead-
ing, for it suggests that persons are just human cerebral hemi-
spheres. They are not, for - and this is why Harrington in the
target article was right to say that McDougall need not have
feared that mental duality threatened belief in a mind distinct
from the body - brain processes, unlike mental acts, have no
intentionality. They are not about anything, do not take objects
or themselves have semantic content. It is this observation,
known as Brentano's thesis to philosophers but increasingly
overlooked by them for over 100 years, which guarantees
distinctness of mind and brain. If mental duality is true, each
human organism is the basis, normally, for two ongoing
conscious lives rather than one, though selective pressure in all
twin-brained species (all vertebrates) conceals this from us, by
introducing an inhibitory mechanism that prevents each half
brain from having introspective access to the conscious content
of the other (to prevent, for example, a doubling of the subjec-
tive visual field), and in reflective species like Homo sapiens
sapiens by giving us such a powerful drive to believe we talkers
and writers are all alone in our heads that to date not a single
split-brain subject has acknowledged the true state of affairs. It
may be some consolation to recognize that our mute cerebral
companion is probably aware of the truth, even if nonverbally,
since from an early age he must have known he was not doing the
talking or writing performed by that body. But of one thing we
can be sure, namely, that the mute half brain did not learn this
by experiencing two selves, because that is an inconceivable
expectation.
Do we have one brain or two? Babylon
revisited?
Aaron Smith
Neuropsychological Laboratory, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
48109
Since the Egyptian Surgical Papyrus over 3,500 years ago, the
tortuous history of efforts to define the nature of human brain
functions and the specific neuroanatomical substrata that under-
lie them reflects the gradual development of diverse, unrelated
disciplines; the emergence, disappearance, and occasional
reemergence or "rediscovery" of unique or specific human
brain structure-function relationships; and changing Zeitgeists,
social forces, and philosophic approaches. Until the revisions of
Galenic dogmas and long-established teachings on human
neuroanatomy by Vesalius (1543), various functions were lo-
calized in the cerebral ventricles. With the development of
modern neuroanatomy, the cerebral mantle was arbitrarily and
increasingly differentiated into lobes from two (anterior and
posterior) to three (anterior, middle, and posterior) to, cur-
rently, four (frontal, temporal, parietal, and occipital).
Beginning with the frontal lobes, each of these variously
defined gross structures became the successive focus of atten-
tion for varying periods. The current intense efforts to lateralize
almost all human cerebral functions derives directly from recent
studies of patients undergoing a revised surgical procedure -
commissurotomy - for relief of intractable seizures. Although
the efficacy of commissurotomy for eliminating seizures has
received little attention, the findings in studies of the behavioral
sequelae in a small number of epileptic patients have given rise
to remarkable and extravagant generalizations (in addition to
those cited by Harrington, see Smith, 1984, p. 310). Educators,
commentators, psychologists, psychiatrists, music and art
teachers, and laymen currently refer to the holistic, artistic,
intuitive, nonhuman "right brain" and the intellectual, analytic,
"human" "left brain." Unaware of the history reviewed by
Harrington, authors increasingly focus on efforts to lateralize
almost all human cerebral functions exclusively to either the left
or right hemispheres in a manner suggestive of a dichotomania
from which no specific human function may be safe.
Harrington's superb and scholarly review of the considerable
preoccupation with hemispheric differences and "duality of
mind" in the 19th century is therefore a salutary and timely
contribution that will afford new as well as old, but broader,
perspectives and contexts for evaluating the remarkable claims
and extraordinary interpretations based on limited studies of a
small number of "split-brain" patients. It is hard to imagine that
the recent authors of such claims were aware of the striking
similarities to their extravagant generalizations based on clinical
findings in patients without commissurotomy in the last
century. As Smith (1981; 1984) has pointed out, many of the
conclusions on the exclusive localization of specific functions in
either the left or right hemisphere are clearly incompatible with
the results of studies of effects of left and right hemispherectomy
for infantile epileptogenic lesions as well as for malignant tumors
in adults. Moreover, comparisons of preoperative and long-
term follow-up studies of patients with complete or partial
commissurotomy have demonstrated that the nature and sever-
ity of deficits both before and after commissurotomy reflect the
effects of extra-callosal lesions that were present before or may
have been incurred during or after surgery. In view of the small
number of patients and the numerous sources of ambiguity
inherent in studies of this clinical material (Campbell, Bogen, &
Smith 1981), Harrington's penetrating and careful review of the
interpretations of findings in 19th-century studies will be of
special interest to investigators planning studies of effects of
commissurotomy.
The broader implications of Harrington's essay, however,
have even greater relevance for students of brain functions. As
she points out, the history of concepts of human brain structure-
function relationships reflects the influence of sociocultural and
technical advances in related disciplines that provide more
accurate definitions and precise measurements of brain struc-
ture and function. In view of the significant advances in
neurosurgery, neuropathology, neuroanatomy, and the
emergence and development of neuropsychology and other
related disciplines since the last century, how can we explain the
recent recurrence of the preoccupation with dichotomization of
human cognitive processes at this time? Is the "double brain"
simply a manifestation of collective social preoccupations? Or is
it possibly a recurrence of the same tendency to prefer a neat,
simplified, and organized static mosaic model of the brain rather
than the complexities of a dynamic model that was reflected in
the victory of Broca over Jackson in their 1868 debate in
Greenwich on the cerebral mechanisms underlying speech and
the nature of the various functions involved?
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Unlike all other paired and single organs, human brain cells
do not regenerate. The human brain also differs from other
single and paired organs in the vastly greater range of functions.
It also apparently differs from other organs in its remarkable
versatility and plasticity in compensating for loss of function
resulting from brain injuries in adults as well as children (Smith
1984). Current descriptions of the two cerebral hemispheres as
"twin brains" or a "double brain" are largely based on observa-
tions of different deficits resulting from commissurotomy and
from seemingly similar differences in effects of left- vs. right-
sided brain lesions. However, numerous reports have also
described similarly unique differences between effects of frontal
and posterior lateralized lesions and between cortical and
subcortical lesions. Might not one be able to cite such dif-
ferences as evidence that we have not only two but four, eight,
or more brains?
Harrington's superb review of 19th-century studies of hemi-
sphere differences is more than a timely and scholarly tour de
force that should temper the current scientific and public
enthusiasm and uncritical acceptance of the extravagant claims
based on recent studies of a few "split-brain" patients. In
devoting a considerable portion of her review to the brilliant
studies of Hughlings Jackson, she calls attention to the limita-
tions of current graduate training of students and teachers in
brain and behavioral sciences. While she notes that Jackson's
works have been "misunderstood or only partially appreciated,"
the simple fact is that the overwhelming majority of students
and teachers in the brain and behavioral sciences have never
read Jackson's prolific writings. Jackson's writing style is pon-
derous and lugubrious. One hopes, however, that the rediscov-
ery of Jackson's work, especially his focus on principles underly-
ing the organization or evolution of brain function, its disruption
by brain injuries at various stages of cerebral maturation, and its
compensation or restitution, will stimulate experimentalists as
well as clinicians in the behavioral and brain sciences to follow
the example of David Ferrier and integrate clinical and experi-
mental approaches for further definitions of such principles.
Author's Response
Historical and scientific issues en route from
Wigan to Sperry
Anne Harrington
Wellcome Unit for the History of Medicine, Oxford University, Oxford 0X2
6PE, England
Ever since I began this research, I have felt that it would
be exciting to engage in a dialogue with modern-day
neuroscientists, and I am grateful to the unique BBS peer
commentary format for making such a dialogue possible. I
was stimulated and, by and large, gratified by the
response my target article elicited. I have organized my
reply into a seven-part structure, which I hope will prove
to be broadly integrative, yet permit sufficient attention
to individual remarks.
1. "Great Men" in the history of laterality
I am concerned here with questions and comments on
specific individuals or groups of individuals, and I begin
with Lokhorst, who tells me that my story stretches back
longer than I think, and in particular that I have omitted a
key figure in the history of laterality: the 4th-century B.C.
Athenian physician, Diodes of Carystus. Having read
both of Lokhorst's publications on Diocles's writings
(Lokhorst 1982a, 1982b), 1 think he has called attention to
a remarkable document, and I am glad to believe that this
ancient physician may have been the first to entertain the
idea of hemisphere functional specialization as a concept.
To that extent, he does indeed deserve a place in the
history of this area. I am undecided, however, about the
further claim that Diocles's views on the nature of hemi-
sphere specialization are directly comparable with the
sorts of distinctions chiefly developed in the last 20 years.
Because we do not know how Diocles came to be "right,"
there is no way of telling whether we are dealing here
with an accidental linguistic correspondence, or a true
conceptual one. Did Diocles choose to put "intellectus"
on the left and "sensus" on the right for empirical reasons,
or is it possible that the localization could just as readily
have been the other way around? If the latter, might not
the duality of the brain have served simply as a neat
means of expressing physically the metaphysical distinc-
tion between sentience and intellect, which Lokhorst
traces back to Alcmaeon and Empedocles?
Eling has focused attention on a considerably better
known "Great Man" in the history of laterality: Paul
Broca. He lays stress on Broca's cautious and meticulous
treatment of the problem of speech localization and
asymmetry, and distinguishes between Broca's "later-
ality as a means" approach to brain functioning, and the
cruder "laterality as an end" approach favored by so many
of his followers. I like this distinction, but wonder if it is
true, as Eling suggests, that Broca's approach was there-
fore also less time-bound; less molded by metaphysical
assumptions, or by the larger sociocultural ethos? On
going back to the Broca passage Eling cites in his
commentary, I was struck by the reason Broca (1865:336)
gave for disclaiming a clear relationship between speech
asymmetry and handedness. He saw no grounds for
assuming, he said, that the "motor" and the "intellectual"
part of the two hemispheres must (in left-handers, at
least) be developmentally bound up with each other.
This distinction between "motor" and "intellectual"
parts of the brain was derived from the reigning doctrine
of Broca's day - mentioned by Greenblatt - that the
cerebral convolutions were the terra incognita of the
mind, and not analyzable in terms of sensory-motor reflex
functioning. For Broca, "articulate speech" was a mental
faculty (1861b:335), and its localization in the third frontal
convolution entailed no belief that parts of the cortex
might serve motor functioning. In the years immediately
following Fritsch and Hitzig (and the rise of the distinc-
tion between "motor" and "sensory" aphasia), would
Broca's caveat for caution - which seems so perspicacious
in light of modern findings - have seemed wise, or merely
outdated?
It may also be relevant, in considering the problem of
how far Broca himself may or may not have been influ-
enced by the wider sociocultural ethos, to note the extent
to which Broca imbued his views on laterality (or func-
tional asymmetry) with moral significance. In the target
article, I spoke about his decision to conflate asymmetry
with the capacity for "perfectibility" and to make it one of
the "chief characteristics" of the human brain (Broca,
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1869:393; 1877:527-28). Although I cannot develop the
argument here, I believe that this aspect of Broca's
scientific thought needs to be understood against a back-
ground of wider cultural concern at the time about the
implications of evolutionary theory (Lamarckian, Spen-
cerian, Darwinian). In a postevolutionary universe, what
still gave substance to mankind's old claims to pride of
place in the natural world?
Oppenheimer is concerned about the fact that there
are fewer references to works by German figures in the
target article than to English and especially French scien-
tists. I have been less successful tracking down German
sources, but is this fact due to a weakness of my histo-
riography or could it reflect differences in national
research interests? According to Oppenheimer (1976) the
2d series of the Surgeon General's Index Catalogue lists
22 late-19th-century articles about the double brain,
written in French, English, and German. In fact, only
one of the listed articles is German (Meynert 1891), and,
ironically, this one turns out to have been incorrectly
indexed. It is an interesting paper, but it is not about the
double brain.
In the early 1860s, Wilhelm Griesinger - one of the
most influential German psychiatrists of the nineteenth
century - summarily dismissed the theories of Wigan and
Holland as lacking in sufficient proof (Griesinger
1861:25-26). Could this have had an inhibiting influence
on the rise of later German "duality of mind" theories? In
contrast, could the greater French interest in brain
duality reflect the fact that the French were particularly
preoccupied with the pathologies for which the double-
brain theories were intended to account (Binet 1889:8-
9)? Similarly, could the fact that late century German
aphasiology was dominated by the "geometric" orienta-
tion of Karl Wernicke have discouraged a tendency in that
country toward the kind of broad dichotomizing one finds
in Broca-influenced France? After all, with his Gratiolet-
inspired explanation for language asymmetry, Broca had
focused attention on hemisphere differences from the
very beginning.
While I believe that there is a clear case to be made for
different national foci of interest in this area, I certainly do
not rule out the possibility that during the isolated,
chauvinistic years after the Franco-Prussian war there
was more German interest in the double brain than my
research methods so far have managed to unearth. Quite
by serendipity, I recently came upon a remarkable case of
apparent "unilateral delirium" reported at the turn of the
century by Eugen Bleuler (1902). It was not referenced in
any of my primary sources, and it was also apparently
unknown to the late Norman Geschwind (1965), who was
well read in the German literature and interested in
finding examples of "disconnection" syndrome. The
patient Bleuler observed had lain in his bed, perfectly
quiet and relaxed on the left side of his body, but in a state
of violent delirium on the right side. The right hand
grasped at ropes, chopped things with an axe, sowed
seeds, and slung away invisible objects with great effort.
Sometimes it would seize hold of the blankets and try to
yank them away, and once it upset the patient's dinner.
When this happened, the left hand readjusted the bed-
clothes, wiped the patient's mouth, and gave every ap-
pearance of remaining in contact with reality. The con-
sciousness associated with the delirious right-sided
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activities had full command of language; the rational
consciousness associated with the left hand was occasion-
ally able to speak but was more limited in this respect.
Bleuler interpreted this case in terms of independent
hemisphere action, and he felt it might instructively be
compared with Liepmann's recently published (1900)
study of unilateral apraxia.
A number of the commentators spoke of the work of
Hughlings Jackson. Oppenheimer wishes I had extended
my analysis of Jackson to include a discussion of his
influence, both on contemporaries and on later 20th-
century figures. I make no apologies for having failed to
address the vast and disputed question of Jackson's gener-
al influence on other figures (in addition to Clarke 1973,
see Dewhurst 1982, and the bibliography in Ey 1975).
What, however, about the fate of Jackson's views on the
double brain? They received no mention in Head's (1926)
very influential interpretation of Jackson's thought,
chiefly (I believe) because they belied the image Head
was trying to create of Jackson as a brave and lonely
"holist." Head did discuss Jackson's views on mental
duality and imperception, but he completely dissociated
them from their anatomical framework, and hopelessly
misrepresented them to boot. What of the influence of
this aspect of Jackson's thought on his immediate contem-
poraries? With one possible exception, I think it was
minimal, except for isolated ideas (e.g., that the right
hemisphere serves "emotional" speech). The possible
exception is Sigmund Freud. There is evidence - which I
hope to lay out fully in a later publication - that certain
aspects of Jackson's views on mental duality (especially
the idea that thoughts must be "objectified") had a signifi-
cant impact on Freud's concept of consciousness, as first
enunciated in the Project.
Notwithstanding Jackson's undoubted importance, I
would strongly resist any attempt to idealize him or his
work. While I readily agree with Smith that there might
be much to be gained from greater attention to some of
Jackson's heuristic principles, I also believe that, inter-
woven with the exhilarating flashes of genius, there are
ambiguities, paradoxes, and blind spots. This may be
especially true for Jackson's idiosyncratic views on the
double-brain. Greenblatt has called attention to some of
the problems raised by Jackson's attempt to apply associa-
tionist principles to the problem of laterality. I will raise
just one more. Because Alexander Bain's associationist
psychology convinced Jackson that words were stored in
the brain in the form of articulatory movements, he never
wavered in his view that speech, both on its expressive
and on its receptive side, was a motor function. Conse-
quently, his theoretical system took no account what-
soever of the work of Karl Wernicke.
Finally, I come to Wigan, whose "patterns of discov-
ery" have been eloquently defended by Isler & Regard.
Although they raise a number of interesting issues, let me
simply try to balance their portrait of Wigan as a scientist
by pointing out that he was no less a moralist. In arguing
that the cause of insanity is to be found in pathological
brain functioning - specifically, in the incongruous action
of the two hemispheres - Wigan was self-consciously
opposing himself to the "monstrous" views of such men as
Johann Heinroth (1773-1843), who argued, in contrast,
that the main cause of mental illness was sin (Winslow
1848:504-5). The paradox of Duality of Mind, however, is
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that even as it proclaimed reassuringly that insanity was
caused by physiological malfunctioning and carried no
moral taint, it affirmed that every individual had a moral
duty to cultivate sufficient power over his two brains - to
make each act as a "sentinel and security for the other" -
in order never to succumb to the ravages of madness
himself (with insanity, then, becoming an implicit failure
to carry out this duty properly). Significantly, Wigan tells
us that although he had been mulling over the problem of
man's double brain for some 25 years he only felt
compelled to "put pen to paper" after reading the Rever-
end John Barlow's 1843 popular tract, Man's Power Over
Himself to Prevent or Control Insanity.
2. What is it like to experience two selves?
It is the belief of Puccetti that confusion over the true
nature of mental duality has plagued most of the history of
this subject. Both proponents and opponents of mental
duality were mistaken in looking for evidence of it in
experience, for no one could experience such a condition.
Two minds cannot introspect each other, because the
moment they did, they would not be two minds, but one.
Consequently, what mental duality really implies is dual
personhood in the same body.
I have no difficulty accepting the logical validity of
Puccetti's argument, but I wonder if he has correctly
assessed the historical record. To begin, there is the
rather banal objection that von Hartmann in 1869 seems
to have made much the same argument as Puccetti has
done, declaring that if one could join the brains of two
men, they would no longer experience themselves as two
selves, but as one (see section 4 of the target article). A
more interesting sort of objection to Puccetti's historical
verdict, however, lies implicit in the clinical material
19th-century clinicians used to support their belief in
hemisphere functional independence. Take, for example,
the case of "D," first recorded in the 1850s by a Dr. Jaffe.
D always spoke of himself in the first person plural
because, as he explained, there was some "other" person
inside him - hidden in the left side of his body, while he
occupied the right side. This "left D" was forever doing
things against the will of the "real" D, on the right side.
Autopsy revealed profound asymmetries between the
two brain halves (Descourtis 1882:38; Luys 1888:524;
Ribot 1891:127-28; Lyon 1895:108).
Then there was the case, reported in 1884 by Benjamin
Ball, of a young man who found himself haunted by a
stranger, a "Mr. Gabbage," whom he could see, but only
from the bust upwards. Gabbage began to torment the
young man with incessant questions and forced him to
commit senseless and violent crimes. One day, while Ball
was talking with his patient about his condition, the latter
said:
You are not up to date in science. You don't seem to
know that one often has two brains in one's head. This is
precisely what I have. Gabbage has the left brain, and 1
possess the right brain. Unfortunately, it is always the
left side which gets the better of me, and that is why I
cannot resist the advice of this man who seems to be an
evil spirit or at least a malevolent person" (Ball
1884:37).
Judging from the sort of clinical material they used, I
would wager that most of the 19th-century clinicians in
question - had they thought about it - would have been
glad to agree with Puccetti that mental duality really
means dual personhood. I suspect, however, that they
would have been more skeptical of Puccetti's further
argument, that one can have no subjective experience of
this phenomenon. The testimony of their patients would
have seemed flatly to contradict this view. It is not really
relevant whether (1) it is a sloppy use of language to call
the cases cited above a doubling of the self (it is, perhaps,
really an invasion of the "self by some "other") or (2)
neurologists today would agree that this sort of "mental
duality" has anything to do with the duality of the brain. I
wish to suggest only that 19th-century neurologists and
alienists were not so incoherent in their thinking as
Puccetti thinks; they were simply operating within a
different conceptual and empirical framework than he.
3. Ambidexterity versus asymmetry
The review of Harris of ambidextral culture grounds that
educational movement in its contemporary scientific and
clinical base far more thoroughly than I was able to do. I
should only like to add that, although John Jackson was
the founder of ambidextral culture in Britain, I have
recently discovered that he had an American predeces-
sor. James Liberty Tadd, director of the Philadelphia
Public School of Industrial Art, promoted ambidextral
training as part of his effort to introduce comprehensive
"real manual training" into the public school system. "I
am firmly convinced," he wrote in his large and
impressive manual (the cover of the first edition shows a
young girl demonstrating "ambidextrous coordination in
4 directions"), "that the better and firmer the union of
each hand with its proper hemisphere of the brain, and
the more facility we have of working each together and
also independently, the better the brain and mind and
the better the thought, the reason and the imagination
will be" (Tadd 1899:48). By 1900, according to E. N.
Smith (1900:581), some 2,000 schoolchildren were regu-
larly undergoing training and were said to have become
"relatively sharper and more intelligent than others."
Harris has stressed that advocates of ambidexterity
"were serious people struggling with serious ideas."
Given this - and considering that they "promised
remarkable psychological and medical benefits" - why,
then, did they always remain on the margins of main-
stream medicine and pedagogy? Perhaps at least a partial
answer may be found in the fact - which I mentioned in
my earlier remarks on Broca, and which Corballis has also
pointed out - that there was and is a strong inclination to
regard the functional asymmetry of the hands and brain as
a sign of human uniqueness, something which sets man
apart (and above) the rest of animal creation. The issue of
human uniqueness is in turn closely tied up with the idea
raised by Bradshaw, that both past and present fascina-
tion with the double brain may be partly a manifestation
of a deeper existential urge to come to terms with human
consciousness and its status in the physical universe.
In the 19th century, then, for every Belfast principal
with a vision of ambidexterity as progress and liberation,
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there was a neurologist who, on some barely articulated
level, perceived it as a loss of civilized standards of
existence, a return to animal status. Interestingly, in our
own time, it seems that the earlier tension between
asymmetry and bilateral training has been resolved, and
this is why I do not believe that the analogy that has been
drawn between the 19th-century ambidexterity
campaign and the "two-brain" education movement of
today is an exact one. People today are no longer seeking
to promote functional identity between the two hemi-
spheres. Instead, believing that the human brain is
uniquely wired up to serve two fundamentally incompati-
ble forms of cognition, they plead for a fair and equitable
balance of power, based on mutual respect.
4. Our multiple left and right brains: Coping with
dichotomies
The "love of the simple dichotomy" (as Milner has put it)
was the focus of a number of the commentaries. In her
supplement to my discussion of "male" and "female"
hemispheres, Mittwoch explains the way in which mas-
culinity became associated with the right side of the body
in ancient Greece through a two-stage argument: (1)
males are dominated by the superior humoral qualities
"hot" and "dry"; and (2) the right side of the body is hotter
than the left. I suspect Delaunay's (1874) identification of
the left brain with masculine thought processes does not
represent so great a break with the past as Mittwoch
suggests, for it did not replace but simply complemented
a belief in the masculinity of the right side of the body.
I do not know what the implications of this might be,
but perhaps it is worth noting - in light of Mittwoch's
comments — that Delaunay's interest in the "comparative
biology" of right and left was initially aroused when, as an
ambulance attendant in the Franco-Prussian war, he
began to be struck by the fact that the left foot of soldiers
suffering from frostbite was almost always more severely
afflicted than the right. He relayed this curious fact to
Brown-Sequard, who assured him that, according to
certain researches of German origin, the right side of the
body did tend to be hotter than the left.
It is no doubt true, as Bradshaw argues, that
dichotomies serve a heuristic function in science; they are
a way of playing "Twenty Questions with Nature." How
far, however, does the "dichotomania" that has charac-
terized the last 100 years of neurology represent a disin-
terested interpretation of data according to classical
inductive methods, and how far does it represent some-
thing of quite a different order - something, as Corballis
eloquently urges, in the realm of myth and metaphor?
According to Needham (1979), simple relations of opposi-
tion serve as one of the most basic resources in the
articulation of symbolic or mythical categories. Linking
categories by antithetical pairs is not merely a way of
imposing order onto experience. As a rule, linked pairs
are perceived not only as opposites, but as unequal in
rank or worth. Consequently, dual opposition systems
are also a way societies enshrine certain moral and social
discriminations, particularly between things judged
sacred and things judged profane.
During the second half of the 19th century, the rise of
evolutionary theory had made it possible to assign sub-
human ontological status to the less desirable members of
one's society (women, nonwhites, madmen, etc.); and to
set up an opposition between this (right hemisphere/
profane) category of subhuman individuals, and the (left
hemisphere/sacred) category within which one placed
one's self. Even as one tried to affirm one's superiority
and distinctiveness, however, there lingered an uneasy
awareness that one's human status was by no means
immutable. The (left-hemisphere) processes of civiliza-
tion and progress could be reversed; the (right-hemi-
sphere) beast from whom one was descended still lurked
within. Do we have here at least a partial explanation for
the potency of the 19th century's vision of madness as a
struggle for control between the two brains?
Corballis has identified some of the ways in the which
the left/right dichotomy continues in our own time to
carry the burden of social, political, and philosophical
concerns. He also points out, however, that just because
perceptions of the two brain halves seem to be influenced
by broader human concerns, this does not mean that they
do not also have some basis in neurological truth. Along
these lines, Marshall suggests that the laterality theories
most apt to reflect wider sociological constraints are those
that have only a broadly tangential relationship to the data
that purportedly sustain them. Although he readily
admits that a great deal of nonsense has been said in
recent years about localizing the yin and the yang, he
affirms that cerebral complementary specialization is a
fact - and that its discovery has been one of the (almost)
unqualified success stories of cognitive neuropsychology.
Milner disagrees. He finds no unequivocal evidence for
any of the current functional distinctions between the two
hemispheres (including the classic verbal versus nonver-
bal/visuospatial dichotomy), and he suggests that "the
search for an explanatory dichotomy for the cerebral
hemispheres is totally misguided." Smith is less emphatic
but equally skeptical. He feels that static, dichotomous
models of the brain gloss over the complexities inherent
in the phenomenon of brain plasticity, and - following in
the tradition not only of Hughlings Jackson but of such
early 20th-century neurologists as Carl von Monakow and
Kurt Goldstein - he makes a plea for a return to a more
dynamic, evolutionary approach to higher brain function-
ing. It is intriguing to me, as an historian of science, that
these experts, presumably responding to the same pool
of data, can disagree so widely, not only over what
they know, but over the very principles of their enter-
prise.
5. Building bridges between the past and present
There are two basic ways in which past scientific ventures
may be related to apparently similar ones in modern
times. 1 will call the first (with apologies to Barbara
Tuchman) the "distant-mirror" approach. This approach
aims to juxtapose a piece of the past against a piece of the
present, and it hopes in this way to change and deepen
the latter's perception of itself. The second - and more
difficult - I will call the bridge-building approach. This
approach tries to come to terms with the dynamics of
scientific change - to show how the past turned into the
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present. It lays stress on drawing a clear distinction
between ideas that are similar because of a direct line of
influence and ideas that, like Old and New World
monkeys, have many important features in common but
nevertheless seem to have evolved independently of each
other.
Clearly, bridge building is an important part of the
historian's task. Nevertheless, I cannot accept Oppen-
heimer's claim that, because I took the distant-mirror
approach in the target article, I defeated my own aim of
"atempt[ing] to define the relevance of older ideas to
present research." One cannot speak intelligently about
continuities and discontinuities between a past and pre-
sent research tradition before one has struggled to come
to terms with the literature and intellectual climate asso-
ciated with the former. Contra Eling, I do not believe a
cursory "Wigan-Broca-Wernicke-Jackson" review at
the beginning of a research paper comes close to convey-
ing an accurate sense of this earlier tradition. My aim in
the target article was therefore to present a broader, more
synthetic, and, one hopes, more contextually sensitive
picture of the 19th-century literature than I believe has
hitherto been available.
I agree with Eling that the goal of contextualization
might have been met more successfully if had managed to
make more links with the wider sociocultural ethos
(although surely I made some). Yet - given the fact that
the article was already well over the suggested maximum
length - I wonder how I could have managed to do so
convincingly and still have covered the same range of
material. As things are, Eling criticizes me for having
thrown too much work into a single heap, thereby
presenting a "caricature of what laterality studies are
about in general." I presume he means that I was not
critical enough in separating what he would consider the
sheep from the goats. But is this properly the historian's
task? In general, my aim was to be neither more nor less
critical than the 19th century itself, and to avoid hindsight
judgments that - as Bradshaw has put it - tend
unhelpfully either to applaud our predecessors for being
so clever or to point out smugly from our superior vantage
point how wrong they were.
Returning to the goal of contextualization, obviously in
a full-scale study, much more could have been done. I
could have spoken, for example, of the way in which a
neurologist's stand on language localization in the
mid-19th century served as a litmus test of his politics and
ethics (cf. Hecaen & Lanteri-Laura 1977:54); of the
implications of the fact that Broca's Societe d'An-
thropologie was known in French science as a focus for
left-wing, anticlerical activity in French science (Ham-
mond 1980); of the way in which ideas in physiology about
division of labor and specialization of function were influ-
enced by ideas current in political economy at the time
(Schweber 1980:250-56); of the sociological and institu-
tional context of Charcot's dramatic metalloscopy and
hemihypnosis experiments (cf. Owen 1971); of scientific
naturalism, evolutionary theory, the Franco-Prussian
war, the literary tradition on man as a soul "divided
against himself," and so on.
In a full-scale study, I could also have attempted some
bridge building. Bradshaw asks whether interest in 19th-
century ideas was maintained throughout the first half of
the 20th century, or whether there was a hiatus. Op-
penheimer wants to know which 19th-century ideas were
effective in stimulating 20th-century concepts and which
were not. My impression is that there was a hiatus and
that much of the older literature fell into neglect or
disrepute. Consequently (with certain qualifications), it
was not effective in stimulating much of the 20th-century
literature. The latter seems quite clearly to have taken its
chief point of origin from certain clinical literature of the
1940s and 1950s, and especially from the animal "split-
brain" and human commissurotomy work of the late
1950s and 1960s. In attempting to understand how this
discontinuity between the two research traditions might
have happened, I have experimented with a number of
historiographic approaches (Kuhnian paradigm shifts;
sociocultural levels of explanation; the changing fortunes
of key historical figures such as Freud and Charcot1). I
have paid particular attention to two key developments:
(1) a growing conceptual and institutional rift between the
clinical world of brain malfunction (neurology) and the
clinical world of personality disorder (psychiatry), which
led to the resurrection of an at least heuristic Carte-
sianism within medicine; and (2) a strong, if not absolute,
swing in neurology away from the localizationist views of
the 19th century toward a more unitary, equipotential
view of cerebral functioning.
Leary and Murray have suggested some other
approaches to explaining the discontinuity between the
19th-century literature and its 20th-century analogue.
Leary, most intriguingly, finds an answer in the norms of
science itself- in the Baconian clarion call to study nature
instead of books. Because functional illiteracy in science
is tolerated (and perhaps even encouraged), scientists are
constantly losing sight of those parts of their discipline's
history upon which they are no longer building. I can only
concur with Leary's conclusion that this has the effect of
sustaining the illusion of linear progress in science while
at the same time probably reducing the rate of true
progress.
Murray's argument is complementary to Leary's. He
focuses on the people who play a key role in determining
how much of a discipline's past will be remembered and
which parts: the textbook writers. I am generally
convinced by his argument, but I am just a little puzzled
about James. It is not true that James failed to indulge in
speculation about the two hemispheres other than to
discuss their role in language mediation. In fact, he
cautiously put forward the view that, in certain forms of
personality dissociation, "the systems thrown out of gear
with each other are contained one in the right and the
other in the left hemisphere" (1890, 1:399-400). In float-
ing this idea, he laid particular stress on Myers's (1885)
views on automatic writing, but referred as well to
Maudsley's "instructive" (1889) essay on the double
brain, and Luys's (1888) article in Encephale. Wigan's
book had been cited earlier (p. 390). Why did this passage
make so little impression?
6. Comparisons between old views and new
Responding gamely to my distant-mirror presentation of
the 19th-century literature on hemisphere differences
and brain duality, Cernatfek, Bradshaw, and Gruzelier
all attempt in various ways to compare old views and new,
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or to look at the latter in the light of the former. Bradshaw
compiles an illuminating list of recurrent themes but
warns that we are really in no position to say how far such
parallelisms might be due to similarities in the 19th- and
20th-century Zeitgeist, the constraints of external reality,
or the modelling propensities of the human mind. Cer-
iitiCek is inclined to conclude gloomily that, because we
are still today pursuing some of the same sorts of studies
and disagreeing over many of the same sorts of conceptual
issues, the "spiral of growth of human knowledge" must,
after all, be "a rather low one."
Perhaps CernaCek is right, but in all fairness I do not
believe one can disregard the impact of genuine meth-
odological advance upon the spiral of human knowledge,
even within an ahistorical science. Improved meth-
odology can define the borders of disagreement more
sharply than may have been possible in the past, and it
can help insure that what may have been a largely
unsuccessful venture in one era might prove to have more
lasting results in another. Only time will tell. The fact,
though, that debates over hemisphere anatomical asym-
metries (for example) now center on data derived from
computer topography rather than from craniology or the
weighing of brain halves at least offers the hope that
modern studies may be less prone to the sort of uncon-
scious bias (Gould 1981) that plagued a fair portion of the
19th-century work.
In addition, as Gruzelier notes, simply pointing out
similarities between research interests may obscure
differences in the conceptual framework within which
scientists interpret their results. The intellectual en-
vironment has changed considerably in the century be-
tween Luys's first (1879) suggestion that the right hemi-
sphere predominates in the mad, and Gruzelier and Flor-
Henry's (1979) collection of studies on hemisphere asym-
metries in psychopathology. Gruzelier particularly
stresses how much effort was devoted in the early 20th
century to elucidating the place of impaired linguistic
functioning in the phenomenology of schizophrenia. The
symptomatic parallels between schizophrenia and the
aphasias then made it reasonable to ask whether the
former disorder might be dependent upon left-hemi-
sphere dysfunctioning. In the target artcle I never
intended to belittle the conceptual differences between
the 19th and 20th centuries - quite the contrary. In the
passage to which Gruzelier refers, I was only asking
whether any of the older data might be interesting to
researchers today.
7. Reflections on the uses of history
If it is clear from history that positive knowledge-claims in
science interact with the wider sociocultural milieu, how
should this change one's view of contemporary work?
Eling suggests that an answer to this question would
represent a significant contribution to science's ability to
evaluate the different interpretations of laterality studies
that can be found in the current literature. Both
Greenblatt and Leary have, I think, made a start toward
providing one. The possibility is raised of a self-critical
science that consciously struggles to recognize the extra-
scientific assumptions that constrain it. It may not be able
wholly to escape them, but at least it can acknowledge
References/Harrington: History of lateralization
that they exist, and can temper its knowledge-claims
accordingly.
Of the commentators, I have the impression that
Lokhorst and possibly Marshall would be most vocal in
questioning the genuine need for such a science.
Marshall concedes that certain highly speculative forms
of theorizing may recur throughout history, but he speaks
of the "self-correcting nature of scientific argumentation"
and affirms that errors such as Gall's craniology, Burq's
metalloscopy, and Charcot's hemihypnosis "are quickly
sorted out and do not tend to recur." He does not say, but
perhaps implies, that given this inherent progressiveness
of science, there is no practical need for scientists to
remember and study such errors. I am less sure. Quite
apart from the problematic status of the traditional idea of
scientific progress in current philosophical debates,
history itself makes me wonder whether it is true that,
once errors in science are sorted out, they do not tend to
recur (for an early repudiated version of metalloscopy,
see Perkins, 1798; for hemihypnosis, see Braid,
1843:131-32, 138; for a later variation on Gall's cra-
niology employed on hysterical patients, see Sollier,
1900).
Lokhorst takes a considerably stronger stand than
Marshall. He declares that he fails to see how historical
studies have any broader significance for contemporary
research because at the end of the day, scientists are still
not absolved of their responsibility of adjudicating
between different knowledge-claims. Quite so; I am far
from suggesting that questions about the truth-value of
scientific ideas can or should be summarily reduced to
questions about their relation to the wider sociocultural
context. Suppose, though, that a scientist knows from
history that he is working in a field that is prone to certain
sorts of easy generalizations, philosophical pitfalls, and
influence from extrascientific quarters. Could he not use
this knowledge to bring into focus certain contemporary
issues and problems that would otherwise be more diffi-
cult to see? If so, there seems every reason to suppose
that a knowledge of history must, in the final analysis,
enhance his critical skills as a scientist.
NOTE
1. I share Isler & Regard's suspicion that there is a link
between the Iate-19th-century reaction against the excesses of
the Paris school of hypnosis and the earIy-20th-century aversion
to Wigan-style mental duality theories.
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